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ABSTRACT 
  This Article examines the sources of the contemporary problems associated 
with the adjudication of parental rights matters in Maine’s probate courts and 
identifies specific reforms to address both the structural and substantive law 
problems. The Article first reviews the development of Maine’s probate courts 
and their jurisdiction over parental rights matters.  It traces the expansion of 
jurisdiction over children and families from a limited role incidental to the 
administration of a decedent’s estate to the current scope—a range of matters that 
may result in the limitation, suspension, or termination of the rights of living 
parents.  Maine probate courts now adjudicate questions implicating parental 
rights in a wide range of scenarios.  However, the basic structure of Maine’s 
probate courts has remained unchanged since 1855.  Maine law assigns exclusive 
jurisdiction of these often complex and contentious matters to a non-centralized 
group of county-based courts, each of which has limited resources and a single, 
part-time elected judge who usually has a busy law practice as his or her primary 
job. 
  This Article provides a close examination of the central issues involved in the 
parental rights matters currently adjudicated in the probate courts under the Maine 
Probate Code.  It analyzes the challenges presented by the probate courts’ 
exclusive jurisdiction of these matters, including the incidence of conflicts and 
confusion when the Maine District Court has addressed a parental rights issue 
involving a child who is also the focus of a probate court proceeding, as well as 
the limitations presented by the probate courts’ structure and operation.  Finally, 
this Article discusses potential reforms aimed at improving the adjudication of 
parental rights matters under the Maine Probate Code (MPC) including eliminating 
the “split jurisdiction” between probate and district courts, structural changes to 
probate courts to ensure fairness and due process for all participants, and 
substantive reforms to the MPC provisions concerning parental rights so that the 
law will better reflect the contexts in which these cases arise today and address the 
needs of the families involved in these cases.  Combined, these proposed reforms 
would mitigate the acute problems described in the Article to better serve both the 
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courts that must adjudicate these difficult cases and the families at the center of 
them. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Probate courts are primarily associated with death, and specifically with the 
administration of decedents’ estates,1 but they have an important role with respect 
to children’s interests as well.  Since their establishment in 1821, Maine probate 
courts’ jurisdiction has included matters addressing the property and care of a 
decedent’s surviving children.2  The Maine Legislature enlarged slightly the courts’ 
authority with respect to children during the 19th century to include exclusive 
jurisdiction over adoptions and name changes when it enacted those statutes.3  Over 
time, these courts have overseen an increasing number of cases involving the care, 
support, and custody of children who have living parents.  Most significantly, 
during the last thirty-five years, the scope and use of Maine’s minor guardianship 
laws have expanded substantially, and the Maine Legislature has granted probate 
courts the jurisdiction to determine paternity and terminate parents’ rights in the 
context of adoption proceedings.4  At the same time, pressures on Maine’s child 
protection system have led to the frequent use of minor guardianships to address 
concerns about child welfare and an increasing number of adoption and related 
proceedings.5   
As a result of this combination of factors, Maine probate courts now adjudicate 
questions implicating parental rights in a wide range of scenarios.  However, the 
basic structure of Maine’s probate courts has remained unchanged since 1855.  
Maine law assigns exclusive jurisdiction of these often complex and contentious 
matters to a non-centralized group of county-based courts, each of which has 
limited resources and a single, part-time elected judge who usually has a busy law 
practice as his or her primary job.6  These courts have a very limited relationship to 
the state court system, and they are entirely unconnected with the Maine Judicial 
Branch’s Family Division.  The Maine Legislature established the Family Division 
in 1997 to “provide a system of justice that is responsive to the needs of families 
and the support of their children” and to oversee all divorce, child protection, 
parental rights and responsibilities, juvenile, and other matters concerning 
children.7  Maine’s split jurisdiction system, perhaps unique in the country,8 
precludes coordination and consolidation of matters involving the same child in the 
                                                                                                     
 1.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “probate” refers to: “The judicial procedure by 
which a testamentary document is established to be a valid will; the proving of a will to the satisfaction 
of the court.”  Probate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  The word “probate” derives from 
the Latin probare meaning “to try, test, approve, prove.” Probate, WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 1806 (2002).  For a history of probate courts generally, stemming from their origins in 
English Ecclesiastical Courts’ jurisdiction over decedents’ estates, see Eugene M. Haertle, The History 
of the Probate Court, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 546 (1962).  
 2.  See infra notes 25–48 and accompanying text. 
 3.  See infra notes 49–55 and accompanying text. 
 4.  See infra notes 56–101 and accompanying text. 
 5.  See infra notes 159–162, 213–214 and accompanying text. 
 6.  4 M.R.S.A. § 301 (Supp. 2014); ME. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1855). 
 7.  4 M.R.S.A. § 183 (Supp. 2014). 
 8.  See infra notes 233–234 and accompanying text. 
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Family Division of the Maine District Court and a county probate court—a judge in 
one court system cannot adopt, modify, or terminate an order from the other 
system.  This common scenario leads to confusion, conflicting orders, 
inefficiencies, and additional stress on a child and family that are already in crisis.9 
In addition to these structural and jurisdictional problems, the Maine Probate 
Code (MPC) provisions addressing parental rights—specifically guardianship, 
change of name, and adoption (including related petitions to establish or terminate 
parental rights)—do not reflect the contemporary use of these laws as private “child 
protection” remedies; that is, to intervene in a parent-child relationship based on 
concerns of potential parental abuse, neglect, or other forms of “unfitness.”  Rather, 
the MPC still reflects the “orphan model” of guardianships and adoptions, where 
there is little need to consider the rights of living parents or broader policy goals of 
preserving parent-child relationships.10  For these reasons, the probate courts 
adjudicating these MPC matters implicating parental rights can fall short of 
ensuring due process and protecting the fundamental rights of parents. 
This Article examines the sources of the contemporary problems associated 
with the adjudication of parental rights matters in Maine’s probate courts and 
identifies specific reforms to address both the structural and substantive law 
problems.  The Article first reviews the development of Maine’s probate courts 
and their jurisdiction over parental rights matters.11  It traces the expansion of 
jurisdiction over children and families from a limited role incidental to the 
administration of a decedent’s estate to the current scope—a range of matters that 
may result in the limitation, suspension, or termination of the rights of living 
parents.  Next, in Part III, the Article provides a closer examination of the central 
issues involved in the parental rights matters currently adjudicated in the probate 
courts under the MPC.  I then analyze some of the challenges presented by the 
probate courts’ exclusive jurisdiction of these matters.  These include the incidence 
of conflicts and confusion when the District Court has addressed a parental rights 
issue involving a child who is also the focus of a probate court proceeding, as well 
as the limitations presented by the probate courts’ structure and operation.12  
In Part IV, I discuss potential reforms aimed at improving the adjudication of 
parental rights matters under the MPC.  First, the Article will advocate, as an initial 
step, eliminating the “split jurisdiction” of family matters between district and 
probate courts by expanding the District Court’s jurisdiction over MPC parental 
rights matters and requiring that court to hear all matters concerning parental rights 
                                                                                                     
 9.  See infra notes 232–270 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See infra notes 127–208 and accompanying text.  Briefly, I use the term “orphan model” herein 
to refer to guardianship and adoption laws that assume that the child at the center of such matters has no 
living parents, and therefore the child’s primary need is for a permanent legal tie to a nonparent 
caregiver, rather than maintaining a relationship with one or both living parents.  
 11.  I have avoided using the term “family law” in this Article, as there are of course many types of 
proceedings that involve legal disputes between family members.  Indeed, most of the matters that 
Maine probate courts address could be seen as family law, defined broadly, such as a conflict among a 
decedent’s heirs regarding disposition of an estate or where a family member seeks to be appointed the 
guardian or conservator of an allegedly incapacitated adult family member.  18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 5-301 to 
5-614 (2012 & Supp. 2014).  However, the focus of this Article is on those matters that concern the 
care, support, and custody of minor children and other associated parental rights. 
 12.  See infra notes 210–300 and accompanying text. 
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of a child.13  In addition, I identify a number of necessary, specific changes to the 
probate courts’ structure and operations to improve the handling of parental rights 
matters that remain in those courts and to ensure fairness and due process for all 
participants.14  Finally, I outline a number of potential substantive reforms to the 
MPC provisions concerning parental rights so that the law will better reflect the 
contexts in which these cases arise today and address the needs of the families 
involved in these cases.15  Combined, these proposed reforms would mitigate the 
acute problems described in the Article to better serve both the courts that must 
adjudicate these difficult cases and the families at the center of them. 
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF MAINE’S PROBATE COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION 
OVER PARENTAL RIGHTS MATTERS  
The current jurisdictional alignment of state and probate courts regarding 
parental rights matters is highly problematic in several important respects.16  
However, such alignment is not by design.  Rather it is the consequence, largely 
unintended, of two distinct developments: (1) the gradual expansion of the county 
probate courts’ jurisdiction beyond those matters directly associated with estate 
administration to include a range of cases directly or indirectly implicating parental 
rights; and (2) substantial reforms to the other Maine courts leading to their 
unification in the Maine Judicial Branch, and the ongoing reorganization within the 
Judicial Branch to eliminate fractured jurisdiction, create efficiencies, and develop 
systems to meet the needs of judges and litigants.  This section will focus primarily 
on telling the first story; the history of Maine’s state courts is complex and has 
been explored by others,17 but I will mention important developments as they bear 
on the central questions considered here. 
A. Probate Courts’ Early Statutory Authority Regarding Minors 
The Maine Legislature established the basic structure for Maine’s county-
based probate courts, with each court having a single judge and a register, in 1821, 
soon after the state’s founding.18  It modeled the courts on the probate courts of 
Massachusetts (of which Maine was a part until achieving statehood in 1820).19  
                                                                                                     
 13.  See infra notes 352–371 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See infra notes 372–387 and accompanying text. 
 15.  See infra notes 388–451 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See Part III, infra. 
 17.  See, e.g., DAVID Q. WHITTIER, HISTORY OF THE COURT SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF MAINE 
(MAINE STATE ARCHIVES) (1971); ROBERT TREAT WHITEHOUSE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL AND 
COMMERCIAL HISTORY OF MAINE.  The history of Maine courts is remarkable for the number of courts 
(e.g. town, police, municipal, Common Pleas, Sessions, Commissioners, District, Superior, etc.) 
established and abolished during the State’s first 150 years.  Id. at 4–29.  See also EDWARD F. DOW, 
COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN MAINE: PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZATION (submitted to Maine Legislative 
Research Committee) 17–18, 28–35 (1952) (describing county and municipal courts in operation at that 
time).   
 18.  WHITTIER, supra note 17, at 6–8 (citing Ch. LI (1821) Me. Laws 191). 
 19.  WHITEHOUSE, supra note 17, at 1153.  The Massachusetts county-based probate courts were 
established in 1691 with the founding of the Massachusetts Bay province and the grant of new powers to 
the governor. Thomas E. Atkinson, The Development of the Massachusetts Probate System, 42 MICH. L. 
REV. 425, 440–41 (1943).  Although most colonial courts were part of a centralized judicial authority, 
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Maine probate judges were appointed by the Governor until 1855, when, pursuant 
to a constitutional amendment, the office of probate judge became a part-time 
position elected by the citizens of the county.20  The basic structure of the probate 
court system has remained remarkably unchanged since the mid-nineteenth 
century.  It still features sixteen part-time elected judges, one per county, who 
operate independently and with no central administrative authority.  Appeals are 
taken to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.21 
Maine probate courts’ jurisdiction has always been “special and limited” to 
those matters specifically granted pursuant to statute.22  Accounts of the early 
development of the Massachusetts probate courts discuss their jurisdiction only in 
terms of administration of decedents’ estates and disposition of their property, 
which was consistent with the law and practice of the Colonial era.23  Maine 
adopted that narrow scope for its probate courts as well.  For this reason, Maine’s 
probate courts’ involvement with minors has, for most of Maine’s history, almost 
exclusively concerned the property of partially or fully orphaned children.24 
                                                                                                     
requiring citizens to travel to a single centralized location for the administration of all estates was not 
ideal. Accordingly, the colonial governor appointed a “deputy or surrogate” in each county as “‘judge of 
probate of wills and the granting of letters of administrations,’ sometimes-particularly later-called 
simply ‘judge of probate.’”  Id. at 441; see also WHITEHOUSE, supra note 17, at 1149.  The position of 
“register” was created to conduct the clerical work and maintain the records of such offices.  Id.  After 
Massachusetts became a state, the legislature established the Probate Court in 1784, setting its 
jurisdiction and providing that all appeals would go to the Supreme Judicial Court, which would serve 
as the Supreme Court of Probate.  Atkinson at 447; WHITEHOUSE, supra note 17, at 1151.  See also 
Peters v. Peters, 62 Mass. 529, 539–44 (1851) (describing history of Massachusetts probate courts). 
 20.  Chapter 273 of the Resolves of 1855 (codified as Me. Const. art. VI, § 6): 
Section 6. Judges and registers of probate shall be elected by the people of their 
respective counties, by a plurality of the votes given in, at the biennial election on the 
Tuesday following the first Monday of November, and shall hold their offices for 4 years, 
commencing on the first day of January next after their election.  Vacancies occurring in 
said offices by death, resignation or otherwise, shall be filled by election in manner 
aforesaid at the November election, next after their occurrence; and in the meantime, the 
Governor may fill said vacancies by appointment, and the persons so appointed shall hold 
their offices until the first day of January next after the election aforesaid. 
The Resolve provided for the mode of election of several different public offices: “Shall the 
Constitution be Amended as Proposed by a Resolve of the Legislature Providing that the Judges of 
Probate, Registers of Probate, Sheriffs and Municipal and Police Judges shall be Chosen by the People, 
and also Providing that Land Agent, Attorney General and Adjutant General Shall be Chosen by the 
Legislature . . .” Id. (http://legislature.maine.gov/9203/).  Professor Dow credited “the spirit of 
Jacksonian democracy” sweeping through the country during the second quarter of the 19th century as 
the basis for moving away from “centralized control” and providing for more “direct election.”  DOW, 
supra note 17, at 5.  See also MARSHALL TINKLE, THE MAINE CONSTITUTION 10 (2013) (noting that the 
effect of this amendment was to curtail the Governor’s appointment power). 
 21.  4 M.R.S.A. § 7 (1989); 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-308 (2012).  From 1929 until 1979, the Superior 
Court sat as the “Supreme Court of Probate,” with jurisdiction to conduct de novo review of probate 
court decisions.  P.L. 1929, ch. 141, § 7 (codified originally at R.S. ch. 75 § 31 (1930) and later as 4 
M.R.S.A. § 401).  The Supreme Judicial Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction was restored as part of the 
enactment of the Maine Probate Code.  P.L.1979, ch. 540, § 7–B (effective Jan. 1, 1981). 
 22.  4 M.R.S.A. § 251–252 (1989); Appeal of Waitt, 140 Me. 109, 34 A.2d 476, 477 (1943); 
Overseers of Poor of Fairfield v. Gullifer, 49 Me. 360, 361 (1860). 
 23.  See generally Atkinson, supra note 19.  
 24.  This focus was consistent with national trends.  See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S 
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 64–68 
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The Maine Legislature made appointing and supervising the guardians of 
minors an explicit part of probate courts’ authority at the time of their 
establishment.25  A “guardian” is a person appointed by a court to serve as a 
“substitute parent”26 by exercising, as described in a 1921 treatise, “custody and 
control of the person or estate, or both of an infant, whose youth, inexperience, and 
mental weakness disqualify him for acting for himself in the ordinary affairs of 
life.”27  However, the purposes and scope of minor guardianships from that initial 
enactment until the adoption of the MPC in 197928 were far different from those of 
most guardianships today.  The pre-MPC statutory provisions regarding the 
appointment and duties of such guardians established their primary role consistent 
with what the MPC today refers to as a “conservator”: to oversee the property 
inherited by the minor children of a decedent.29  Indeed, before reforms improved 
women’s status and property rights, a father could, through testamentary 
appointment, name a male guardian to oversee a surviving child’s property, even if 
the father was survived by the child’s mother.30  
This limited focus of a “guardian of the estate” is distinct from that of a 
“guardian of the person,” who was appointed to provide care for the minor, a 
position that was quite rare in the early days of American probate law.31  Orphaned 
children without estates were cared for by others pursuant to informal 
                                                                                                     
(1994).  Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the court assigned jurisdiction of minor guardianships was (and 
often still is) referred to as an “orphans’ court.”  HASSELTINE BYRD TAYLOR, LAW OF GUARDIAN AND 
WARD 19 (1935); see, e.g., The History of the Orphans Court, PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON 
PLEAS, ORPHANS DIVISION, http://courts.phila.gov/common-pleas/orphans/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015) 
(noting 1682 statute establishing the court “to inspect and take care of the estates, usage, and 
employment of orphans, which shall be called the Orphans’ Court . . . that care may be taken for those, 
that are not able to take care for themselves.”).  In Colonial America, most laws defined an “orphan” as 
a “child whose father had died, even if the child had a surviving mother.”  MASON supra at 18. 
 25.  P.L. 1821, ch. 51, § 1 (including in probate courts’ jurisdiction “appointing guardians to minors 
and other persons”).  
 26.  TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 3.  The terms “guardian” and “guardianship” can have a range of 
meanings in different contexts, and they are sometimes used interchangeably with the legal concept of 
“custody,” including with reference to parental rights.  Id. at 165; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 1, at 822-23 (describing the many different legal meanings of the term “guardian.”).  In this 
Article, I use the term to refer to a nonparent who has been appointed by a court to oversee certain or all 
aspects of the care and/or property of a minor.  The person, adult or minor, who is the subject of a 
guardianship is commonly referred to as the “ward” of the guardian.  Id. at 1720. 
 27.  TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 3 (quoting JAMES SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 283 (1921)). 
 28.  P.L. 1979, ch. 540.  
 29.  P.L. 1821, ch. 51, §§ 46-48. Until the enactment of the MPC in 1979, Maine law did not 
distinguish between “guardians” and “conservators” for minors.  Me. Probate Law Revision Comm’n, 
Report of the Commission’s Study and Recommendations Concerning Maine Probate Law 45, 511 
(1978) [hereinafter MPLRC 1978 Report].  Under the MPC, a conservator’s role is limited to overseeing 
the property of the ward, whether the person is a minor or an incapacitated adult.  18-A M.R.S.A.  
§§ 5-401-5-432 (2012).  A court can appoint a person as both a guardian and conservator of a minor. 
MITCHELL & HUNT, MAINE PROBATE PROCEDURE: GUIDE TO OFFICIAL AND RECOMMENDED FORMS  
§ 5-33 at § 5.06 (2014); Maine Probate Form PP-106, available at http://www.cumberlandcounty.org/ 
DocumentCenter/View/925. 
 30.  MASON, supra note 24, at 19, 54–66. 
 31.  See id. at 66 (noting the development of two forms of guardianship in the 19th century); 
TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 26, 110, 168 (noting that, from the Colonial era through to the publication of 
that study in 1935, courts generally only appointed guardians for orphaned minors with property). 
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arrangements; formal appointments as guardians in such circumstances were 
unusual (and occurred only when the petitioner had the funds to pursue such 
appointment).32  The early reported opinions of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court 
reflect this largely property-oriented role for guardians as well.33 
Because guardianships were primarily limited to overseeing children’s 
property, any living parent of a minor ward retained most of her parental rights.34  
The common law view is that parents are the “natural guardians” of their 
children.35  Thus, guardianship statutes provided that, even if another person were 
appointed to oversee a minor’s property, the “care of the person and education of 
the minor” were expressly left to the minor’s father “if alive and competent to 
transact his own business,” and, if not, to the mother “while unmarried and thus 
competent.”36  As the Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted in a 1924 opinion: “To 
the natural guardians the law commits the child’s care and custody, even if he has a 
guardian appointed by the probate court.  The probate guardian as such (and other 
than in exceptional cases) has to do only with the ward’s property.”37   
While the guardianship statute granted probate courts the authority to assign 
care and custody rights to the guardian “if [the judge] deems it for the welfare of 
                                                                                                     
 32.  TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 157 (noting that, in 19th century United States, unless a child 
inherited property, a guardian would not have been formally appointed by a court; rather, the child 
would be cared for through family arrangements); id. at 26, 168 (noting that matters concerning 
“guardianship of the person” were not usually the subject of petitions unless there was a dispute between 
two people who wanted custody of the child, in part because of the significant expense of bringing such 
petitions).  Alternatively, abused, neglected, or abandoned children (generally from poor families) could 
become “wards of the court” pursuant to dependency proceedings; id. at 167, often ending up in public 
or charity-based orphanages.  LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY, NEGLECT, AND 
ABUSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 23–30 (1997). From the Colonial era through the 19th century, a 
dependent child could also be “bound” or “put out” to a master. Id. at 10–11, 37–51.  Any of these 
outcomes were possible even where the child’s mother survived the father, if the mother had insufficient 
financial means or was found to be “incompetent” to care for the child.  MASON, supra note 24, at 20. 
 33.  See, e.g., Drinkwater v. Gray, 2 Me. 163, 164 (1822); Haskell v. Haskell, 2 Me. 157 (1822); 
Bailey v. Rogers, 1 Me. 186 (1821).  Similarly, probate courts have long had the authority to appoint, 
“upon the application of his friends, relatives or creditors, a guardian, ‘to take care of the person and 
estate’ of one said to be an idiot, lunatic or distracted person.”  Hovey v. Harmon, 49 Me. 269, 273 
(1861) (citing R.S. ch. 51, § 49 (1821)).  In 1879, the Maine Legislature reworked the original laws 
regarding minor guardianships to set out some additional guidance for the probate courts’ authority in 
making such appointments.  The guardianship law still referred primarily to the management of the 
ward’s estate rather than exercising parental rights.  See. P.L. 1879, ch. 102 (codified as R.S. ch. 67, § 1 
(1883)). 
 34.  Guardianship of children with living parents became less common once the statute provided 
widows the right to oversee their minor children’s property.  R.S. Ch. 67, § 3 (1883).  The history and 
evolution of women’s ability to control their and their children’s property on the death of a husband is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but it does bear on the development of minor guardianship law, 
particularly with respect to testamentary guardianships when a parent names a guardian in his will.  See 
MASON, supra note 24, at 18–21, 50–54, 65–67; TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 25. 
 35.  Legault v. Levesque, 150 Me. 192, 193, 107 A.2d 493, 495 (1954); MASON, supra note 24, at 
18; TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 31; R.S. ch. 67, § 3 (1883) (providing that a parent may act as a guardian 
as long as he or she is “competent”). 
 36.  R.S. Ch. 67, § 3 (1883).  This provision was revised in 1895 to apply the same standard to both 
fathers and mothers; it provided that fathers and mothers jointly retained the rights to care and education 
if they were alive and competent and to the surviving parent if one had died.  P.L. 1895, ch. 43, § 1 
(codified in R.S. ch. 69, § 3 (1903)). 
 37.  Shaw v. Small, 124 Me. 36, 36, 125 A. 496, 498 (1924).  
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the minor,”38 such authority was, as the court observed, only used “in exceptional 
cases.”39  The paucity of reported guardianship cases applying the language about 
assigning authority for the “care of the person and education” of minor children to 
a non-parent confirms that such authority was rarely used and remained undefined.  
This is not surprising since the practice of state intervention in a family to remove a 
child from one or both parents on the basis of parental abuse and neglect did not 
begin until the Progressive era.40  Such “dependency” proceedings generally only 
took place in juvenile courts.41  As one scholar noted in 1935: “The probate court 
has been traditionally interested in property, not child welfare.”42  Indeed, prior to 
the enactment of the MPC, there are few references in Maine case law to 
appointment of a guardian for children with one or more living parents, as there 
was no clear statutory basis for a non-parent to seek such appointment unless a 
child had substantial property in need of control, which few non-orphans did.  
For example, in the 1871 case Peacock v. Peacock, the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court noted that appointment of a guardian for a two-year-old girl may be 
appropriate where her father was deceased and her mother lived out of state; it 
reasoned: “an infant of the tender age of two years, a resident of this State, should 
not be left a mere waif without any one to care for and protect it.”43  The Law 
Court nonetheless noted that the child’s mother was entitled to notice before the 
court could grant the petition appointing her uncle as guardian.44  That case was 
cited as the primary authority more than eighty years later in the 1954 opinion in 
Legault v. Levesque, in which the Law Court held that a grandmother’s petition for 
guardianship of a minor could not proceed unless it “allege[d] the incompetency of 
the [surviving father]” as a basis to overcome the father’s parental rights to care for 
his children.45  
In the only reported opinion dating prior to the enactment of the MPC in which 
a court appointed a guardian for a minor with living parents on the basis of a 
child’s welfare, the Law Court regarded such decision as being within a court’s 
“sound judgment and discretion” and that “the welfare of the child is the main and 
                                                                                                     
 38.  R.S. Ch. 69, § 3 (1903). 
 39. Shaw v. Small, 124 Me. at 36, 125 A. at 498. 
 40.  MASON, supra note 24, at 100–05; ASHBY, supra note 32, at 79–83; see TAYLOR, supra note 
24, at 35 (“The acknowledgement of child welfare as a state responsibility, although relatively new, now 
colors the concept of natural rights of parents in their children.”). 
 41. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 167–70. 
 42.  Id. at 170. 
 43.  Peacock v. Peacock, 61 Me. 211, 214 (1871). 
 44.  Id.  The Law Court referenced the statutory provision at R.S. ch. 67, § 3 (1883) granting a 
mother oversight of the “care of the person and education of the minor” where the child’s father has 
died, and the court clearly regarded this as conferring a right that could not be removed without 
affording due process of law.  Id.  
 45.  Legault v. Levesque, 150 Me. 192, 195, 107 A.2d 493, 495 (1954) (“Sec. 3, Chapter 145, 
R.S.1944 . . . declares ‘the care of the person and the education of the minor shall be jointly with the 
father and mother, if competent, or if one has deceased, with the survivor, if competent,’ and the Justice 
hearing the case must, in addition, do what ‘he deems . . . for the welfare of the [child].’”); see also 
TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 33–35 (discussing early 20th century courts’ approach to claims for custody 
or guardianship by nonparents where “either or both parents have, through necessity, convenience, or 
indifference, left their children in the care of another and wish to regain them after a period of time.”). 
54 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
controlling consideration.”46  In the 1905 opinion In re Dunlap, the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the appointment of a child’s grandfather as guardian “with 
the care and custody of his person.”47  Pursuant to the procedure at that time, the 
appeal before the Law Court was on “exceptions” from the Supreme Court of 
Probate, which held a hearing on the appeal from the Probate Court.  The Law 
Court concluded that the Supreme Court of Probate justice’s factual findings 
supporting such appointment—namely that “the welfare of the minor demanded his 
removal from the influences surrounding him while in the custody of his parents, 
and that they were incompetent to discharge their duty in that regard”—were not 
subject to review on appeal and there was no basis to revisit the appointment.48  
The probate courts’ jurisdiction regarding children expanded to include 
adoptions beginning in 1855, when Maine law first established legal adoption.49 
That legal process was also largely limited to orphans at first.  At the time of the 
original enactment, adoptions could occur only if a child’s parents were deceased, 
“hopelessly insane or intemperate” (in which case the court could proceed as if 
they were dead), or consented to the adoption.50  The standards for adoption 
changed gradually to expand the circumstances under which a court could grant an 
adoption in the absence of consent by a living parent.  In 1867, the provision 
regarding adoption of a minor eliminated the requirement for consent by a parent 
who had not been awarded custody of the minor in a divorce or if the judge 
determined that such non-consenting parent is “unfit to have custody of the 
child.”51  However, there are no reported court opinions applying this language to 
provide insight into how frequently and in what contexts courts used it.52 
                                                                                                     
 46.  In re Dunlap, 100 Me. 397, 397, 61 A. 704, 704 (1905). 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id.  
 49.  P.L. 1855, Ch. 189, § 1.  Massachusetts had adopted its first adoption statute only five years 
earlier, which served as a leading model for other states.  PETER CONN, ADOPTION IN AMERICA: A 
BRIEF SOCIAL and CULTURAL HISTORY 73–74 (2013).  Until that time, most adoptions in the United 
States were either informal or made through private laws.  See id.; see also MASON, supra note 24, at 
73; Christine Adamec, Introduction: A Brief History of Adoption, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION 
xxi, xxiv (3d ed. 2007).  
 50.  P.L. 1855, ch. 189, §§ 2, 8.  The consent of the minor was also required if he or she were over 
the age of 14.  Id. § 3.  If a minor did not have living parents to give consent, then a probate court could 
appoint someone to act as the minor’s “next friend” for the purpose of granting or withholding consent. 
Id. § 2. See also MASON, supra note 24, at 74. 
 51.  See P.L. 1867, ch. 87 § 1 (codified at R.S. ch. 67, § 29 (1871)). The affected statute also 
indicated that consent was not required from a parent who had abandoned and failed to support the 
child.  See R.S. ch. 67, § 29 (1871).  Professor Mary Ann Mason has described the distinction, at least as 
developed during the rise of child welfare laws during the Progressive era, between the concepts of 
“parental incompetence”—“not properly caring for the everyday needs of a child”—and “parental 
unfitness”—“usually immoral behavior on the part of the mother or drunkenness on the part of either 
mother or father.”  See MASON, supra note 24, at 104.  Today, Maine case law (but not statutory law) 
uses the term “unfitness” to encompass a range of concerns about a parent’s ability to care for a child. 
See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80 (Jewel II), ¶ 11, 2 A.3d 301; In re Cody T., 2009 
ME 95, ¶ 25, 979 A.2d 81. 
 52.  Cf. Blue v. Boisvert, 143 Me. 173, 181, 57 A.2d 498, 502 (1948) (vacating contested adoption 
on basis that mother’s consent was required because she had been awarded custody in divorce 
proceeding notwithstanding finding that she was unfit and had abandoned child); Taber v. Douglass, 101 
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A related but distinct form of jurisdiction concerning children reserved for 
probate courts is the authority to change a minor’s name.  From its initial 
enactment, Maine’s adoption law permitted petitioners to seek to change the name 
of a child as part of that proceeding.53  In 1876, the Maine Legislature authorized 
probate courts to approve petitions to change the name of a minor outside of the 
adoption context, so long as the person “having the legal custody of such minor” 
had filed the petition.54  The scope and language of the name-change statute with 
respect to minors has changed little since that law’s enactment.55 
B. The Maine Legislature Expands Probate Courts’ Role over Parental Rights 
Matters 
Beginning with the enactment of the MPC in 1979, the Maine Legislature 
passed a series of laws that collectively had the effect of substantially expanding 
the role of probate courts in adjudicating questions directly implicating parental 
rights.  This expansion is perhaps most significant with respect to minor 
guardianships.  As the previous section explained, Maine guardianship law served 
primarily as a mechanism to ensure that a minor’s inherited property was 
appropriately managed until she achieved majority.  During the past thirty-five 
years, the Maine Legislature transformed this mechanism into a route for a 
nonparent to obtain parental rights of another person’s child, without formal 
involvement of the state child welfare system.  It achieved this expansion through a 
series of changes to the standards for appointment of a guardian where one or both 
of a child’s parents are still alive.  At the same time, the Maine Legislature 
expanded probate courts’ jurisdiction to terminate a parent’s rights in the context of 
an adoption proceeding, thus conveying power to these courts to substantially and 
even permanently transform the legal status of parent-child relationships. 
The Maine Probate Law Revision Commission (MPLRC) noted in its 1978 
report regarding the proposed adoption of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) in 
Maine that, at that time, the Maine statute granting authority to probate courts to 
appoint guardians for minors provided “[n]o statutory criteria . . . for determining 
when a guardian should be appointed for a minor.”56  Rather, probate courts 
assumed they had discretion to appoint guardians “under the very general criteria of 
the welfare of the child.”57  Thus, the MPC introduced into Maine law the first 
statutory criteria for appointment of guardians and thereby limited the discretion of 
probate courts in making such appointments. 
The guardianship provisions of the MPC, when initially enacted in 1980, 
permitted appointment of guardians for minors outside of the testamentary 
                                                                                                     
Me. 363, 370, 64 A. 653, 656 (1906) (vacating contested adoption based in part on fact that that probate 
court never considered fitness of nonconsenting mother as required by statute). 
 53.  See P.L. 1855, ch. 189, § 9. 
 54.  See P.L. 1876, ch. 59, § 1. The Legislature had enacted the basic name change statute three 
years earlier but that original law did not make explicit reference to name changes for minors. See P.L. 
1873, ch. 97, § 1. 
 55.  See infra Part III.A.3 (summarizing current change of name law). 
 56.  See MPLRC 1978 REPORT, supra note 29, at 504. 
 57.  Id. (citing In re Dunlap, 100 Me. 397, 61 A. 704 (1905)).  By contrast, Maine statutory law 
specified the criteria for appointment of a guardian of an adult. Id. at 505. 
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appointment context only “if all parental rights of custody have been terminated or 
suspended by circumstances or prior court order.”58  This standard, which the 
Maine Legislature derived from the UPC,59 was designed to encourage 
testamentary appointments because any such nomination took precedence over 
other potential guardians.60  It also recognized that a child’s living parents were that 
child’s natural guardians and “the proper persons to be responsible for an 
unemancipated minor” unless their rights had been terminated by a prior court 
action or other event.61 
The MPC changed existing Maine law by having a guardianship order grant a 
guardian full care of the minor, including her “person and education,” as the 
default; previously, the parents retained such rights unless a court specifically 
awarded some or all such authority to the guardian.62  In drafting those provisions, 
the MPLRC assumed that courts could allow parents to retain some rights through 
provisions authorizing “limited” guardianships or permitting courts to order “any 
other disposition of the matter that will best serve the interest of the minor.”63  In 
addition, the MPC created a distinction between a “guardian,” which was a person 
who stepped in the role of legal custodian with some or all of the powers of a 
parent (including overseeing the child’s education and health and providing a 
home), and a “conservator,” which was solely responsible for overseeing the 
management of a minor’s property, the role that had been assigned to pre-MPC 
guardians.64 
The effect of the MPC standard for appointment of a guardian where a parent 
retained parental rights was to preclude appointment even where a parent consented 
to a co-guardianship with another person.65  In cases where a parent contested the 
appointment of a guardian, the appointment language sometimes required litigation 
of the question of whether a parent’s rights had been “suspended by 
circumstances.”66  Courts interpreted such language as allowing appointment only 
on a finding that the parent had abandoned the child or was “unfit,” using as 
guidance the standard for termination of parental rights (“TPR”) under the child 
protection statute in Title 22.67 
The Maine Legislature revised the guardianship appointment provision in 1995 
                                                                                                     
 58.  See P.L. 1979, ch. 540, § 1 (codified as 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204 (1981)); In re Krystal S., 584 
A.2d 672, 675 (Me. 1991). 
 59.  See MPLRC 1978 REPORT, supra note 29, at 520–21. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 521–22. 
 62.  Id. at 522. 
 63.  Id. at 522–23 (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-207 (b) (1975)).   
 64.  Id. at 522 n.2, 555 (discussing enactment of UPC §§ 5-401 to -432). See also supra text 
accompanying note 29. 
 65.  See, e.g., In re James John L., 601 A.2d 630, 631 (Me. 1992) (affirming Probate Court’s refusal 
to appoint child’s mother’s boyfriend as limited guardian for purposes of obtaining medical insurance 
where mother’s parental rights had not been terminated or suspended). 
 66.  See 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204 (1981). 
 67.  See, e.g., Conservatorship of Justin R., 662 A.2d 232, 234 (Me. 1995) (holding that mother’s 
agreement to give primary residence to father in divorce agreement did not amount to “abandonment” of 
the children and suspension of her parental rights under 22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(1-A) (1992)); see also 
Guardianship of Zachary Z., 677 A.2d 550, 553 (Me. 1996); In re Krystal S., 584 A.2d 672, 674 (Me. 
1991); MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.01.5 at 5-22. 
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in direct response to the Law Court opinions holding that “suspended by 
circumstances” had a fairly narrow reach;68 the amendment expressly permitted the 
appointment of a guardian even where a parent unquestionably still held all 
rights.69  Such appointment could occur if the parent gives consent and the 
appointment was in the child’s best interests.70 A parent could, for example, 
consent to a co-guardianship with her partner to provide that partner with some 
form of parental rights, especially in instances where adoption was not possible 
under Maine law.71  Parties could also use a consented-to guardianship to establish 
a child’s legal residence if she is living apart from her parents, such as for purposes 
of school attendance.72 
The 1995 amendment also provided a specific basis to appoint a guardian over 
the objection of a parent with intact parental rights by authorizing a court to appoint 
a guardian where: 
[T]he court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person or persons have 
failed to respond to proper notice or a living situation has been created that is at 
least temporarily intolerable for the child even though the living situation does not 
rise to the level of jeopardy required for the final termination of parental rights, 
and that the proposed guardian will provide a living situation that is in the best 
interest of the child.73 
This new standard clearly established minor guardianship as a legal route for a 
third party to acquire parental rights of a child where the biological parents fell 
short of providing adequate care, even if the situation did not rise to a level 
requiring intervention by the State’s child welfare system.  
With these changes to the standard for appointment, the number of 
guardianship petitions increased substantially.  One probate judge noted a 300% 
increase in minor guardianship filings within the first eight years after the 1995 
amendments.74  Moreover, the character of many of these cases changed to focus 
                                                                                                     
 68.  P.L. 1995, ch. 623, § 1; Testimony of Rep. Elizabeth Mitchell, L.D. 1765, 117th Legis. 2d Reg. 
Session. 
 69.  P.L. 1995, ch. 623, § 1 (codified as 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(b)(1995)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of I.H., 2003 ME 130, 3, 834 A.2d 922 (describing petitioners for 
co-guardianship of a child as “the natural mother of I.H., age one, and the mother's domestic partner . . .  
who state that they have a committed relationship as lesbian partners.”).  Prior to In re Adoption of 
M.A., 2007 ME 123, 930 A.2d 1088, many Maine probate courts interpreted Maine law to preclude two 
unmarried people from petitioning jointly to adopt a child, see id. at ¶ 5, and therefore such couples, 
particularly same-sex couples who, at the time, were also prohibited from marrying, sought these co-
guardianships. 
 72.  See MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.01.5 at 5-21 (“Courts should be wary, however, of 
being made parties to sham guardianships by consent.  There should be a real change of residence and a 
real change of custodial authority to support a guardianship by consent.”).  Such measures are often not 
necessary if the two school districts reach an agreement regarding a child’s attendance at a school 
outside of her local district.  20-A M.R.S.A. § 5205(6)(A) (Supp. 2014). 
 73.  P.L. 1995, ch. 623, § 1 (emphasis added) (codified as 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(c) (1995)). 
 74.  See Hon. Robert M.A. Nadeau, Maine’s Probate Courts: The Other Family Law, 18 ME. B.J. 
32, 36 (2003). 
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increasingly on child welfare concerns.75  The probate judge observed that many 
petitioners were family members (grandparents, aunts, etc.) who were filing at the 
insistence or encouragement of the Maine Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS), whose child protection caseworkers often appeared at 
guardianship hearings.76 
A further expansion of the guardianship appointment standard by the 
Legislature in 2005 permitted appointment of a “de facto” guardian where the 
petitioner could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a 
“lack of consistent participation” by the non-consenting parent or legal guardian.77  
This is a distinct concept from “de facto” parent, a status recognized by the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court but reserved for a fairly narrow set of circumstances.78  
Thus, through these amendments during the twenty-five years after the enactment 
of the MPC, the Maine Legislature authorized probate courts to appoint guardians 
solely to provide care of custody of children in a wide range of settings, regardless 
of the fact that a child’s parents were alive and had full parental rights at the time 
of the appointment. 
Shortly after the enactment of the MPC, the Legislature also expanded the 
kinds of matters included within the probate courts’ jurisdiction of adoption 
petitions.  In 1981, Maine’s adoption law was amended to allow probate courts to 
terminate the parental rights of a non-consenting parent on petition of the person 
seeking the adoption.79  The “Emergency Preamble” to that enactment states that, 
under the then-current law, it was “difficult, if not impossible, to process an 
adoption without the written consent of both parents.”80  At that time, judicial 
termination of parental rights could only occur in District Court, “requiring two 
separate court actions.”81  The Legislature also noted that the adoption consent 
provisions for putative fathers lacked certain “due process requirements and equal 
protection requirements.”82 
To address those deficiencies, the emergency law provided that a petition for 
termination of parental rights could be brought in a probate court as part of an 
adoption petition and that the termination standards of the child protection statute 
                                                                                                     
 75.  See e.g., In re Amberley D., 2001 ME 87, ¶¶ 2–6, 775 A.2d 1158 (describing circumstances 
leading to guardianship petition including child’s unstable housing, inconsistent school attendance, 
sexual abuse, and mother’s substance abuse). 
 76.  See Nadeau, supra note 74, at 36. 
 77.  See In re Guardianship of Kean R. IV, 2010 ME 84, ¶¶ 8-10, 2 A.3d 340 (reversing 
appointment of guardian pursuant to § 5-204(d) when the grounds for such appointment were neither 
pleaded nor litigated).  However, the Law Court recently held that the lower standard of proof set forth 
in § 5-204(d) is unconstitutional.  In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 32-35, 118 A.3d 
229. 
 78.  Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 27, 90 A.3d 1169 (internal citations omitted) (holding that an 
individual seeking parental rights as a de facto parent must show that (1) he or she has undertaken a 
“permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life,” and (2) that there 
are exceptional circumstances sufficient to allow the court to interfere with the legal or adoptive parent’s 
rights).  This definition has been superseded by the enactment of the Maine Parentage Act.  P.L. 2015, 
ch. 296, § A-1 (codified as 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1891 (2012)). 
 79.  P.L. 1981, ch. 369 (emergency, effective August 3, 1981) (codified at 19 M.R.S.A. § 533-A). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id.  
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would apply to such proceedings, with some minor exceptions.83  It also provided a 
basis for finding that a “natural” father’s consent was not required if it could be 
proven that he was unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy or had 
abandoned or refused to take responsibility for the child.84  These changes shifted 
the authority of the probate court from determining whether a parent’s consent to 
the adoption was required under the statute to severing a parent’s rights through its 
own termination proceeding thereby eliminating the need for the parent’s consent.85 
The enactment of the MPC and the subsequent amendments discussed above 
reflected national trends in the evolution of minor guardianship law as part of the 
overall development of child protection and child welfare laws, as well as a broader 
transformation of the role of courts in adjudicating questions of children’s interests, 
including who was responsible for provided their care.  At the turn of the twentieth 
century, public agencies and departments were sometimes appointed as guardians 
of children in need of “proper care and supervision” through so-called public 
guardianships, which did not take place in probate courts.86  In 1934, Hasseltine B. 
Taylor, a graduate student in social work, published her Ph.D. thesis, Law of 
Guardian and Ward, in which she advocated the extension of the role of “private 
guardian” to address children without property as a component of child welfare 
laws.87  She argued that any child who was without adequate care due to a parent’s 
death, absence, abuse, or neglect should be able to receive the protection of a legal 
guardianship.88 
A 1964 study commissioned by the U.S. Children’s Bureau proposed that 
states replace the informal system of “passing along children to the informal 
custody of relatives, friends, and neighbors” with a regulated system of judicially-
appointed guardians.89  Two years later, Taylor published a follow-up essay in 
                                                                                                     
 83.  Id. at § 8 (enacting 19 M.R.S.A. § 533-A).  In the same enactment, the Legislature expanded 
the bases to terminate a parent’s rights from a finding that the parent was “unwilling or unable to protect 
the child from jeopardy” to alternatively find that the parent “has willfully abandoned the child or has 
refused to take responsibility for the child.”  Id. at § 16.  Such a standard could have particular 
applicability in the adoption context where a long-term caregiver for a child seeks to establish a legal 
relationship with a child. 
 84.  Id. at § 6 (enacting 19 M.R.S.A. § 532-C).  Although the adoption laws were not initially made 
part of the MPC in 1979, they have always been under the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate courts.  
The Maine Adoption Act was moved from 19 M.R.S.A. § 1101 et seq. (where it was located with other 
family and parentage laws) to Article IX of the MPC in 1995.  P.L. 1995, ch. 694, § C-7. 
 85.  As a practical matter, a court’s determination that a parent’s consent is not required, thereby 
permitting the adoption to go forward, has the legal effect of terminating the parent’s rights since the 
adoption itself divests such rights.  See, e.g., R.S. ch. 67, § 35 (1883); New England Trust Co. v. Sanger, 
151 Me. 295, 303, 118 A.2d 760, 764 (1955) (citing R.S. ch. 158, § 40 (1954)); GEORGE A. WILSON, 
MAINE PROBATE LAW 444 (1896).  However, there is a distinction between the two inquiries, and the 
1981 amendment placed questions of parental fitness and rights more squarely before probate courts. 
 86.  Mark F. Testa & Jennifer Miller, Evolution of Private Guardianship as Child Welfare 
Resource, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE, 
POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 406 (Gerald Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005). 
 87.  TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 164–71.  See also Testa & Miller, supra note 86, at 406. 
 88.  See TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 168–69. 
 89.  Testa & Miller, supra note 86, at 406–407 (citing Irving Weissman, Guardianship: Every 
Child’s Right, in 355 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 134–
39 (1964)). 
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which she refined and explained her model for minor guardianship.90  She noted 
that there were a great number of children who were “in need of parents” but, for 
one reason or another, were not likely to be adopted,91 and she explained the 
advantages of achieving permanency with court-appointed guardians for such 
children.92 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the child welfare practices in courts usually resulted in 
either preservation of children’s relationships with their biological parents (i.e. 
“natural guardians”) or adoption; private guardianship was not yet regarded as a 
child welfare tool.93  However, by the late 1980s and 1990s, state child welfare 
agencies, with overwhelming numbers of children in long-term foster care after 
unsuccessful attempts at reunification and relatively few children being adopted, 
began to look at “kinship” placement—children in state custody residing with 
extended family—as an alternative to traditional foster care.94  At the same time, 
commentators urged consideration of private guardianships as an alternative to 
foster care, adoption, or even formal state custody, and as a way to preserve some 
familial ties while also ensuring care and stability for the child.95  While many of 
these discussions were largely about children who were formally in the child 
welfare system, they no doubt shaped the perception of guardianship by extended 
family members as a resource for children in need due to their parents’ limited 
ability to provide care, as distinguished from the traditional “probate 
guardianship.”96 
During the latter third of the 20th century, the notion of legal intervention in 
“child custody” became commonplace.97  Increasing divorce rates, a greater role of 
the state as “superparent,” and specifically in removing children from their parents’ 
homes, expanded courts’ role beyond their prior focus on “orphans or children of 
                                                                                                     
 90.  Hasseltine B. Taylor, Guardianship or “Permanent Placement of Children,” in THE LAW OF 
THE POOR 417 (Jacobus tenBroek ed. 1966). 
 91.  Id. at 417–18.  For example, some living parents may be unable to provide care for their 
children but may nonetheless be unwilling to consent to adoption.  Also, the number of children in foster 
care far exceeded the number of families seeking to adopt children.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 419–21.  A person may be more willing to be a guardian than a foster parent since the 
former position provides the person “the dignity in law as well as fact [the status of being] a substitute 
parent” without having to answer to a child welfare agency.  Id. at 419.  At the same time, the person 
would not need to make the same commitment to a child, such as providing financial support, as 
required by an adoption.  Id. at 420. 
 93.  Testa & Miller, supra note 86, at 407–408. 
 94.  Id. at 410–11; Mark F. Testa, When Children Cannot Return Home: Adoption and 
Guardianship, 14 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND FOSTER CARE 115, 116 
(2004). 
 95.  Testa & Miller, supra note 86, at 412–13; Testa, supra note 86, at 120–21; Carol W. Williams, 
Expanding the Options in the Quest for Permanence, in CHILD WELFARE: AN AFRICENTRIC 
PERSPECTIVE 266, 276–82 (Joyce Everett, Bogart Leshore, & Sandra Stukes Chipungu, Eds. 1992) 
(noting that “guardianship complements the social and cultural reality of many African American 
children”); Bogart R. Leashore, Demystifying Legal Guardianship: An Unexplored Option For 
Dependent Children, 23 J. FAM. L. 391, 393–97 (1985).  In the 1990s, a number of states adopted 
subsidized guardianship programs; Maine was not among them.  Testa & Miller, supra note 86, at 414–
15; Testa, supra note 94, at 121. 
 96.  Leashore, supra note 95, at 393 (“Typically, probate guardianship over a child occurs if a 
child's parents die or become incapacitated and someone assumes legal control of the child.”). 
 97.  MASON, supra note 24, at 121–22.  
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parents who could not care for them.”98  An increasing awareness of and concern 
about child abuse swept the United States in the 1970s,99 followed by both an 
explosion of foster care placements and intense controversies regarding the 
appropriate legal responses to abuse in the 1980s and 1990s.100  During this same 
period, a growing preoccupation with the legal concepts of “parent” and “custody” 
raised new questions regarding the status of those raising children who were not 
their biological offspring.101  All of these developments likely played a role in the 
expanded use of guardianships and adoptions to remove children from allegedly 
unfit parents in the absence of action by the state.                
C. Probate Courts’ Concurrent Jurisdiction, Past and Present 
While the primary focus of this Article is the probate courts’ adjudication of 
parental rights through guardianship and adoption proceedings, such courts have at 
times had jurisdiction over other matters pertaining to parental rights, usually, 
although not always, concurrently with other types of courts in Maine.  Their role 
in these other kinds of parental rights matters, however, has been limited and has 
narrowed over the years.  Since 1895, probate courts have had jurisdiction, 
concurrent with other courts, to address questions of care and support of children 
whose parents were living apart.102  In 1905, the Legislature enacted a law 
authorizing courts to order a man to financially support his wife and children.103  A 
separate provision enacted in 1903 permitted either parent to petition for an order 
concerning the “care or custody” of their children.104 
 In 1915, the Legislature granted probate courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
judicial separations.105  That statute primarily concerned a spouse’s property and 
                                                                                                     
 98.  Id. at 121, 149–50.  See Santosky v Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (addressing the constitutional 
rights of biological parents implicated in a termination of parental rights proceeding). 
 99.  ASHBY, supra note 32, at 135–37, 146–47. 
 100.  Id. at 150–78.  These trends reached Maine.  According to a 1985 report of a working group 
studying the Maine child protection system, the number of child protective services investigations of 
alleged child abuse and neglect in 1983 represented a 13.4% increase over the number from the year 
before, and the report anticipated that there would be a further 23% increase in investigations in 1984.  
GOVERNOR’S WORKING GROUP ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, PROTECTING 
OUR CHILDREN: NOT WITHOUT CHANGES IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM iii–iv (1985).  There was a 32% 
increase from 1982 to 1983 of substantiated child sexual abuse cases.  Id. at iv.  Although the report 
provided a comprehensive survey of civil and criminal proceedings involving child abuse and neglect, 
and made extensive recommendations for reforms at all levels, there is no mention of a role for 
guardianships or the probate courts.   
 101.  MASON, supra note 24, at 122, 133–35, 168–69.  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) 
(striking down Washington State’s “Grandparents Rights” law as an unconstitutional interference with 
parents’ constitutionally-protected rights). 
 102.  P.L. 1895, ch. 43, § 2 (codified as R.S. ch. 61, § 40 (1903)).  This provision was described in a 
treatise in the guardianship section, and it appears that the statute was applied to provide that one parent 
or the other could exercise the full rights of a guardian when the parents were living apart, since without 
such order both parents would be the “natural guardians” of their children.  WILSON, supra note 85, at 
97–98. 
 103.  P.L. 1905, ch. 123 § 6 (codified at R.S. ch. 66, § 9 (1916)).   
 104.  P.L. 1895, ch. 43 § 2 (codified as R.S. ch. 61, § 40 (1903)). 
 105.  P.L. 1915, ch. 328, § 1 (codified as R.S. ch. 66, §§10–13 (1916)).  The Supreme Judicial Court, 
and eventually the Superior Court, P.L. 1929, ch. 141 § 7 (1930), had exclusive jurisdiction over 
divorces. R.S. ch. 65, § 2 (1916). 
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inheritance rights when abandoned by the other spouse,106 but it did grant probate 
courts the authority to issue orders pertaining to the “care, custody, and 
maintenance” of a couple’s minor children.107  When the Legislature established 
the District Court in 1961, it granted that court concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Superior Court over divorces and annulments and with the Probate Court in actions 
for separation.108  With the enactment of the MPC, jurisdiction over actions for 
separation was transferred from the probate courts to the Superior Court, 
concurrent with the District Court.109  By 2001, the Superior Court’s remaining 
jurisdiction over family law matters had been eliminated by the Legislature, leaving 
the District Court as the true “family court” in the state court system.110 
The concurrent jurisdiction set forth in the early laws granting state and county 
courts authority to address custody and support of children whose parents live apart 
continues to this day.111  However, such actions are rarely if ever initiated in 
probate courts today,112 and this jurisdiction is likely exercised only when a 
parental rights determination may be necessary or appropriate in the context of a 
guardianship proceeding.113  Indeed, the language of these provisions is somewhat 
in conflict with the statute describing the District Court’s original jurisdiction over 
a range of family matters as being “not concurrent with the Superior Court” and 
silent on whether it is concurrent with any other court.114 
For a period of time,115 the probate and municipal (later state) courts had 
                                                                                                     
 106.  R.S. ch. 66, §§ 10–12 (1916).  These actions for separation were quite different from today’s 
“legal separation” akin to divorce. They were gender-based and required a showing of good cause as a 
prerequisite to the relief sought.  See, e.g., Chivvis v. Chivvis, 158 Me. 354, 358, 184 A.2d 773, 775 
(1962).  A man might seek such an order so that he could dispose of certain property as if he were 
unmarried, id. at 357, 184 A.2d at 774, or to limit other “restraint upon his liberty.”  Lausier v. Lausier, 
123 Me. 530, 530, 124 A. 582, 584 (1924). 
 107.  P.L. 1915, ch. 328, § 1 (codified at R.S. ch. 66, § 10 (1916)); see also Appeal of D'Aoust, 146 
Me. 443, 443, 82 A.2d 409, 409 (1951) (addressing parental rights matter decided in Probate Court). 
 108.  WHITTIER, supra note 17, at 29-30; P.L. 1961, ch. 386, §§ 1, 2.  
 109.  P.L. 1979, ch. 540, § 37 (codified at 19 M.R.S.A. § 588 (1979), repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 694, 
§ B-1 (effective Oct. 1, 1997)).  The jurisdiction language was subsequently modified, P.L. 1997, ch. 
224, §§ 1–2, and eventually the District Court was granted exclusive jurisdiction of legal separation 
actions as part of its overall jurisdiction of family law matters.  P.L. 1999 ch. 731, § ZZZ–4 (codified at 
4 M.R.S.A. § 152(11) (Supp. 2014)).   
 110.  See P.L. 1999, ch. 731, §§ ZZZ-3, ZZZ-4, ZZZ-5 (effective Jan. 1, 2001) (revising jurisdiction 
of District and Superior Court with respect to divorce, separation, annulment, and support to place such 
matters in exclusive jurisdiction of District Court). 
 111.  19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1652, 1654 (2012). 
 112.  Telephone Interview with Amy Faircloth, Esq., Pelletier & Faircloth, Bangor, ME (Aug. 4, 
2015).  A survey of all Maine Probate Court filings in 2013 did not reveal any petitions for such 
determinations. 
 113.  See Maine Family Law Advisory Commission, Report to the Maine Legislature Joint Standing 
Committee on Judiciary on L.D. 376, “An Act to Remove Domestic Relations Cases from the Probate 
Court,” 124th Legislature (2009).  However, I have heard anecdotally that, notwithstanding this 
statutory language, probate judges decline to adjudicate determinations of parentage and parental rights 
in the context of a guardianship matter and instead refer the parties to the District Court for such 
determinations. 
 114.  Compare 4 M.R.S.A. §§ 152(11)–(12) (Supp. 2014), with 4 M.R.S.A. § 152(8) (Supp. 2014) 
(“Original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the Probate Court, to grant equitable relief in 
proceedings” regarding consent for a minor’s abortion). 
 115.  See R.S. ch. 64, § 53 (1916). 
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concurrent jurisdiction over initial protective custody petitions when the State 
sought authority to remove a child from his or her parents in cases of abuse or 
neglect.116  When the comprehensive “Child and Family Services and Child 
Protection Act” was enacted in 1980, it granted the district court jurisdiction over 
all child protection petitions, with concurrent jurisdiction in the probate courts to 
hear initial petitions and discretion to transfer a child protection case filed in that 
court to the District Court on its own motion or that of a party.117  In 1989, the 
Legislature further amended the statute to its present language, which permits 
probate courts (as well as Superior Courts) to hear only petitions for preliminary 
protection orders alleging a “serious risk of immediate harm to the child”118 and 
requires these other courts to immediately transfer the matter to the District Court 
after issuing such order.119 
When the Legislature established the Family Law Advisory Commission in 
1995, it included a “Current Probate Judge” among the membership, a further 
recognition that Probate Judges oversee matters that are properly characterized as 
“family law.”120  However, as described above, in nearly all respects, such role is 
one that probate judges today carry out in isolation from each other and from state 
courts.  Even where the Legislature expanded the jurisdiction of either the District 
or Probate Courts regarding certain parental rights matters, such laws have 
                                                                                                     
 116.  Maine Probate Law Revisions Commission, Report to the Legislature and Recommendations 
Concerning Probate Court Structure 5 (Feb. 1980); 25 M.R.S.A. § 249 (1954) (municipal and probate 
courts); P.L. 1963, ch. 171, § 1 (codified as 22 M.R.S.A. § 3792 (1964)), repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 
733, § 15 (effective July 3, 1980) (probate and district courts). 
 117.  P.L.1979, ch. 733, § 18 (codified as 22 M.R.S.A. § 4031(1)(B) (2004)). The original bill 
granted far more limited jurisdiction to the probate courts.  The language would have permitted a 
probate court to hear petitions for preliminary protection orders only if a District Court judge was not 
available and then it would have to transfer the case to the District Court as soon as possible.  L.D. 1906 
§ 18 (109th Legis. 1980).  It was amended in committee to “continue[] the present jurisdiction of the 
Probate Courts in child protection proceedings.”  Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1906 § 18 (109th Legis. 
2009).  Given the absence of reported opinions in child protection cases on appeal from probate courts, 
it appears that such courts’ role has been generally limited to petitions for initial protection orders. 
 118.  22 M.R.S.A. § 4034(1), (2) (2004) (providing that a petitioner in a child protection action may 
also seek a preliminary protection order as part of or separately from a child protection petition brought 
under section 4032). 
 119.  P.L. 1989, ch. 270, § 11 (codified at 22 M.R.S.A. § 4031(1)(B) (2004 & Supp. 2014)).  The 
child protection statute now provides that, “as soon as action is taken by the Probate Court or the 
Superior Court, the matter shall be transferred to the District Court.”  Id.  Presumably, the concurrent 
jurisdiction in all Maine courts for the preliminary protection order remains to ensure that DHHS has a 
large pool of judges to contact for such emergency action when there is an “immediate risk of serious 
harm.”  22 M.R.S.A. § 4034(2) (2004). 
 120.  P.L. 1995, ch. 694, Pt. B, § 352 (codified as 19-A M.R.S.A. § 352(1)(C) (2012)).  There are a 
few other matters reserved to the jurisdiction of probate judges which may be characterized as relating 
to “family law.”  They are given the authority to review a “caution” filed with the probate court by a 
petitioner who “believes that parties are about to contract marriage when either of them can not lawfully 
do so.”  19-A M.R.S.A. § 653(1) (2012).  If such a caution is filed, the town clerk may not issue a 
license until the county probate judge has (after giving the parties notice and opportunity to be heard) 
“approved the marriage.”  Id. §§ 1–2.  Probate judges may also grant consent to the marriage of a minor 
in the absence of the consent of the minor’s parents, and the probate judge’s consent is required for any 
marriage by a person under the age of 16.  19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 652(7)–(8) (2012 & Supp. 2014).  The 
probate and District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to authorize a minor’s abortion.  22 M.R.S.A.  
§ 1597-A(6) (2004). 
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maintained a sharp separation between the courts’ realms. 
For example, in recent years the Legislature has expanded the jurisdiction of 
the District Court to include some guardianships and adoptions, but such matters 
are distinct from those heard in the probate courts.  In 2005, the Legislature granted 
the District Court authority to appoint a “Permanency Guardian” for a child in a 
child protection matter, who has the same powers and duties as a guardian 
appointed pursuant to the MPC.121  This is the only context in which the District 
Court may appoint a guardian, and, because a probate court has no jurisdiction over 
child protection cases, such appointments may only occur in the District Court.122  
The child protection statute, as amended by the Legislature in 2011, also grants the 
District Court the jurisdiction to grant a petition for adoption of the child by the 
permanency guardian, a narrow exception to the probate courts’ exclusive 
jurisdiction over adoptions, including those resulting from the child protection 
process.123 
Probate courts and the District Court may both consider a petition for 
termination of parental rights, but they have exclusive realms in these matters as 
well.  The District Court may consider such a petition if brought as part of a child 
protection matter,124 whereas probate courts may only adjudicate a petition in a 
case where there is no pending child protection proceeding and where the petitioner 
has already brought a petition to adopt the child.125 
This survey of the allocation of jurisdiction reveals that, while probate courts 
today adjudicate a wide range of parental rights matters, they do so wholly apart 
from the District Court with essentially no overlapping jurisdiction.  In 1997, the 
Maine Legislature enacted the Family Division of the Maine Judicial Branch with 
the mission of providing “a system of justice that is responsive to the needs of 
families and the support of their children.” 126  Notwithstanding the probate courts’ 
expanded jurisdiction—resulting from the MPC amendments—over matters 
involving central questions about the care and custody of children, the Legislature 
has left these courts outside of that “system of justice” with highly problematic 
results.  As described below, the current, fragmented jurisdiction isolates several 
types of cases—including those where substantial rights and interests are at stake—
with lasting implications for the children and families involved. 
III. PARENTAL RIGHTS MATTERS IN PROBATE COURTS TODAY 
This Part examines more closely the types of parental rights determinations 
that Maine’s probate courts adjudicate today within the context of guardianship, 
                                                                                                     
 121.  22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4038-C(2), (5) (Supp. 2014). 
 122.  22 M.R.S.A. § 4031(1)(A) (2004 & Supp. 2014); 22 M.R.S.A. § 4038-C(5) (Supp. 2014). 
 123.  2011 P.L. ch. 402 § 15 (codified as 22 M.R.S.A. § 4038-E (Supp. 2014)). The probate courts’ 
exclusive jurisdiction over all other adoptions is set forth at 18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-103(a)(1) (2012). 
 124.  22 M.R.S.A. § 4051 (2004); cf. In re Austin T., 2006 ME 28, ¶¶ 9-10, A.2d 946 (holding that a 
child protection order is not a prerequisite to a petition to terminate a parent’s rights under 22 M.R.S.A. 
§ 4052 if custody of the child has already been removed from that parent pursuant to 19-A M.R.S.A.  
§ 1653). However, such TPR (termination of parental rights) proceedings between parents are highly 
unusual in District Court. 
 125.  22 M.R.S.A. § 4051 (2004); 18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-204(a) (2012).  
 126.  See 4 M.R.S.A. § 183 (Pamph. 2014). 
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adoption, and name change matters.  For each kind of matter I review the key 
statutory provisions that govern court decisions that limit, suspend, or terminate 
parental rights, along with the leading Maine Supreme Judicial Court cases 
interpreting such provisions. 
The MPC, by and large, still follows an “orphan model” with respect to minor 
guardianships and adoptions, meaning that its provisions reflect an assumption that 
the child at the center of the proceedings has no living parents with intact rights and 
that her foremost need is a permanent substitute parent.  Although the grounds for 
appointment of guardians for minors have been expanded to allow appointments 
where a child still has living parents, the overall structure and other specific 
provisions do not reflect policy goals of preserving parent-child relationships and 
family reunification, which have no application to orphans.  Further, the Law Court 
has taken, particularly in recent years, an active role in analyzing the MPC’s 
parental rights provisions and has occasionally gone to great lengths to interpret 
such laws (and to direct probate courts’ application of them) in ways that ensure 
that probate courts adequately protect parents’ statutory and constitutional rights. 
After reviewing these substantive provisions, I explain the benefits, challenges, 
and other implications of adjudicating parental rights matters in the probate courts 
as they are structured and administered today. 
A. Parental Rights Determinations under the Maine Probate Code 
1. Guardianship of Minors 
a. The Statutory Bases for Appointment of a Guardian of a Minor 
Nearly all cases in which a person seeks guardianship of a minor are under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Courts.127  A petition for guardianship can 
arise in a wide range of contexts.  Regardless of the circumstances of appointment, 
a guardian has all of the powers of a parent including primary residence and sole 
decision-making rights regarding the child’s education, medical care, and other 
matters, unless such authority is specifically limited.128 
One category of guardianship cases comprises what the MPC refers to as 
“testamentary appointments,” where parents who had intact parental rights are 
deceased, and the Probate Court appoints an adult to serve as the legal guardian of 
the surviving minor children of such parents, usually according to the deceased 
                                                                                                     
 127.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-102(a) (2012).  As discussed in the prior Part, one narrow exception to this 
exclusive jurisdiction is appointment of Permanency Guardians in child protection matters.  See 22 
M.R.S.A. § 4038-C (Supp. 2014); see In re Dustin C., 2008 ME 89, ¶ 12, 952 A.2d 993 (Levy, J., 
dissenting). 
 128.  See 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-209 (2012) (“A guardian of a minor has the powers and responsibilities 
of a parent who has not been deprived of custody of a minor and unemancipated child, except that a 
guardian is not legally obligated to provide from the guardian's own funds for the ward and is not liable 
to 3rd persons by reason of the parental relationship for acts of the ward.”); In re Guardianship of 
Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 29, 118 A.3d 229 (“A guardian, once appointed, has almost all decision-
making responsibilities for the child, which removes from the parent even the right to determine how or 
where the child should be raised.”). 
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parents’ wishes as set forth in a valid will.129  Such appointments usually grant 
unlimited rights to a guardian to enable him or her to address the child’s full needs, 
and there is little reason to revisit the appointment itself or its scope since there are 
no living parents with legal standing to challenge the continuation of the 
appointment or the specific actions of a guardian.  These are generally uncontested 
matters (unless competing petitions are filed) which can often be handled 
appropriately and efficiently through the informal proceedings of the Probate 
Court, as a part of overall management of a deceased parent’s estate.130 
Under current Maine law, there are four contexts in which a probate court may 
appoint a guardian for a minor where the parent did not make a testamentary 
nomination.131  First, a parent may consent to such appointment, and the court may 
make the appointment if it finds that “the consent creates a condition that is in the 
best interest of the child.”132  Second, if a parent’s parental rights have been 
terminated, no consent is necessary.133  Approximately three-quarters of the 
guardianship petitions filed in Maine each year fall under one of these 
aforementioned categories and are therefore uncontested matters.134 
The remaining guardianship cases involve disputes between the person (or 
persons, in the case of joint or multiple petitions) seeking appointment as a child’s 
guardian and one or both of a child’s parents regarding whether a guardian should 
be appointed.  If a parent with intact parental rights objects to the guardianship 
petition, then the parties must litigate the question of the appointment to determine 
if the situation falls under one of the two remaining contexts for appointment.  
Specifically, a probate court must determine if the petitioner has met the standard 
for appointment in either section 5-204(c) (“at least temporarily intolerable” living 
situation)135 or section 5-204(d) (a de facto guardian and a “demonstrated lack of 
consistent participation” by the nonconsenting parent).136  Under section 5-204(c), 
                                                                                                     
 129.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-202 (2012).  This language permits the appointment of a guardian without a 
specific action by a probate judge.  MPLRC 1978 REPORT, supra note 29, at 518. 
 130.  Interview with Hon. Joseph Mazziotti, Cumberland County Probate Court, Portland, ME 
(August 20, 2015).  Judge Mazziotti also noted that guardianship appointments necessitated by a 
minor’s parents’ deaths are fairly uncommon, comprising only a fraction of all minor guardianships. 
 131.  While there is no specific provision for appointment of a guardian where both parents are 
deceased, but left no will or other testamentary document, such authority is implicit from the language 
of section 5-204.  See 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(b) (2012) (referring to requirement for consent of “each 
living parent whose parental rights and responsibilities have not been terminated.”). 
 132.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(b) (2012).  There are also contexts in which a parent asks another adult, 
often a family member, to exercise certain parental rights because the parent’s current situation (military 
service, illness, etc.) limits his or her ability to parent the child.  Id. § 5-104 (2012).  In this context, the 
delegation of powers through a power of attorney does not suspend the parent’s rights, can be revoked 
by the parent at any time, and lasts only up to twelve months (but may be renewed).  Id. 
 133.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(a) (2012).  This provision of the statute does not make reference to 
making a finding that the appointment would be in a child’s best interest.  However, § 5-207(b), which 
applies to all appointments made under § 5-204, requires the court to find that “the welfare and best 
interests of the minor will be served by the requested appointment” as a condition for such 
appointments.  See id. § 5-207(b). 
 134.  Data on file with author. 
 135.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(c) (2012). 
 136.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(d) (2012).  The definition of “demonstrated lack of consistent 
participation” is set forth at § 5-101(1-C): 
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the petitioner bears the burden of proving parental unfitness by clear and 
convincing evidence,137 and the petitioner must also prove that his or her 
appointment as guardian would be in the child’s best interests.138  The standard of 
proof set forth in section 5-204 is preponderance of the evidence.139 
Imposing a guardianship over the objection of a parent implicates that parent’s 
constitutional rights, and the Law Court has held, based upon U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent, that absent a showing of “unfitness,” parents retain a fundamental 
liberty interest with respect to the care, custody, and control of their children.140  
For this reason, the Law Court has held that a probate court must apply a high 
standard for determining unfitness in the context of a contested guardianship.  
Specifically, in order to appoint a guardian pursuant to section 5-204(c), a court 
must find “the parent is currently unable to meet the child’s needs and that inability 
will have an effect on the child’s well-being that may be dramatic, and even 
traumatic, if the child lives with the parent.”141 
In the recent opinion Guardianship of Chamberlain, the Law Court noted that 
an order appointing a guardian is “more final than a jeopardy order in a child 
protection proceeding, and parental rights are transferred to the guardian almost in 
their entirety.”142  Accordingly, the risk of error in such cases triggers extensive due 
process protections for objecting parents.143  For this reason, the Law Court held 
that, although section 5-204(d) provides that the burden of proof on a petition for 
appointment as a de facto guardian is only a preponderance of the evidence, 
applying this lower standard in a contested matter would be unconstitutional.144  
The Law Court explained: “[A]n order appointing a guardian pursuant to section 5-
204(d)—like other orders that terminate or severely constrain the fundamental right 
to parent—can be entered only after a court has made findings applying the 
standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence.”145  Thus, the Law Court has 
interpreted the guardianship statute as one akin to a child protection law, and has 
effectively re-drafted some of its key provisions to bring it in line with the same 
due process requirements. 
                                                                                                     
[R]efusal or failure to comply with the duties imposed upon a parent by the parent-child 
relationship, including but not limited to providing the child necessary food, clothing, 
shelter, health care, education, a nurturing and consistent relationship and other care and 
control necessary for the child’s physical, mental and emotional health and development. 
Id. § 5-101(1-C).  That provision also includes five factors that a court must consider in making such 
determination.  See id.; In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 12, 118 A.3d 229. 
 137.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(c) (2012); Jewel II, 2010 ME 80, ¶ 12, 989 A.2d 726. 
 138.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(c) (2012).   
 139.  See id. § 5-204(d). 
 140.  See In re Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶¶ 5-6, 10 A.3d 684; Jewel II, 2010 ME 80, 
¶¶ 6, 7, 9, 2 A.3d 301; In re Guardianship of Jewel, 2010 ME 17, ¶ 12, 989 A.2d 726 (Jewel I); In re 
Guardianship of Jeremiah T., 2009 ME 74, ¶ 27, 976 A.2d 955; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57, 72-73 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972). 
 141.  Jewel I, 2010 ME 17, ¶ 12, 989 A.2d 726. 
 142.  See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 30, 118 A.3d 229.  
 143.  See id. ¶¶ 31–32. 
 144.  See id. ¶ 33. 
 145.  Id. ¶ 33. 
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b. The Imperfect Fit of the MPC for Guardianship as “Private Child Protection” 
Contested guardianship cases are often acrimonious and protracted, and they 
can involve difficult issues such as abandonment, allegations of abuse and neglect, 
substance abuse and mental illness, incarceration, teen parents, alienation and 
interference with parent-child relationships, and complex and contentious family 
dynamics.146  In some instances, more than one relative seeks appointment as a 
child’s guardian, requiring a probate court to determine not only if a parent is unfit 
but also which (if any) of the competing petitioners should be appointed as 
guardian.147  Probate courts also have jurisdiction to enter child support orders 
against biological parents in guardianship proceedings.148  Accordingly, cases in 
this category of guardianship matters resemble, in all pertinent respects, family 
matters regarding parental rights and responsibilities that typically proceed in the 
Family Division of the Maine District Court.149  However, despite the Legislature’s 
expansion of the standards for appointment of guardians for minors, other 
provisions of the MPC, as well as the practices of the probate courts, do not reflect 
the role of these proceedings in addressing difficult issues of child welfare and 
parental rights.  
Probate courts generally issue full, rather than limited, guardianship orders, 
                                                                                                     
 146.  See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 20, 98 A.3d 1023 (mental illness); In 
re Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶ 4, 86 A.3d 1197 (substance abuse and mental illness); In re 
Guardianship of LaBree, 2013 ME 82, ¶¶ 5–6, 76 A.3d 386 (substance abuse and “unstable personal 
life”); Jewel I, 2010 ME 17, ¶¶ 3-6, 989 A.2d 726 (substance abuse and domestic violence); see 
generally Jill Kaufman, Grandparents Step in When Parents Get Hooked on Opiates, NPR NEWS (Aug. 
4, 2015) (discussing how grandparents are increasingly seeking guardianship and adoption of their 
grandchildren due to their children’s addiction to opiates),  http://www.npr.org/2015/08/04/429385912/ 
grandparents-step-in-when-parents-get-hooked-on-opiates; An Act to Ensure a Continuing Home Court 
for Cases Involving Children: Hearing on L.D. 890 Before the Judiciary Committee, 127th Leg., (Me. 
2015) (statement of Kathryn Ayers, President, Maine Probate Registers Assn.), available at 
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=29270. 
 147.  Mazziotti, supra note 130.  Judge Mazziotti indicated that competing petitions are a common 
occurrence. 
 148.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(d) (2012).  This may require a paternity determination as part of the 
guardianship proceeding.  Nadeau, supra note 74, at 36.  However, the MPC does not expressly state 
how such child support awards are to be determined.  Judge Mitchell has written that the best practice is 
to apply the child support guidelines under Title 19-A, chapter 63.  MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29,  
§ 5.01.3.B at 5-14. 
 149.  See Nadeau, supra note 74, at 34 (“These cases involve numerous attorneys and parties, motion 
hearings, conferences, child support determinations, contempt hearings, and post-judgment reviews and 
petitions that the Maine Legislature certainly did not fully contemplate and address from a financial 
perspective.”).  Probate courts may also be required to determine whether to appoint a conservator for a 
child. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-401 (2012).  However, such matters rarely involve questions of “parental 
rights” as they nearly always arise in the estate context when a child may have a “significant amount of 
money.” MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.01.3 at 5-14; see also Nadeau, supra note 74, at 36–37.  
A guardian need not be appointed as conservator in order to receive and use funds payable for the 
ward’s benefit (such as support, benefits, trust funds, etc.) so long as the funds are used for the ward’s 
support. See 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-209(b) (2012).  Indeed, petitions for conservatorship of a child 
comprise a very small percentage of probate courts’ work.  In 2013, out of the total 612 “protective 
proceedings” filed in Maine probate courts regarding children, only 30 were for conservatorships and 5 
for joint guardianship-conservatorships.  Data on file with author.  Accordingly, I will not be addressing 
conservatorship matters in this article. 
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meaning that the parents retain no specific rights.150  Nothing in the text of the 
MPC suggests that they should do otherwise; a “limited guardianship” is presented 
as the exception, not the standard practice.151  If an order is silent as to a parent’s 
rights, the effect is to provide a guardian complete discretion regarding whether 
and if to allow any parent-child contact.152  In fact, the form orders for appointing 
guardians of minors used by many probate courts do not have a designated space 
for specifying such contact.153  Absent language in a guardianship order limiting 
the guardian’s powers by setting the time, place, conditions, and frequency of 
parent-child contact, a parent has no basis to ask the court to order a guardian to 
allow contact with his or her child. 154  Many guardians exercise this implied 
discretion reasonably, and they facilitate and encourage visits between the parent 
and child to move the family towards reunification.155  However, if a guardian does 
not allow contact, such actions may entirely cut a parent out of the child’s life, 
potentially causing lasting damage to the relationship or at least making 
reunification far more challenging, if not impossible.156  There is no provision in 
the MPC authorizing modifications to a guardianship order to change its scope or 
to expand the rights retained by a parent. 
The practice of appointing “full guardians” reflects the origins of guardianship 
                                                                                                     
 150.  The practice varies among judges and has, in some courts, changed over time.  For example, 
one long-time practitioner has noted that the probate courts before whom she practices now issue more 
limited guardianships than in years past (although full guardianships are still common).  Faircloth, supra 
note 112.  Our experience at the Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic indicates that many probate courts still 
routinely issue full guardianships in contested matters. 
 151.  The primary authority for appointing a limited guardian is in Title 18-A § 5-105, which applies 
to guardians for minors or adults.  See 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-105 (2012) (“[T]he judge may appoint a 
limited guardian with fewer than all of the legal powers and duties of a guardian.”).  Perhaps because the 
language in that provision makes it more applicable to adult guardianships (i.e. “A person for whom a 
limited guardian has been appointed retains all legal and civil rights except those which have been 
suspended by the decree or order.”), see id., the minor guardianship statute at § 5-204 includes language 
specifying which parental rights and responsibilities are retained by parents where a limited guardian is 
appointed, see id. § 5-204. 
 152.  See In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 15, 98 A.3d 1023 (noting that the order 
appointing grandparents as full guardians of child “effectively stripped the parents of their parental 
rights”). 
 153.  Probate courts may use any of several different forms to make such appointment: PP-104 
(“Appointment of Guardian of Minor”); PP-104 (used for temporary appointments of a guardian);  
PP-106 (“Appointment of Guardian and Conservator of Minor”); PP-108 (“Order on Petition for 
Appointment of Guardian of Minor Alleging Intolerable Living Situation”).  See MAINE PROBATE 
FORMS (Rev’d ed. 2014).  These forms provide a space to indicate the limitations on the appointment, 
but do not indicate what such limitations may include.  Compare MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH:  SCHEDULE 
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FORM, FM-140, available at http://ptla.org/sites/ 
default/files/FM-140.pdf (revised in Sep., 2015).  A probate judge may also create his or her own order 
when making an appointment.  
 154.  18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 105, 204 (2012).  One “kinship families” advocate serving on a legislative 
task force reported: “I do not think that there is agreement within the Probate Court system about 
whether Probate judges can determine whether visits are appropriate between the parent and the child, 
and, if so, set up a contact schedule for parents within a guardianship order.”  TASK FORCE ON KINSHIP 
FAMILIES: STATEMENT OF BARBARA KATE, MAINE KIN-KIDS PROGRAM (2007), available at 
http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/kinshipfamResponsesToInfoReq.pdf).  
 155.  Faircloth, supra note 112; Mazziotti, supra note 130. 
 156.  Faircloth, supra note 112; Mazziotti, supra note 130. 
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law, including Maine’s statute, as an “estate” matter rather than a “parental rights” 
matter, and therefore there was no need to preserve a parent-child relationship or 
move towards reunification.  Rather, what orphans need is a permanent 
arrangement to ensure that all of their needs will be met for the remainder of their 
childhoods.157  However, as the new standards for appointment allow, 
guardianships today frequently function as private child protection cases, in that the 
court intervenes in a parent-child relationship out of concern for the child’s welfare 
based on a petition brought by a private individual, rather than the State.  In many 
such instances, a grandparent or other family member seeking guardianship may 
not want to become the child’s permanent substitute parent but is merely 
responding to an urgent, present need.158 
As compared with their “public” counterparts in the District Court, one of the 
notable implications of these private child protection matters is the differing role 
and responsibilities of the Maine DHHS.  Child protection cases brought in District 
Court are generally initiated by DHHS Office of Child and Family Services after a 
child abuse or neglect investigation.159  By contrast, in minor guardianship 
proceedings brought in probate court, DHHS is not directly involved as a party and 
may not be involved at all.  It may have some engagement with a family prior to 
the filing of a guardianship petition in probate court, including encouraging a 
relative to file for guardianship as part of a “safety plan” for the child based on 
DHHS’s concerns regarding a parent’s fitness.160  Even in those cases, however, 
DHHS is not a party to the guardianship case, nor does it usually remain involved 
with the family to provide services such as supervision of visitation, transportation, 
housing assistance, parenting support, or any of the other services that it may be 
required to provide the family in a child protection case to preserve the family 
                                                                                                     
 157.  In addition, it was not until Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 
of 1980, P.L. 96-272, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679c, that the public policy goal of family 
reunification became clearly established law throughout the United States.  42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) 
(2014) (requiring, as a condition for receipt of federal funding for adoption and foster care programs, 
that states ensure that “in each case, reasonable efforts will be made . . . to prevent or eliminate the need 
for removal of the child from his home, and . . . to make it possible for the child to return to his home . . 
. .”); see also Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358 (1992); Barbara A Pine, et al., Defining and 
Achieving Family Reunification in MALLON & HESS, supra note 86, at 378, 379; Fred Wulczen, Family 
Reunification, 14 CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND FOSTER CARE 95, 97 (2004).  Thus, Maine child welfare 
law did not reflect such goal at the time of the MPC’s enactment, and the federal law only required 
changes to public child protection matters where the state became involved with a family. 
 158.  See Kaufman, supra note 146. 
 159.  See generally 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4031–4039 (2004 & Supp. 2014).  A child protection petition 
may also be initiated by a police officer or “three or more persons” as well as DHHS, id. § 403(1), but 
once the case is underway the State, through DHHS, is a party; this is a far less common way for a child 
protection matter to begin.  See In re M.M., 2014 ME 15, ¶ 5, 86 A.3d 622.  
 160.  Faircloth, supra note 112; Mazziotti, supra note 130; FAMILIES AND CHILDREN TOGETHER, A 
LEGAL GUIDE FOR GRANDFAMILIES 19 (2011), available at http://www.familiesandchildren.org/ 
uploads/2/4/6/9/24696876/legal_guide_for_maine_grandfamilies_2011.pdf; MAINE LEGISLATURE, 
FINAL REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON KINSHIP FAMILIES 5 (2010) (hereinafter “TFKF Report”) 
http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/kinshiprpt.pdf; Maine Department of Health and Human Services 
Regs. IV.L (“Care of Child Outside of Home/Emergency Informal Care”).  Petitioners are responsible 
for their own legal fees.  
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relationship and to facilitate and support reunification.161  Indeed, it is ironic that 
parents involved with guardianship matters, who as a group show more promise at 
being fit and capable parents in the future than do parents involved in child 
protection proceedings, whose alleged abuse and neglect rose to a level 
necessitating the initiation of such proceedings, have fewer guarantees under Maine 
law that they will be reunited with their children.162 
A particularly confusing aspect of the current guardianship law is the role of 
temporary guardianships.163  Under the statute, a temporary guardianship can be in 
place for only six months, but the language is silent on whether there can be 
successive appointments.164  The practices among probate judges regarding these 
appointments vary enormously.  Some see their authority as limited to making a 
single appointment, whereas others see the statute’s silence as providing an 
opportunity to apply “common sense” and renew temporary guardianships where 
appropriate.165  The latter approach provides probate courts the opportunity to use 
temporary guardianships much as District Courts employ interim orders, 
particularly where the circumstances are likely to change in a way difficult to 
anticipate and accommodate in a “permanent” appointment.166 
Parents whose parental rights have not been terminated are allowed to petition 
the probate court to terminate the guardianship, although the standards for seeking 
and prevailing on such petitions are not well-defined in the statute.167  As the Law 
                                                                                                     
 161.  Mazziotti, supra note 130; 22 M.R.S.A. § 4041(1-A) (Supp. 2014); In re Guardianship of 
Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 27, 118 A.3d 229 (“[I]n contrast to the consequences of a jeopardy order, 
neither the appointed guardian nor the State is obligated to provide services or make efforts to reunify 
the parent and child to prevent a permanent deprivation of the right to parent.”); see also In re Amberley 
D., 2001 ME 87, ¶ 23, 775 A.2d 1158 (noting biological mother’s arguments that her due process rights 
were violated when guardians were appointed for her daughter over her objection in a proceeding in 
which her parental rights have “effectively been terminated” yet “no home study was made, and no 
agency or individual will work with [the mother] towards reunification.”).   
 162.  Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 30, 118 A.3d 229 (noting that an order appointing a guardian is 
“more final than a jeopardy order in a child protection proceeding.”).  See also Williams, supra note 95, 
at 282 (noting that children involved in legal guardianship “may have periodic crises that can be 
resolved or minimized with access to social services.”). 
 163.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-207 (2012). 
 164.  MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.01A.4 at 5-30. 
 165.  Id. at 5-31.  Faircloth, supra note 112 (noting that some probate courts now see their authority 
as limited to issuing single 6-month guardianships in light of recent Law Court opinions on the subject, 
whereas they issued more serial temporary guardianships in the past). 
 166.  Id.  The Law Court has never squarely addressed this issue but frowned on the practice in its 
opinion in Johnson, at least in contexts where it is unclear whether the probate court had ensured that it 
followed the standards in section 5-204 in making each appointment.  In re Guardianship of Johnson, 
2014 ME 104, ¶17 n.6, 98 A.3d 1023 (“[T]he Probate Code does not support the Probate Court’s 
interpretation of the statute as permitting serial temporary guardianships as stop-gap measures while the 
petition for permanent guardianship is proceeding.”).  In this respect, it emphasized, courts should not 
treat a temporary guardianship like a temporary protection from abuse order, which is in place until a 
hearing on a final order can occur.  Id. (citing 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4006(2) (Supp. 2014)). 
 167.  18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 5-210, 5-212 (2012). Section 5-210 is titled “Termination of appointment of 
guardian” but it only refers to external events (such as the ward’s adoption, marriage, or death) as 
having an automatic effect on the continuation of the appointment. Section 5-212 (“Resignation or 
removal proceedings”) makes no reference to the ward’s parents but states that “[a]ny person interested 
in the welfare of the ward” (or the ward herself, if over fourteen) may petition “for removal of the 
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Court has observed: “[O]nce a guardianship is established, there is, by statute, ‘a 
presumption in favor of continuing it.’”168 Specifically, in 2005, the Maine 
Legislature amended the MPC to shift the burden of proof on a petition to terminate 
from the guardian to the petitioning parent.169  However, the Law Court has held 
that the guardianship should be terminated if the situation that gave rise to a 
guardianship (i.e. parental unfitness) has ended and that parents are entitled to a 
presumption of fitness during such termination proceeding.170  In In re 
Guardianship of David C., the Law Court clarified: “Because a parent has a 
fundamental right to parent his or her child, the party opposing the termination of 
the guardianship bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the parent seeking to terminate the guardianship is currently unfit to regain 
custody of the child.” 171  The Law Court explained that, if the opposing party does 
not meet its burden, “the guardianship must terminate for failure to prove an 
essential element to maintain the guardianship.”172  As a practical matter though, 
termination is difficult to obtain where the original appointment was made on a 
judicial finding of unfitness.173 
However, another amendment by the Legislature provided an important 
reversal in the trend of limiting parents’ rights in the guardianship context.  In 
2011, the Maine Legislature amended the MPC to allow probate courts to order 
“transitional arrangements for the minor if the court determines that such 
arrangements will assist the minor with a transition of custody and are in the best 
interests of the child.”174  The Law Court has interpreted this legal change as 
having a significant impact on guardianship termination determinations.  In In re 
Zacharia, a probate court’s refusal to order “transitional arrangements” was not “in 
the interests of justice” because it effectively precluded the child’s mother from 
becoming a fit parent and operated as de facto termination of her parental rights. 175  
                                                                                                     
guardian on the ground that the removal would be in the best interest of the ward.” It also provides that 
the guardian may seek permission to resign. Id. § 5-212(a). 
 168.  In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 28, 118 A.3d 229 (quoting In re 
Guardianship of Jeremiah T., 2009 ME 74, ¶ 21, 976 A.2d 955).  
 169.  P.L. 2005, ch. 371, § 5.   
 170.  In re Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶¶ 6–7, 10 A.3d 684.  
 171. Id. ¶ 7.   
 172.  Id.  See also Jeremiah T., 2009 ME 74, ¶¶ 24–28, 976 A.2d 955 (applying prior law which 
required that a guardianship “must be terminated unless the guardian proves that the mother is an unfit 
parent for the child and that continuation of the guardianship is in the child’s best interests.”). 
 173.  MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.06B.4 at 5-32.10.  In 2001, in In re Amberley D., the 
Law Court held, applying the MPC provisions in effect at that time, that a mother’s “right to regain 
custody” through termination of a guardianship meant that fewer procedural safeguards were required 
for the initial appointment.  2001 ME 87, ¶¶ 12, 23, 775 A.2d 1158.  The rationale (which has not 
appeared in recent Law Court opinions) is of dubious validity today, particularly in light of the Law 
Court’s recent opinion in Chamberlain.  There the Law Court characterized both the process for 
terminating a guardianship and the accompanying need for heightened due process protections quite 
differently: “The process for a parent to re-enter the child’s life through a contested motion to terminate 
the guardianship also demonstrates the significant potential for a permanent interference with a parent’s 
fundamental rights.” 2015 ME 76, ¶ 28, 118 A.3d 229 (emphasis added). 
 174.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-213 (2012).  The Legislature based the amendment on a recommendation 
made in the November 2010 Report of Legislature’s Task Force on Kinship Families.  The Report is 
available at: http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/kinshiprpt.pdf. 
 175.  In re Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, 86 A.3d 1197. 
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The purpose of the new law was to “give the Probate Courts another tool in 
fashioning an appropriate plan for the restoration of custodial care to the 
parents.”176  If a parent follows all guardian ad litem (GAL)177 recommendations, is 
physically capable of providing care to the child, and is willing to participate in 
transitional arrangements, it is an abuse of discretion not to order such 
arrangements.178 
By ordering such “transitional arrangements,” a probate court can take a step 
toward having a minor guardianship case operate as a private child protection 
matter, where a court and (usually) extended family members, operating wholly 
outside of the State’s child welfare system, address a child’s safety and care.179  
However, in nearly all other respects, the MPC falls far short of providing courts 
and litigants the statutory tools they need to address the difficult questions that 
arise in these cases and parents the protections they need throughout the litigation 
in accordance with their constitutional rights. 
2. Adoption, Termination of Parental Rights, and Paternity Proceedings  
The Maine Adoption Act, which is now located in Article IX of the MPC, 
vests most adoptions in the exclusive jurisdiction of probate courts, even if the 
adoption proceeds after a District Court has issued a TPR order and determined that 
adoption is the most appropriate permanency plan for a child.180  As noted above, 
the only narrow exception, adopted by the Maine Legislature in 2011 and not 
reflected in the MPC itself, is the jurisdiction granted to the District Court to 
approve adoptions (and accompanying name changes) by Permanency Guardians in 
child protective proceedings, but these are uncommon.181 
As part of their adoption jurisdiction,182 probate courts review a biological 
parent’s “surrender and release” of parental rights to a child,183 as well as a parent’s 
consent to an adoption.184  The parent must execute such surrender or consent in the 
presence of a probate court judge,185 and the adoption statute imposes requirements 
for a judge to meet before he or she can approve such surrender or consent.186 
The MPC also provides probate courts exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings 
                                                                                                     
 176.  Id. ¶ 18. 
 177.  A “Guardian ad litem” in parental rights matters is a person appointed by the court to 
investigate a child’s circumstances and make recommendations regarding his or her best interests. 18-A 
M.R.S.A. § 1-112 (2012); 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1507 (2012). 
 178.  Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶ 20, 86 A.3d 1197. 
    179.   See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Gionest, 2015 ME 154, ¶ 6, __ A.3d __ (describing court's 
order for transitional arrangements as part of a temporary, limited guardianship order designed to enable 
the child to eventually return to his mother's custody).  
 180.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-103 (2012). 
 181.  22 M.R.S.A. § 4038-E (Supp. 2014).  
 182.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-103 (2012). 
 183.  Id. § 9-202 (2012). 
 184.  Id. §§ 9-202, 9-302 (2012). 
 185.  Id. § 9-202(a) (2012). 
 186.  Id. § 9-202(b). For example, the Probate Court must explain certain matters to the parents, such 
as their parental rights and responsibilities and the effect of the consent or surrender, and it must 
determine that the parents freely gave consent or surrender after they were informed of their rights. Id.  
§ 9-202(b)(2), (3). 
74 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
in which an adoption petitioner asks the court to terminate the parental rights of a 
non-consenting biological parent to clear the way for the adoption.187  The rights at 
stake for such parents are even more substantial than those implicated in 
guardianship proceedings because the TPR severs the parent-child legal 
relationship completely and permanently.188 Although the result of such pre-
adoption TPR proceedings can be the same as a TPR order in a District Court child 
protection proceeding and the same basic standard for termination applies,189 the 
course of proceedings and protections afforded to the biological parents are far 
different in each court.190 Most significantly, in a public child protection 
proceeding, DHHS must establish and implement a family reunification plan, and 
the District Court may allow a TPR petition to proceed to hearing only after the 
State has demonstrated that such reunification efforts should be abandoned.191 
By contrast, although TPR proceedings in a probate court can also be 
characterized as a kind of child protection matter, much like contested guardianship 
cases, nothing in the MPC (or those sections of Title 22 incorporated by reference) 
authorizes the Probate Court to order DHHS, or the petitioners, to provide services 
to the child or parents or to require attempts at reunification as a prerequisite to the 
TPR.192  Rather, the petitioner(s) (who may be the child’s other biological parent, 
joined by his or her new spouse or partner193) need only offer evidence to support a 
finding that the grounds for termination194 have been met to obtain an order 
permanently ending a parent’s legal relationship with the child.  Given the 
                                                                                                     
 187.  See id. § 9-103(a)(4) (2012).    
 188.  See id. § 9-204 (2012). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397, 
71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (“When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not 
merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.”); In re Adoption of L.E., 2012 ME 
127, ¶ 16, 56 A.3d 1234 (noting that TPR proceedings in probate court in the context of adoptions 
should “[r]ecogniz[e] the [child’s] need for stability and permanency.”). 
 189.  Id. § 9-204(b) (2012); In re Jacob B., 2008 ME 168, ¶ 13, 959 A.2d 734, 737. 
 190.  Compare 18-A M.R.S.A § 9-204 with 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4050-4058. Although the Protective 
Custody statutory scheme permits a Probate Court to issue a preliminary protection order, 22 M.R.S.A. 
§ 4031(1)(B) (2012 & Supp. 2014), the child protective petition itself must be filed and adjudicated in 
the District Court. Id. § 4031(1)(A) (2012 & Supp. 2014).   
 191.  22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4041(1-A)(A)(1), (2)(A-2) (Supp. 2014); In re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258,  
¶¶ 4–5, 11–13, 721 A.2d 629. 
 192.  In re Adoption of L.E., 2012 ME 127, ¶ 13, 56 A.3d 1234. 
 193.  See e.g., In re Adoption of Hali D., 2009 ME 70, ¶ 1, 974 A.2d 916 (affirming termination of 
incarcerated father’s parental rights in context of petition for adoption brought by mother and her 
husband).  
 194.  22 M.R.S. § 4055 (2004 & Supp. 2014). That statute permits a court to terminate a parent’s 
rights without their consent if:  
(1)(B)(2) The court finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that: 
 (a) Termination is in the best interest of the child; and 
 (b) Either: 
(i) The parent is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these 
circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated to 
meet the child's needs; 
(ii) The parent has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child 
within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs; 
(iii) The child has been abandoned; or 
(iv) The parent has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify 
with the child pursuant to section 4041. 
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significant problems, outlined below, of adjudicating contested family matters in 
probate courts, there is a substantial risk that a parent-child relationship could be 
severed in a process that does not fully protect parents’ rights, meet the best 
interests of the child, or serve the broader goals of preserving families set out in 
Maine law.195 
The MPC includes a provision addressing the determination of paternity of a 
putative father in the context of an adoption proceeding,196  which is also similar in 
many respects to a child protection proceeding in that it requires the court to make 
a case-specific determination of whether a biological parent may exercise his 
parental rights. The language of the statute suggests that, if a probate court finds 
that a putative father is the biological father of the child, it must then make specific 
findings about his ability to take responsibility for the child before it may “declare 
the putative father the child’s parent with all the attendant rights and 
responsibilities.”197  If the father does not timely invoke the process to “establish” 
his parental rights, or he has not met the requirements of section 902(i) (i.e. the 
court does not make the aforementioned specific findings), the statute provides that 
the court must rule the he has “no parental rights,” and his consent (or surrender 
and release) is not required for the adoption.198 
The Law Court’s opinion in In re Tobias D., however, requires probate courts 
to interpret and apply the language of section 9-201 in a manner far different from 
the statute’s plain language, apparently to ensure that the provision is not 
unconstitutional in its application.199  Although the MPC provides that it is the 
father’s burden to petition the court to have his parental rights granted by the court 
after demonstrating that he meets the requirements set forth in section 9-204(i),200 
the Law Court held that, in order to ensure that the father’s liberty interests are 
adequately protected, the burdens must be reversed.201  If a man is found to be the 
biological father but the petitioners nonetheless wish to proceed with the adoption, 
the matter must proceed as a TPR determination in which it is the petitioners’ 
burden to prove that his rights should be terminated under the standard set forth in 
Title 22.202  Thus, the Probate Court must follow the same requirements as those 
governing other contested TPR determinations in conjunction with adoptions under 
section 9-204.203  Therefore, in this context as well, probate courts are making 
                                                                                                     
 195.  See id., § 4003(3) (requiring “family rehabilitation and reunification” to be given “priority as a 
means for protecting the welfare of children” in child protection cases). Hon. Joseph Mazziotti, the 
Cumberland County Probate Judge, outlined a number of the challenges facing probate courts in these 
termination of parental rights cases in his September 27, 2010, letter to the Maine Legislature’s Task 
Force on Kinship Families, available at http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/JudgeMazziottiRespon.pdf. 
He stated that “more specific standards/guidelines to apply in a given situation would assist the probate 
court.” Id. 
 196.  18-M.R.S.A. § 9-201 (2012). 
 197.  Id. § 9-201(i) (2012).   
 198.  Id. § 9-201(j) (2012).   
 199.  See In re Adoption of Tobias D., 2012 ME 45, ¶¶ 15–16, 40 A.3d 990. 
 200.  18-A §§ 9-201(d)(i) (2012).   
 201.  Tobias D., 2012 ME 45, ¶¶ 17, 20, 40 A.3d 990 (“[T]he procedures, burdens, and standards set 
out in [Title 22] section 4055 constitute the means by which the fundamental constitutional right to 
parent is safeguarded.”). 
 202.  Id. ¶¶ 16–21 (citing 22 M.R.S.A. § 4050 et seq. (2004 & Supp. 2014)). 
 203.  Id. ¶¶ 17-18. 
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determinations that can permanently alter the legal relationship between a parent 
and child. 
3. Change of Name of Minor Child 
The core of Maine’s name change law is quite simple: “If a person desires to 
have that person’s name changed, the person may petition the judge of probate in 
the county where the person resides.  If the person is a minor, the person’s legal 
custodian may petition in the person’s behalf.”204  The Law Court has interpreted 
the term “legal custodian” in that statute as meaning the person with “decision-
making authority” over a child.205  If two people share decision-making rights—as 
in the absence of an order affecting parents’ status as the “‘joint natural guardians’” 
of a child206 or if there is a District Court order expressly awarding shared decision-
making—207 the Probate Court cannot grant a name change unless both “legal 
custodian[s]” join the petition.208  Thus, while a probate court can issue an order 
changing a child’s name (thereby affecting an important connection with a parent), 
it lacks the jurisdiction to allocate the authority to seek such change to a parent who 
does not possess it.  Only a District Court can determine whether to vest one or 
both parents with such authority in a family matter.209 
B. The Impact of Probate Courts’ Exclusive Jurisdiction of Certain  
Parental Rights Proceedings 
The District Court is the primary court in Maine where parental rights matters 
are adjudicated.210  As explained above, there are several types of contested 
proceedings under the MPC which are unquestionably “family law” matters in 
terms of the parties, issues, and potential outcomes.211  Probate courts report that 
their minor guardianship and adoption caseloads are increasing,212 yet they lack the 
statutory tools and resources to effectively address the underlying issues facing the 
                                                                                                     
 204.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-701(a) (2012) (other provisions in section 1-701 set forth the fee and 
procedures and address situations of domestic violence or identity theft).  Requests for name changes 
can also be included with an adoption petition. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-301 (2012)). 
 205.  In re Perry, 2004 ME 46, ¶ 4, 845 A.2d 1153; In re Kidder, 541 A.2d 630, 631 (Me. 1988).  
 206.  See, e.g., Perry, 2004 ME 46, ¶ 5, 845 A.2d 1153 (quoting 19-A M.R.S.A § 1651 (1998)). 
 207.  See, e.g., Kidder, 541 A.2d 630, 630-31 (Me. 1988) (holding that where a divorce judgment 
awarded parents “shared parental rights and responsibilities,” one parent cannot be the “legal custodian” 
for purposes of changing the child’s name). 
 208.  Perry, 2004 ME 46, ¶ 4, 845 A.2d 1153. 
 209.  As part of granting an initial adoption petition, the probate court can change a person’s name. 
18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-301. However, once such adoption is granted, one adopting parent would need to 
obtain a District Court order to allocate the name-change authority to her to the exclusion of the other 
adoption parent, just as any other parent would need to do. 
 210.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 103 (2012) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided, the District Court 
has original jurisdiction of all actions under this Title.”); 4 M.R.S.A. § 152(11) – (13) (Pamph. 2014). 
 211.  See Nadeau, supra note 74, at 34 (“ . . . Maine's probate courts have become family law courts.  
Any Maine judge of probate today will tell you, if asked, that his or her time on the bench is primarily 
consumed by custody and related family issues. Probate court provides the only forum where many 
issues concerning the welfare and property of individuals and family members may be addressed.”) 
 212.  Id. at 36; In re Holmes, 2011 ME 119, ¶ 4, 32 A.3d 1011 (noting the “substantial growth” of the 
probate court’s “family law docket”); Mazziotti, supra note 130. 
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families involved in these cases, particularly in contested matters.  The MPC 
provides little guidance or clear authority to the judges overseeing these difficult 
cases regarding how best to address children’s needs on a case-specific basis, and, 
at the same time, vests exclusive jurisdiction of these matters in a system of part-
time, independent probate courts that is inadequate to meet the needs of the 
litigants and the children involved.  This section will outline some of the specific 
problems stemming from the current situation. 
1. The probate courts’ limited statutory authority and lack of a centralized system 
hinder their ability to effectively address the needs of families in crisis 
As noted earlier, guardianships and adoptions often arise from problems 
affecting Maine families such as substance abuse, mental illness, domestic 
violence, poverty, homelessness, teen pregnancy, unemployment, and 
incarceration.  As Maine’s child protection system has become increasingly 
overburdened and under-resourced,213 some DHHS caseworkers have come to 
regard guardianships as key tools in developing safety plans that avoid the need to 
file a child protection petition.214  Unlike the contexts requiring testamentary 
guardianships (i.e. the death of parents), the situations warranting other 
guardianships, while acute, may nonetheless be temporary, and therefore there is 
                                                                                                     
 213.  DHHS’s Child Protection Services Annual Reports document a dramatic increase in the 
agency’s child welfare caseload in recent years.  In 2003, there were 4,930 reports of child abuse and 
neglect that were of sufficient severity that DHHS assigned the matter to a caseworker for a safety 
assessment. Me. Dep’t of Human Servs., Annual Report on Referrals 2003, 3 (May 3, 2004), available 
at http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/ocfs/cw/reports/2003_CPS_Report.pdf.  In 2008, the number of assigned 
reports had increased to 6,178, Me. Dep’t of Human Servs., Annual Report on Referrals 2008, 3 (May 
15, 2009), available at http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/ocfs/cw/reports/2008_CPS_Report.pdf, and in 2014 
the number was 8,945, Me. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Child Protective Services Annual Report 
2014, 5 (Mar. 2015), available at http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/ocfs/cw/reports/documents/ 
2014CPSAnnualReport_FINAL.pdf, representing an 81% increase in cases assigned to child welfare 
caseworkers over the course of eleven years. 
  There has been a corresponding substantial increase in child protection matters filed in District 
Court. Between fiscal years 2010 and 2014, the number of child protection petitions filed in Maine 
District Court increased by 36%, from 737 to 1008. Me. Admin. Office of the Courts, Maine State Court 
Caseload 5 Year Trend, 4 (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://www.courts.maine.gov/ 
news_reference/stats/pdf/5yr%20Trend%20Stats/Statewide%20Stats%20FY'10_FY'14.pdf.   
 214.  Faircloth, supra note 112; Mazziotti, supra note 130.  The burdens on the child protection 
system have a spillover effect resulting in more guardianship petitions in Probate Court.   As noted 
earlier, supra note 160 and accompanying text, one strategy frequently implemented by DHHS as part 
of a “safety plan” in child welfare investigations is to identify a non-parent family member to provide 
care for a child and then to encourage that relative to seek guardianship of the child.  With the 
guardianship order in place, DHHS then closes its file on the child.  See SANDRA S. BUTLER, UNIV. OF 
ME. CTR. ON AGING, SUPPORTING MAINE'S FAMILIES: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MAINE'S RELATIVES 
AS PARENTS PROJECT 3, 7 (2005), available at http://umcoa.siteturbine.com/uploaded_files/ 
mainecenteronaging.umaine.edu/files/RAPPWhitePaper08.pdf (describing factors leading to increasing 
number of children being raised by grandparents and other non-parent relatives and how guardianships 
save the State money).  
  Interestingly, in her 1966 essay, Taylor noted reduced agency caseload as one of the advantages 
of legal guardianships: “Social agencies which would develop and encourage the use of the relationship 
of guardian and ward would be able to ‘close the case’ after satisfactory placement had been achieved 
for appropriate children and letters of guardianship issued, as is done when an adoption decree is 
issued.” Taylor, supra note 90, at 420. 
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reason to try to preserve the parent-child relationship.  These scenarios require 
flexibility and customization of guardianship orders.  However, the typical form 
orders for appointing guardians issued by most probate courts are not structured to 
set forth detailed, case-specific language.215  Similarly, the short-term (maximum of 
six months) temporary guardianships permitted under the MPC limit probate 
courts’ ability to provide extended interim relief.216 Accordingly, many families 
involved with these cases find that the probate courts are not in a position to 
manage the proceedings in the most effective manner. 
In contrast to the MPC’s limited and rigid language in guardianship and TPR 
matters, discussed in the prior section, the statutes and rules governing family 
matters in District Court provide a far greater range of options to address the 
interests of the children in challenging situations, such as appointing a GAL, 
issuing and modifying interim relief, requiring participation in parent education 
programs and counseling, setting progressive visitation schedules, crafting 
reunification plans, and other targeted measures.217 Family Law Magistrates 
oversee many of the cases involving children in the Judicial Branch’s Family 
Division.218  District Courts manage child protection matters pursuant to a specific 
statutory framework and timelines.219  The underlying policy determination 
reflected in Maine’s family law statutes is that a child is best served by maintaining 
a relationship with his or her parents unless compelling circumstances dictate 
otherwise and that such relationship should not be severed until all possible 
measures have been exhausted (or the parent fails to engage in such measures).220  
This approach is also required to protect parents’ fundamental constitutional 
rights.221 
                                                                                                     
 215.  See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.04 
at 5-32.6 (discussing Form PP-104).  A guardianship imposed pursuant to 18-A M.R.S.A § 5-204(c) 
over the objections of one or both parents should set forth detail regarding the basis for finding the 
“intolerable living situation” and should include provisions for visitation rights and child support. 
MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.06B at 5-32.9. Form PP-108 was developed for this purpose but 
it is not used by probate judges consistently.  Faircloth, supra note 112 (noting that some probate judges 
do not use the standard forms).  Judges may set forth such details and provisions in an order that is not 
set forth on the form. 
 216.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 207(c); see also In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 17 n.6, 98 
A.3d 1023. 
 217.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(2) (2012); 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4036, 4041 (Supp. 2014).  
 218.  See M.R. CIV. P. 100, 110A. 
 219.  See, e.g., 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4031–4039 (2004 & Supp. 2014).  The District Court can also order 
the parties to participate in mediation with a professional mediator hired, trained, and supervised by the 
Maine Judicial Branch’s Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Services (CADRES).  19-A M.R.S.A.  
§ 251; http://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/adr/index.shtml (accessed on October 31, 2015).  
There is no equivalent service for litigants in the Probate Courts.  The Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic has 
been fortunate to work with pro bono mediators in a few of our contested guardianship cases who 
provided mediation services in response to requests from either our office or the Probate Court.  The 
Maine Legislature’s Task Force on Kinship Families, in its November 2010 Report, suggested that 
increased availability of mediation services in guardianship matters would be beneficial to the Probate 
Court and families.  See TFKF Report, supra note 160, at 8. 
 220.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. §1653(1)(C) (Supp. 2014); 22 M.R.S.A. § 4003(3) (Supp. 2014); In re 
Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 41, 854 A.2d 195 (“The formulation of rehabilitation and reunification 
plans is a cornerstone of the Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act.”). 
 221.  See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752–54 (1982). 
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Proper adjudication of difficult parental rights cases also requires a system 
whose structure can accommodate multiple court appearances and periodic reviews 
to address new conditions and circumstances as they arise.  The Maine probate 
courts’ decentralized, uncoordinated structure is ill-suited to address the challenges 
that can arise in parental rights matters.  They are not included in the Family 
Division nor any other part of the Maine Judicial Branch.  Accordingly, there is 
limited opportunity for development of uniform (or at least consistent) procedures 
among the various probate courts, and the practices of different probate courts in 
fact vary greatly.222  Indeed, there is no “Probate Court system” to develop and 
implement policy and best practices and coordinate the work of all of the probate 
courts, as the Maine Judicial Branch does for the courts within its system.223  This 
means that, other than the appellate jurisdiction of the Law Court224 or the 
oversight of the Committee on Judicial Disability and Responsibility,225 each of 
which can only review specific errors or complaints on a case-by-case basis, there 
is no oversight of the probate courts.226 
The Maine Judicial Branch also has several features to increase efficiency and 
quality control and to improve the administration of justice within the Family 
Division.  For example, Maine District Court judges and Family Law Magistrates 
participate in initial training and intensive continuing judicial education.227  The 
                                                                                                     
 222.  While there is a set of procedural rules (i.e. Maine Rules of Probate Procedure) and standard 
forms for use in Probate Courts, many individual courts vary in their practice and may even require use 
of their own forms and unwritten procedures.  Attorneys who practice in probate courts quickly learn 
not to assume that the procedure in one county will be followed in another.  In addition, the election of a 
new judge in a county can bring about a range of changes in practice.  Faircloth, supra note 112. 
  There is an informal nonprofit association, the Maine Probate Judges Assembly, which meets 
twice each year for educational presentations and discussion. Mazziotti, supra note 130.  It has no 
responsibility for setting probate court policy or procedure.  The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s 
Advisory Committee on Probate Rules oversees revisions to the Maine Rules of Probate Procedure.  
However, such rules are fairly general, and individual probate courts set much actual “procedure” 
through local practice, not the promulgation of rules. 
 223.  Because the probate courts are not part of a “system” of courts—but instead a “separate and 
distinct” court exists in each county—a party cannot request a change in venue.  See In re Adoption of 
G., 502 A.2d 1044, 1046 n.5 (Me. 1986) (vacating adoption because probate court did not have 
jurisdiction over petition when no party resided in that county).  Probate courts can transfer cases to 
another probate court.  See 18-A M.R.S.A. §1-303(c) (2012). 
 224.  See 4 M.R.S.A. § 7 (1989); 18-A M.R.S.A. §1-308 (2012).   
 225.  ME. R. COMM. JUD. RESPONSIBILITY & DISABILITY, Order 6, available at 
http://www.jrd.maine.gov/pdfs/JudRespDisabR%202-15.pdf.  
    226.  One consequence of this lack of supervision is that each probate judge has a nearly unfettered 
ability to control his or her court calendar or docket. A notable recent example of this is a probate judge 
who allegedly altered his docket to cause substantial delays in cases (including those involving children) 
as retaliation against the county in a dispute about his pay.  Scott Dolan, Judge Denied Big Pay Raise 
Retaliated by Causing Backlog, York County Officials Say, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 9, 2015, 
http://www.pressherald.com/2015/11/09/york-county-officials-find-probate-judge-intentionally-created-
court-backlog-to-retaliate/.  
 227.  As Superior Court Justice Thomas Warren explained recently: 
When appointed, Maine District [Court] Judges usually have a two month orientation 
program and shadow experienced judges before beginning independent case resolution. . . 
. After that, there is a requirement that all judges, justices, and magistrates obtain 24 
hours of continuing judicial education within every two year period.  In 2012 and 2014 
the Judicial Branch held a three-day Maine Judicial College of judicial education 
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Judicial Branch maintains a roster of qualified GALs whom the District Court may 
appoint in child protection and family law matters228 and oversees a program to 
recruit, train, and supervise volunteer GALs in child protection matters.229  The 
Judicial Branch has policies and protocols to ensure language access for those with 
limited English proficiency or limited hearing.230  It also provides low-cost or free 
mediation services by an approved roster of trained, professional mediators in 
family matters through the Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Service 
(CADRES).231  Without a central authority, the probate courts cannot replicate 
these features; this limitation further undermines the probate courts’ ability to meet 
the needs of the families who appear before them. 
2. The “split jurisdiction” of district and probate courts over parental rights 
matters leads to confusion, delay, inefficiencies, and inconsistent rulings 
One of the most serious consequences of the assignment of guardianship and 
adoption matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate courts is that such 
cases can be complicated by the occurrence of separate, simultaneous proceedings 
in the District Court involving the same child.232  My review of national surveys of 
court jurisdiction indicates that Maine may be unique or among only a very small 
number of states that have family law jurisdiction spread out between, not only 
different courts,233 but separate court systems, each of which has exclusive 
                                                                                                     
programs for judges and magistrates of the District Court . . . . It is anticipated that in the 
future the three-day Judicial College will offered every two years and in alternate years a 
one-day intensive educational program will be offered. 
E-mail from Justice Thomas Warren, Chair of the Maine Judicial Branch’s Judicial Education 
Committee, to author (July 28, 2015) (on file with author). 
 228.  See generally 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1507 (2012); 22 M.R.S.A. § 4005 (Supp. 2014).  For the roster, 
see Guardians Ad Litem, STATE OF MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.maine.gov/ 
maine_courts/family/gal/index.html (last visited Sep. 18, 2015). 
 229.  The Maine Judicial Branch oversees the Court Appointed Special Advocate Program. See 
generally Court Appointed Special Advocates, STATE OF MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
http://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/family/casa/index.shtml (last visited Sep. 18, 2015). 
 230.  To view these policies, see Accessibility and Interpreters, STATE OF MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
http://www.courts.maine.gov/citizen_help/access_interp.html (last visited Sep. 18, 2015). 
 231.  For information about CADRES, see Alternative Dispute Resolution, STATE OF MAINE 
JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/adr/index.shtml (last visited Sep. 19, 
2015). 
 232.  See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶¶ 2-13, 98 A.3d 1023; Jewel II, 2010 
ME 80, ¶¶ 36-37, 2 A.3d 301; Jewel I, 2010 ME 17, ¶ 6, 989 A.2d 726; see also An Act To Ensure a 
Continuing Home Court for Cases Involving Children: Hearing on L.D. 890 Before the J. Standing 
Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Leg. (Me. 2015) (statements of Lou Ann Clifford, Andrew Dawson, Sen. 
Roger Katz, Calien Lewis, Mary Ann Lynch, Rep. Kimberly Monaghan, Jacqueline Moss, Dana 
Prescott, Deirdre M. Smith, Heather Whiting, and Caroline Wilshusen) 
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/display_ps.asp?snum=127&paper=HP0609PID=0# (click to 
expand “Public Hearings” hyperlink; then follow hyperlinks for individual testimony documents) 
(describing significant problems presented, both system-wide and in specific cases, of current 
jurisdictional split of family matters between district and probate courts). 
 233.  For example, in 2003 (the year of the most recent survey by the National Center for State 
Courts), Maine was one of thirteen states in which guardianships of minors were handled in a Probate 
Court, but it was one of only two states in which the Probate Court had the exclusive jurisdiction over 
such cases. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF PROBATE JURISDICTION (2003), 
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jurisdiction over certain matters thereby precluding coordination or consolidation 
of proceedings.234  The current system of “split jurisdiction” between district and 
probate courts is depicted in Figure 1.235  
 
This split jurisdiction over parental rights matters is particularly problematic 
because Maine law is unclear regarding which proceedings take precedence or how 
conflicting orders are to be interpreted and enforced.236  As a practical matter, by 
suspending parents’ rights, guardianship orders take precedence over underlying 
                                                                                                     
available at http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/spcts/id/173.  The other state is 
Connecticut, whose probate courts have more extensive jurisdiction over a range of family matters, 
including child welfare and paternity cases, than Maine’s probate courts. See Children’s Matters, 
CONNECTICUT PROBATE COURTS, http://www.ctprobate.gov/Pages/ChildrensMatters.aspx, (last visited 
Sep. 20, 2015).   
 234.  Table of Probate Jurisdiction, NATIONAL COLLEGE OF PROBATE JUDGES (2014) 
http://ncpj.org/about-ncpj/state-courts-having-probate-jurisdiction/ (“In most states, probate subject 
matter jurisdiction is vested in the courts of general trial jurisdiction as a division within the courts.”).  
Some states continue to have designated probate courts, but such courts are usually part of the state 
judicial branch.  For example, Vermont’s Probate Court is now part its Superior Court in the Vermont 
Judiciary. https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/GTC/Probate/default.aspx New Hampshire’s Probate Court 
is part of its Circuit Courts. http://www.courts.state.nh.us/probate/.  Only Maine’s probate courts are 
described as “under county, not state, court system jurisdiction.”  NATIONAL COLLEGE OF PROBATE 
JUDGES, supra at 13.  Those few probate courts that are separate from the state court system also have 
far more limited jurisdiction than do Maine’s probate courts (i.e. estate or adult 
guardianship/conservatorship matters), making conflicts unlikely.  Id. 
 235.  Figure 1 does not include the theoretical, but apparently unused, jurisdiction of Probate Courts 
to make parental rights determinations and the concurrent jurisdiction of the district and probate courts 
to issue preliminary protection orders in child protection matters.  See supra notes 111–114 and 
accompanying text. 
 236.  Marin v. Marin, 2002 ME 88, ¶ 10 n.1, 797 A.2d 1265. 
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District Court divorce and parental rights orders, 237 but they cannot supersede child 
protection and protection from abuse orders.238  Yet, no statute or Law Court 
opinion sets forth explicit guidance on how the determination of priority for 
proceedings and orders must apply in various situations.  Moreover, probate and 
district courts are inconsistent regarding communication about pending matters.239  
Even if courts do share information, Maine law provides no guidance to courts 
about how to proceed in a way that protects the parties’ rights and the child’s 
interests and ensures that they handle the matter in an efficient and effective 
way.240 
District courts and probate courts may, in their respective parental rights cases 
involving the same child, engage in fact finding or may appoint GALs to conduct 
an investigation and provide recommendations.241  However, separate proceedings 
render it difficult, if not impossible, for the other court to avoid re-litigation of 
certain issues or to build on (and issue orders consistent with) prior knowledge 
acquired by the court and GAL about the family and the course of proceedings.242 
Similarly, name change petitions involving minor children, which are in the 
exclusive jurisdiction of probate courts, can be rendered more complex by the fact 
that a parent’s authority to seek such name change is controlled by the rights 
granted under a District Court order; yet the District Court has no jurisdiction to 
order a child’s name to be changed as part of a parental rights proceeding.243  Thus, 
where there is no parental rights order in effect but a child’s parent wishes to 
change a child’s name without the consent of the other parent, the Law Court 
explained the two-step, two-court process for doing so as follows: “If a single 
parent with shared decision-making authority wishes to change a child’s name, the 
appropriate procedure is to petition the District Court for an allocation of parental 
rights giving her or him the exclusive authority to do so.  Once a parent has been 
allocated the authority, he or she may then petition the Probate Court 
                                                                                                     
 237.  Id. ¶ 10 (noting that the District Court has jurisdiction to determine parental rights and 
responsibilities as between parents “subject to the outstanding guardianship” another has over their 
child). MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.01.3.C at 5-16–5-17. 
 238.  Nadeau, supra note 74, at 36; 22 M.R.S.A. § 4031(3) (Supp. 2014) (stating that a child 
protective order “takes precedence over any prior order regarding the child's care and custody”). 
 239.  In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶¶ 15-17, 98 A.3d 1023; Jewel II, 2010 ME 80,  
¶ 50, 2 A.3d 301. 
 240.  Jewel II, 2010 ME 80, ¶¶ 24, 36, 50, 2 A.3d 301.  Indeed, the courts may conclude that they 
simply need to allow the proceedings before their respective courts to continue as there is no way to 
consolidate the matters due to the courts’ respective exclusive jurisdiction. 
 241.  See, e.g., Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 15, 98 A.3d 1023 (noting conflicting District and Probate 
Court orders in effect); In re Guardianship of Kean R. IV, 2010 ME 84, ¶ 5, 2 A.3d 340 (noting that the 
District Court had scheduled a hearing on a parental rights and responsibilities matter for the month 
following a hearing on the paternal grandmother’s guardianship petition, which both parents opposed). 
 242.  See, e.g., In re Adoption of Michaela C., 2004 ME 153, ¶ 8 n.1, 863 A.2d 270 (noting that, for 
unknown reasons, the Probate Court had appointed a GAL for a child in an adoption proceeding where a 
different person had served as GAL in the child protection proceeding). 
 243.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-701(a) (2012); In re Perry, 2004 ME 46, ¶ 5, 845 A.2d 1153; In re Kidder, 
541 A.2d 630, 631.  By contrast, the District Court does have jurisdiction to order a name change for 
one or both divorcing spouses as part of a divorce judgment pursuant to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1051 (2012), 
presumably for reasons of efficiency. 
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unilaterally.”244 
While a District Court judge, as well as a GAL, may have become very 
familiar with (and a familiar face to) a child involved in a child protection 
proceeding, the adoption of that child must proceed in a new case before a judge 
who has no prior knowledge of the child, the petitioners (who may be foster parents 
or other long-term caregivers), or the context for the adoption.245  The need for an 
entirely new and separate proceeding for the child’s adoption not only may result in 
significant delays in completing the adoption, it may derail the adoption entirely. 
The Probate Court may decide that, notwithstanding the District Court’s 
permanency, the adoption petition should be denied, thereby sending the child back 
into the State child protection system.246 
A related complication that can arise in these dual-jurisdiction child protection 
matters stems from the probate courts’ authority under the MPC adoption provision 
to find that DHHS’s position to withhold consent to a pending adoption is 
“unreasonable.”247  In In re Adoption of Matthew R.,248 the child’s mother had 
consented to the entry of a District Court child protection permanency order and 
specifically to the child’s adoption by his foster parent.249  Other family members 
unsuccessfully sought to intervene in the child protection matter, and then 
petitioned for adoption of the child in probate court.250  The foster parent then filed 
a competing adoption petition in the same probate court, which consolidated the 
matters.  The Probate Court held a hearing on the issue of DHHS’s position 
opposing the family members’ petition and concluded that DHHS had 
unreasonably withheld its consent.251 
One of the few types of family law matters on which probate and district 
courts do have some concurrent jurisdiction is with respect to child support, as such 
orders can be entered by the Probate Court in guardianship matters, as well as by 
the District Court252 or by DHHS (through its Division of Support Enforcement and 
                                                                                                     
 244.  Perry, 2004 ME 46, ¶ 5 n.1, 845 A.2d 1153.  One could argue, however, that changing a child’s 
name implicates the other parent’s rights, thus requiring that the court provide the parent notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.  The Law Court has never considered the constitutionality of unilateral name 
changes. 
 245.  See Testimony of Lou Ann Clifford and Caroline Wilshusen 
 (Guardians ad litem) in Support of LD 890, 127th Legis, http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/ 
display_ps.asp?paper=HP0609&snum=127#. 
 246.  Id.; 18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-205. 
 247.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-302(a)(3) (2012). 
 248.  In re Adoption of Matthew R., 2000 ME 86, 750 A.2d 1262. 
 249.  Id. ¶ 3. 
 250.  Id.  To add even more complexity, those same family members obtained guardianship over the 
child’s sibling, who was also the subject of a child protective proceeding. Id. at ¶ 3, n.2. 
 251.  Id. ¶ 5.  The Law Court denied DHHS’s appeal from that decision as interlocutory and 
remanded the case for a final determination on the adoption petitions.  Id. ¶¶ 5–8.  The Law Court was 
critical of the Probate Court for bifurcating the issue of consent from the adoption itself as having 
contributed to the further delay in the resolution of the child’s adoption.  Id. ¶ 8, n. 5. 
 252. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204 (2012); 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1652, 2001–2012 (2012 & Supp. 2014).  
Kennebec County Probate Judge James Mitchell and his co-author Philip Hunt suggests that the 
“simplest solution” is to “redirect[]” a child support order between parents to the guardian.  MITCHELL 
& HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.01.3.C at 5-15.  However, such redirecting would not, strictly speaking, be 
in accordance with the child support guidelines, which base awards on the “gross income of both 
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Recovery, which is separate from its Office of Child and Family Services) in an 
administrative proceeding.253  However, the efficiencies that can be gained by 
allowing a probate court to enter a child support order as part of a guardianship 
proceeding are quite limited where a support order is already in effect.  The law is 
unclear regarding the priority of orders in the event that multiple orders are in 
effect.254  With respect to child support orders, a probate court cannot issue an 
order regarding arrears that have accrued under a District Court order, even in the 
context of issuing an order directly implicating the parental rights of the parent 
with a support obligation.255  It can be quite confusing to sort out whether and to 
what extent a child support order is enforceable when there is a guardianship order 
in effect, particularly when it concerns a child who is one of multiple children 
included on another support order.256 
The Law Court commented in an appeal in a probate court termination of a 
parental rights matter, where the father sought to have his child support arrearage 
eliminated on the termination of such rights, that the Probate Court was correct in 
declining to address the issue of support; “These orders originate in the District 
Court, and the District Court retains jurisdiction to amend or terminate such 
orders.”257  The Law Court appeared to be not only referring to the order with 
respect to the father in that case, but also observing, as a general matter, that child 
support matters (“These orders…”) are addressed in the District Court.258 
A related problem of split jurisdiction arises when the parties in a contested 
guardianship or adoption case reach an agreement that involves modification to an 
existing parental rights order in a District Court family matter.  The parties must 
first request that the Probate Court stay the proceedings, and then they must file a 
new post-judgment matter in the District Court (meeting all of the filing and 
service requirements) to move the District Court to make the modification to the 
                                                                                                     
parties” and presumes that the “primary care provider” supports the child directly and the other parent 
must make weekly payments.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2006 (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 253.  19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2002, 2101–2109 (2012 & Supp. 2014).  See also Testimony of Attorney 
General Janet Mills in Support of LD 890, 127th Legis., http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/ 
getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=29269 (describing four cases in which child support enforcement was 
complicated by the occurrence of simultaneous proceedings in probate and district courts). 
 254.  MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.01.3.C at 5-15.  If there is an administrative order 
issued by DHHS, such order is suspended once a court order (whether from District or Probate Court) is 
entered.  Id. at 5-16.  
 255.  In re Jacob B., 2008 ME 168, ¶ 19, 959 A.2d 734. 
 256.  MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 5.01.3.C at 5-16–5-17 (2014).  Moreover, a guardianship 
terminates automatically when the ward reaches the age of 18 and presumably the accompanying child 
support obligation ends with it. This leads to a different result from some child support orders issued 
under title 19-A, which may terminate between the ages of 18, and 19 if the child is attending secondary 
school.  19-A M.R.S.A. § 2001(11) (2012). 
 257.  Jacob B., 2008 ME 168, ¶ 21, 959 A.2d 734. 
 258.  An additional distinction is that probate judges have the discretion to enter child support orders 
in guardianship matters, see 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-104 (2012) (“the court may order parent to pay child 
support”) (emphasis added), whereas a District Court parental rights and responsibilities order must 
include “a provision for child support . . . or a statement of the reason for not ordering child support,” 
19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(2)(D)(3) (2012).  Some probate judges, as a matter of regular practice, refuse to 
order child support as part of guardianship proceedings. 
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District Court order.259  This is in sharp contrast with, for example, litigants’ 
options for resolving Protection from Abuse (PFA) Proceedings; if they reach an 
agreement to amend a family matter order in lieu of (or in addition to) a PFA 
Order, it is quite simple to have the District Court amend the family matter order on 
the same day that the parties are in court for the PFA.260 
The circumstances described in the 2004 Law Court opinion In re Adoption of 
Michaela C. demonstrate how this split jurisdiction can allow a dispute to develop 
into a morass, with a young child at the center.261  The District Court had 
terminated the child’s mother’s parental rights in a child protection proceeding, but 
her father still had his parental rights.  DHHS’s permanency plan, approved by the 
District Court, was for the child to be adopted by her paternal grandmother, Rachel, 
an arrangement to which her father indicated that he would consent.  Rachel filed 
an adoption petition in the Sagadahoc County Probate Court.  The child’s maternal 
grandmother, Linda, filed a competing adoption petition in the York County 
Probate Court, which both the father and DHHS opposed.262  The York County 
Probate Court refused to dismiss Linda’s petition, and the entire situation came to a 
standstill for years.263  The Law Court held that the York County Probate Court had 
to dismiss Linda’s petition because the biological father would not consent to the 
adoption by Linda and the Probate Court could not terminate his parental rights in 
that matter since there was a pending child protection petition.264  The Law Court 
stated plainly: “Children should not be in limbo, caught between courts.”265 
The Maine Judicial Branch’s Family Division Task Force issued a Report on 
June 6, 2014, which addressed, among other concerns, the split jurisdiction system 
                                                                                                     
 259.  Faircloth, supra note 112.  We have done several of these cases in the Clinic, such as when the 
parties to a contested adoption agree to the entry of a District Court order granting a petitioner de facto 
parent status, thereby establishing a legal parent-child relationship without requiring the termination of 
the biological parents’ rights. 
 260.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4010(2) (providing that PFA proceedings may be independent of or 
joined with other family matters).  In the Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic’s experience with PFA matters, 
we have frequently seen cases resolved on the dates set for a final hearing through the parties’ 
agreement to enter or modify an order in a parental rights proceeding.  Similarly, a District Court judge 
presiding over a protective custody proceeding may enter an order regarding parental rights pursuant to 
19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653, which can enable the parties to resolve the protective custody case through an 
amendment to a family matters order.  22 M.R.S.A. § 4036(1-A) (Supp. 2014).  The District Court can 
also consolidate child protection and grandparents’ visitation rights proceedings.  19-A M.R.S.A. § 1805 
(2012). 
 261.  In re Adoption of Michaela C., 2004 ME 153, 863 A.2d 270. 
 262.  The local probate court for Rachel, who lived with the child in Kennebec County, was the 
Kennebec County Probate Court.  However, counsel for Linda, the maternal grandmother, was the 
Probate Judge in that county so her petition was transferred to the Sagadahoc County Probate Court. Id. 
¶ 19 n.5, 863 A.2d 270. 
 263.  Id. ¶ 8, 863 A.2d 272-73.  
 264.  Id. ¶¶ 14, 19, 863 A.2d 270 (citing 18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-204(a) (2012); 22 M.R.S.A. § 4051 
(Supp. 2014)). 
 265.  Id. ¶ 15, 863 A.2d 270. Linda’s adoption petition had been pending in the York County Probate 
Court for three years by the time of the Law Court’s opinion; the Law Court issued its opinion nine days 
after the completion of briefing. 
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for family matters.266  The Task Force noted, based on information gathered at a 
series of public hearings and from solicitation of public comments: “Litigants and 
attorneys expressed dissatisfaction with the disconnect between the various district 
courts and the county probate courts.  Overall, the perception is that when families 
are required to appear before two completely separate and disconnected legal 
venues, the result is confusion and waste of precious resources.”267 
Social science findings bear out these concerns and note even more worrisome 
conclusions.  Extensive research during recent decades has documented the adverse 
effects on children’s emotional health and development of protracted and 
contentious litigation regarding custody issues.268  Some scholars have analyzed the 
potential negative impact of intergenerational disputes, such as grandparent 
visitation litigation, which can often occur in the context of parental conflict and 
instability.269  Commentators have also noted how “fragmented” jurisdiction over 
children’s issues can cause a range of harms for children, litigants, and the 
courts.270  Maine’s split jurisdiction between district and probate courts – and the 
associated delay, confusion, and conflict – implicate all of these concerns. 
3. The probate courts’ “informality” and limited resources can result in 
inadequate due process and access to justice for litigants 
Maine’s probate courts have long touted their reputation as an informal 
“peoples’ court” where unrepresented litigants can have their matters addressed in 
a setting away from the often-emotional and fast-paced, hectic state courts.271  As 
the vast majority of what probate courts do is non-adversarial, whether it be the 
                                                                                                     
 266.  Maine Judicial Branch, Family Division Task Force, Final Report to the Justices of the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court 6 (2014) (“FDTF Report”) available at http://www.courts.maine.gov/ 
maine_courts/supreme/comment/fdtf/ftdf_notice.shtml. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  John H. Grych, Interparental Conflict as a Risk Factor for Child Maladjustment: Implications 
for the Development of Prevention Programs, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 97, 99–100 (2005); Joan B. Kelly, 
Psychological And Legal Interventions For Parents and Children in Custody and Access Disputes: 
Current Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 131 (2002); Linda D. Elrod, Reforming 
The System To Protect Children In High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495, 496–
501 (2001); Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault 
Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395, 
405 (2000); Catherine C. Ayoub et al., Emotional Distress in Children of High-Conflict Divorce: The 
Impact of Marital Conflict and Violence, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION COURTS REV. 297, 298–301 (1999); 
Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary 
System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 85, 123–27, 133–34 (1997); Richard Wolman & Keith Taylor, 
Psychological Effects of Custody Disputes on Children, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 399 (1991). 
 269.  Stephen A. Newman, Grandparent Visitation Claims: Assessing the Multiple Harms of 
Litigation to Families and Children, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 21, 27–40 (2003). 
 270.  Carolyn D. Schwartz, Unified Family Courts: A Saving Grace for Victims of Domestic Violence 
Living in Nations With Fragmented Court Systems, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 304, 309–10 (2004); 
Developments in the Law−The Law of Marriage and Family: Unified Family Courts And The Child 
Protection Dilemma, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2099, 2105–06 (2003); Elrod, supra note 268, at 519–20; 
Catherine Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Unified Family Courts, 32 
FAM. L.Q. 3, 6–9 (1998); Weinstein, supra note 268, at 173–74. 
 271.  Public Testimony of Hon. Michael Dubois, Androscoggin County Probate Judge, before Joint 
Standing Committee on the Judiciary, 127th Legislature (February 3, 2015). Judge Dubois estimated 
that between 80-90% of litigants in his court were not represented by counsel.   
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administration of estates (which can often be managed entirely by the register and 
her staff, without any involvement of the probate judge) or uncontested 
guardianships and name changes,272 the un-court-like “feel” for the register’s office 
may provide a less stressful setting for petitioners and others seeking help.  Indeed, 
reports regarding the operation of probate courts, discussed further in Part IV.A 
below,273 note the probate court offices seem to function and serve the public well. 
However, in the context of contested parental rights matters before a probate 
court or the District Court, or where a probate court’s actions may supersede those 
of the District Court, this informality and overall structure can be counter-
productive and even injurious to the rights of litigants and the interests of 
children.274  Although Probate Judges describe their approach as having positive 
benefits, their description of what such approach entails suggests that they equate 
informality with a casual approach to process.275 
The probate courts, with very limited resources, are ill-equipped to handle the 
protracted nature of contested parental rights disputes, which often require multiple 
testimonial hearings, including those for modification or enforcement of prior court 
orders.  Circumstances may necessitate expeditious resolutions of specific disputes 
to protect a child’s best interests or a litigant’s rights.  Probate Judges are part-time, 
and each probate court has only one judge to serve the entire county.  Thus, 
                                                                                                     
 272.  In 2013, only 25% of minor guardianship petitions and 1% of name change petitions filed in 
Maine probate courts were contested matters.  Attorneys were involved in 4% of name changes.  Data is 
not publicly available regarding attorney involvement in adoption proceedings.  Research results on file 
with author. 
 273.  See infra notes 305–340 and accompanying text. 
 274.  In addition to the problems associated with informality set forth below, many probate judges do 
not routinely follow the Maine Rules of Evidence in contested testimonial matters involving parental 
rights, although such proceedings are not exempted from the rules’ applicability. ME. R. EVID. 101.  
 275.  For example, Androscoggin County Probate Judge Michael Dubois noted in his statement to the 
Judiciary Committee on behalf of the Probate Judges Assembly in opposition to LD 890 that, among the 
benefits of litigating family law matters in probate court rather than District Court:  
Any interested person may petition the probate court to ensure the protection and 
promotion of a minor's best interests.  No predetermination of standing is required, no 
extensive pleadings and no pre-hearing conferences are needed.  In fact, notice may be 
waived as the circumstances warrant.  Many probate guardianships are resolved quite 
successfully without employing the myriad legal and social services supports. 
Letter of Hon. Michael Dubois to Joint Standing Committee on Judiciary, L.D. 890 (127th Legis. 2015) 
(emphasis added) (on file with author); see infra notes 352–370 and accompanying text (discussing L.D. 
890 and the model set forth therein). 
  Similarly, in 1986, Franklin County Probate Judge Richard Morton (who is still in office) 
offered the following caution to the Maine Legislature’s Joint Standing Committee on Judiciary as a 
basis to reject legislation that would merge all family law matters into the District Court and create 
several new full-time probate judge positions within that court: 
The informality and extra time that we are now able to provide to the public will be a 
thing of the past. People who now can obtain guardians or conservators without attorneys 
will be forced to hire counsel because the cases will have to be properly organized and 
documented when the Judge arrives.  Perhaps it is essential to progress that the Probate 
Courts become as impersonal as the District Courts are now, but society pays dearly for 
that progress and the architects of progress must recognize the cost they are exacting. 
Testimony of Franklin County Probate Judge Richard Morton, L.D. 2119 (112th Legis. 1986).  Some 
attorneys have told me that they prefer to be in a probate court when the “informality” is advantageous 
to a client’s position. 
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scheduling hearings (particularly contested testimonial proceedings requiring 
several hours of court time) is very challenging, often leading to substantial delays 
or interruptions in proceedings.276 
A probate judge’s failure to timely process minor guardianship cases led to the 
reprimand of the Probate Judge for violation of the Judicial Canon requirement that 
a judge “dispose of all judicial matters promptly.”277 The Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court found that the Probate Judge was well-intentioned and that his “failure to 
effectively manage his caseload was undoubtedly aggravated by the substantial 
growth of the [] Probate Court’s family law docket in recent years.”278  The Court 
noted that a “heavier docket requires judicial practices tailored to the time-sensitive 
needs of children and families.”279  However, there have been no systemic or 
structural changes in the Maine probate courts to allow judges to tailor their 
practices to these acute needs. 
The limited resources and informal practices of the probate courts can also 
lead to inadequate due process for litigants in contested parental rights matters.  
Probate courts do not customarily record proceedings in minor guardianship 
matters, even in testimonial hearings where there is a request by one of the 
parties.280  Creating a record of proceedings is not only a core due process value,281 
it is also a best practice.282  Having an accurate record is essential for reviewing a 
                                                                                                     
 276.  See MAINE BAR DIRECTORY 98-99 (2014) (noting days each month when each county probate 
court holds court dates, such as Knox County, “first & third Wednesday of each month,” or Somerset 
County, “every three weeks”).  A probate court may spread the trial days in a single contested matter 
across several weeks because it cannot schedule a matter for consecutive days due to the limited 
availability of the Probate Judge.  Even non-testimonial court dates in guardianship matters are 
sometimes scheduled more than six months into the future.  The delays in scheduling guardianship 
matters can be contrasted with child protection proceedings, which must follow 22 M.R.S.A. § 4035(4-
A) (2004 & Supp. 2014), which requires the District Court to issue a jeopardy order within 120 days of 
the filing of a child protection petition.  Indeed, I have heard reports that, in at least one Maine county, 
the delays in scheduling guardianship hearings have gotten so lengthy that a significant number of 
individuals concerned about the welfare of a child now resort to pursuing the more unusual and 
complicated route of filing a “three-party petition” to initiate a child protection proceeding in District 
Court. See supra note 159 (explaining three-party petition process). 
 277.  In re Holmes, 2011 ME 119, ¶ 1, 32 A.3d 1011 (citing Maine Judicial Canon 3(B)(8)). 
 278.  See id. ¶ 4, 32 A.3d 1011 (quoting Justice Jon Levy’s factual findings). 
 279.  Id.   
 280.  See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 10, 98 A.3d 1023.  However, the Law 
Court has held that TPRs in adoption cases are “child protection” proceedings, and therefore must be 
recorded pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4007(1) (2004 & Supp. 2014).  In re Dylan B., 2001 ME 31, ¶ 1, 
766 A.2d 577 (vacating TPR order against mother and remanding where Probate Court failed to record 
contested TPR hearing).   
 281.  See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-23 (1996); Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, 646 
F. Supp. 799, 808 (D. R.I. 1986), rev’d in part on other grounds, 837 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988); In re 
Guardianship of McIntosh, 2015 ME 95, ¶ 14, 120 A.3d 654 (“In proceedings in which fundamental 
liberty interests are implicated, due process requires that there be an adequate record of the trial court 
decision, including any transcript of the proceedings, to permit fair consideration of the issues on 
appeal.”). 
 282.  See Task Force on Revision of the National Probate Court Standards, National Probate Court 
Standards, § 1.3.E (2012) (“Records of all relevant probate court decisions and proceedings should be 
accurately maintained and securely preserved.”).  
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court’s actions on appeal,283 and it can also be important for promptly documenting 
an agreement reached by parties at the courthouse by entering it “on the record” or 
for accurately capturing the specific terms of a bench ruling.284  The burden of 
arrangements for making one’s own recording is particularly severe on 
unrepresented or low-income parties.285 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has identified testimonial hearings 
involving the guardianship of children as a type of proceeding that a court must 
routinely record, regardless of any request of the parties.286  However, many 
probate courts did not follow the recording requirement set forth in that 
administrative order.287  Accordingly, “to . . . ensure that probate proceedings 
involving fundamental rights or liberty are . . . recorded,” the Law Court recently 
adopted amendments to the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure and the Maine Rules of 
Probate Procedure288 requiring probate courts to record “any proceeding that . . . 
any statute, court rule, or administrative order requires be recorded.”289  This would 
encompass minor guardianship proceedings, as well as any proceeding that “any 
party requests, at least 24 hours before the start of the proceeding, be recorded.”290 
With these amendments, probate courts should now record all parental rights 
matters that come before them, but given that most do not own recording 
equipment, it may be some time before such recording becomes routine. 
Another indication of the limited resources of these courts is that some 
attorneys who represent low-income litigants have noted that it is far more difficult 
                                                                                                     
 283.  McIntosh, 2015 ME 95, ¶¶ 14–15, 120 A.3d 654; In re Guardianship of Helen F., 2013 ME 18, 
¶¶ 5–7 (vacating adult guardianship order where Probate Court did not make recording of the 
proceedings and the judge’s inability to recall the evidence presented prevented the appellant from 
submitting an adequate statement of the evidence pursuant to M.R. App. P. 5(d)). See also In re 
Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 17 n. 6, 98 A.3d 1023 (noting the difficulty of determining on 
appeal what proceedings took place when there is no recording). 
 284.  See Toffling v. Toffling, 2008 ME 90, ¶ 8, 953 A.2d 375 (upholding District Court’s entry of 
judgment based on agreement orally put on the record by the parties). 
 285.  As noted in the Johnson opinion (a case in which the Clinic represented the appellant at both 
the trial and appellate levels), a probate court did not permit a party to make her own recording of a 
contested guardianship hearing after the court refused to record the proceedings. The Law Court 
declined to reverse the judgment due to such action, but it did note in its opinion: “Nevertheless, it is 
preferable in every instance for a trial court to allow a party to record a hearing if the court is unwilling 
or unable to do so.”  Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 18, 98 A.3d at 1023. 
 286.  Recording of Trial Court Proceedings, Me. Admin. Order JB-12-1 (as amended by A. 11-14) 
(effective Nov. 24, 2014).  The Maine Judicial Branch maintains a central Office of Transcript 
Operations and Projects, which provides transcriptions services for state court proceedings.  See The 
Office of Transcript Operations and Projects, STATE OF MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
http://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/transcription/index.shtml (stating that the office “provides 
the official transcripts of electronically recorded hearings from the Maine State Courts” and making no 
reference to probate courts) (last visited Sep. 21, 2015). 
 287.  In the recent opinion in Johnson, the Law Court noted that Administrative Order JB-12-1 
appears to require such recordings but declined to apply the AO in that case or to clarify its 
requirements. Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 18 n.7, 98 A.3d 1023. 
 288.  ME. R. CIV. P. 76H ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S NOTE TO 2015 AMEND., ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH 
WEBSITE/RULES (visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
 289.  ME. R. CIV. P. 76H(b)(2)(A); see ME. R. PROB. P. 76H (providing that, other that with respect 
to costs and fees, “Rule 76H of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure governs procedure in all formal 
probate and civil proceedings in the Probate Courts.”). 
 290.  ME. R. CIV. P. 76H(b)(2)(B). 
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for such clients to receive a waiver of filing and related fees in probate courts than 
in state courts, although both are ostensibly governed by the same rule for such 
waivers,291 and the U.S. Constitution’s requirement of due process, regardless of 
the ability to pay court fees, applies to both.292  This practice creates another barrier 
to the courts for a large number of litigants.  
4. The practice of law by Maine Probate Judges undermines the delivery of justice 
in parental rights matters 
The fact that sitting Probate Judges (and candidates for such office) are 
permitted under the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct to practice law293 can further 
complicate parental rights proceedings in probate court.  The only limitation on the 
judges’ practice is before their own court.294  This means that Probate Judges can 
appear as counsel in matters before their fellow Probate Judges in other counties, as 
well as in state courts anywhere, including the same county in which they sit.  
The practice of law by Maine’s elected part-time Probate Judges has long been 
the specific focus of extensive criticism.295  It causes practical problems and can 
lead to actual or apparent conflicts of interest;296 at the very least, it can be 
unsettling for the litigants and the other counsel.297  Such problems can be 
                                                                                                     
 291.  See ME. R. CIV. P. 91; ME. R. PROB. PROC. 91 (stating that “Rule 91 of the Maine Rules of 
Civil Procedure governs procedure in all proceedings in the Probate Courts”).  For example, although 
Rule 91(a)(3) sets forth a presumption of inability to pay court fees or costs if the affidavit states that the 
person’s income is “derived from poverty-based public assistance programs,” one of our clients, who 
was disabled and received needs-based benefits for herself and her two children, was ordered to appear 
for a testimonial hearing before a probate court when she sought a waiver of the filing and service fees 
(more than $100) for her petition to terminate the guardianship regarding her third child.  After the 
hearing, the probate court denied the fee waiver (but allowed the client to pay in monthly installments) 
because the client testified, in response to questioning from the judge, that she paid $8 per month for the 
Netflix streaming service (the only television programming her children watched) and $25 per month for 
a cell phone (her only telephone).  We have also noted that some probate courts refuse to grant fee 
waivers to incarcerated individuals as a matter of policy, and other attorneys have reported similar 
difficulties obtaining fee waivers for low-income clients.  
 292.  See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124–25 (1996) (holding that denying indigent parent’s 
access to record on appeal of termination of her parental rights violated due process). 
 293.  See ME. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, COVERAGE & EFFECTIVE DATE I(B) (exempting probate judges 
from several provisions of the code, including those prohibiting the practice of law). 
 294.  ME. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, COVERAGE & EFFECTIVE DATE I(B)(1). 
 295.  In re Estate of McCormick, 2001 ME 24, ¶ 16 n.4, 765 A.2d 552; ME. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO 2015 AMEND., ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH 
WEBSITE/RULES (visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
    296.    The ethical issues created by Maine’s current probate court system were the focus of oral 
arguments before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in a judicial misconduct appeal involving a Probate 
Judge. Justice Joseph Jabar posed the following questions to counsel for both the Probate Judge and the 
Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Discipline: “Aren’t all these problems inherent in having 
elected probate judges and allowing them to practice?… Isn’t this just the nature of the system in 
Maine?” Both attorneys responded: “Yes.” Judy Harrison, High Court Considers Ethical Problems of 
Probate Court Judges, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), http://bangordailynews.com/2015/11/04/ 
news/state/high-court-considers-ethical-problems-of-probate-court-judges/; see also Scott Dolan, 
Justices on Maine’s Highest Court Ask If Multiple Roles Cloud Ethical Rules For Accused Judge, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.pressherald.com/2015/11/04/maines-highest-
court-weighs-whether-to-discipline-part-time-judge/. 
 297.  See McCormick, 2001 ME 24, ¶ 16, 765 A.2d 552.  
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compounded because there is only one Probate Judge in each county, which 
requires a transfer of the case itself when there is a conflict of interest presented by 
the judge’s practice of law.298  Maine is an outlier, particularly in its utter lack of 
any restriction on the practice, permitting Probate Judges to appear before courts in 
their own county299 or before Probate Judges of other counties.300 
The implications of the lack of limitations on probate judges’ law practice is 
exemplified by a recent contested minor guardianship case in which the law school 
clinic I supervise represented a biological parent.  Counsel for the petitioners 
unseated the Probate Judge during the course of the proceedings.  Because there is 
only one judge in each county, the Probate Court had to transfer our case to another 
county, requiring additional travel for all of the parties, including our low-income 
client, witnesses, and counsel.  While the delay in our proceedings from the transfer 
was fairly minimal, there is certainly the potential for longer delays to result from 
any case transfer.  The transfer also meant that all of the prior judge’s knowledge of 
the case was no longer a part of the proceedings.  Opposing counsel, now a sitting 
Probate Judge, represented the petitioners until the case went to a contested 
hearing.  He then represented the other biological parent in a parallel District Court 
parental rights proceeding involving the same child.  These events demonstrate the 
inconvenience, disruption, cost, and appearance of impropriety that can result from 
the exemption created for Probate Judges from the Judicial Code’s prohibition on 
practice by judges when combined with the current Probate Court structure. 
By providing the above description of the range of problems presented by the 
current jurisdictional alignment of parental rights matters, my intention is not to 
suggest that Maine’s Probate Judges are not qualified, dedicated, ethical jurists.  To 
the contrary, many Probate Judges, despite their part-time status, low pay, 
inadequate resources, and poor guidance from the applicable statutes, do an 
exceptional job handling very difficult cases.  These judges devise creative 
solutions to family problems and are clearly committed both to administering their 
courts in a fair and just manner and to serving the best interests of all litigants who 
come before them, especially the children at the center of parental rights disputes.  
However, even the most conscientious and hard-working Probate Judge must 
nonetheless operate within the limitations created by the MPC, the Probate Court 
structure and its resources, and the split-jurisdiction approach to family matters.  
My criticisms here address those limitations, not the judges who must contend with 
                                                                                                     
 298.  4 M.R.S.A. § 307 (2014). 
 299.  New York imposes the following restrictions on all part-time judges: 
[Part-time judges] shall not practice law in the court on which the judge serves, or in any 
other court in the county in which his or her court is located, before a judge who is 
permitted to practice law, and shall not act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which the judge 
has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.  
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 100.6(B)(2) (2015). 
 300.  By contrast, in New Jersey, “Surrogates” (who are the equivalent of probate judges): 
Shall not practice law in any estate or trust matter, including the preparation of wills, trust 
documents, or any other probate documents, in or out of court.  Furthermore, a surrogate 
or deputy surrogate shall not practice law in any criminal, quasi-criminal or penal matter, 
whether judicial or administrative in nature, in that county, nor in the Superior Court, 
Chancery Division, Probate Part in any county.  
N.J. R. COURT 1:15-1(C), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/r1-15.htm. 
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them. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
As discussed in the prior section, Maine probate courts’ adjudication of 
parental rights disputes results in a wide range of problems.  The exclusive 
jurisdiction of these matters in under-resourced and part-time courts creates 
numerous limitations on these courts’ abilities to effectively and promptly address 
these matters.  Having a child at the center of one of these disputes also involved in 
a pending or prior District Court matter presents an even more significant problem.  
Accordingly, a range of reforms to the structure and jurisdiction of the probate 
courts is necessary to reverse these problems.  As an initial matter, the Legislature 
must expand the jurisdiction of the District Court to include these MPC parental 
rights matters so the same court can hear all matters involving the parental rights of 
a child.  A more comprehensive solution, as recommended in numerous studies and 
reports, is to absorb the county-based probate courts into the Maine Judicial 
Branch.301  Such restructuring, however, is not likely to occur anytime soon.  As 
long as Maine probate courts remain apart from the state court system as sixteen 
individual courts, other reforms are needed to minimize the negative impacts on 
litigants, such as mandating recording of probate court proceedings and limiting the 
practice of law by Probate Judges. 
In addition to these jurisdictional and structural changes, the text of the MPC 
provisions governing these matters is in need of substantial reform.  A series of 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court opinions adopting interpretations of the laws to 
preserve their constitutionality and to enable courts to use them to effectively 
address the needs of children and litigants has resulted in a body of case law that 
must be read in conjunction with the statutory language, in some cases to reverse 
the text’s plain language.  However, there are a number of provisions that no 
amount of generous interpretation could enable a court to apply in a way that 
addresses the full range of a child’s needs and embodies the broader policy goal of 
preserving families.  The Legislature also needs to revise the law to work 
effectively in a court with jurisdiction to hear all matters involving parental rights 
of a child.  Accordingly, I offer a series of suggested reforms for the MPC itself, 
which the Legislature could enact regardless of which court hears the matter. 
A. Attempts to Reform the Probate Court System 
Maine has a remarkable history of studying the problems of the probate court 
system generally and their handling of parental rights matters specifically and then 
not acting on the resulting recommendations.  Indeed, even though Maine voters 
amended the Maine Constitution in 1967 to abolish the probate court system, 
leaving only the implementation for the Legislature, no action has been taken to 
effectuate the voters’ mandate.302  I briefly outline this unfortunate history here. 
The period from the 1950s to 1980s saw multiple attempts to reform Maine’s 
probate court system.  Each of the proposals advanced during this period suggested 
                                                                                                     
 301.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 302.  Resolves 1967, ch. 77 (amending ME. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (repealed 1967)). 
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eliminating the courts in their present form and merging them into the state court 
system, which was itself undergoing rapid development and unification during this 
time.303  These efforts were launched in 1952, when Edward F. Dow, Chair of the 
University of Maine’s Department of History and Government304 published his 
study County Government in Maine on behalf of the Maine Legislative Research 
Committee.305 Professor Dow made several recommendations regarding the 
organization of local courts, including that the probate courts should be integrated 
into the state court system and their judges should be appointed.306  The reports that 
followed struck similar themes and made similar proposals. 
The Maine Legislature authorized two extensive studies of Maine’s probate 
courts in the 1960s.307  The reports resulting from these studies describe a situation 
that closely resembles the current system.308  The second, more comprehensive 
study, conducted by the Institute of Judicial Administration (“IJA”), was 
commissioned on the heels of a statewide referendum in 1967, in which Maine 
voters approved an amendment to the Maine Constitution repealing the 1855 
amendment that provided for the election of probate judges by the residents of each 
county.309  However, the language of the amendment provides that the repeal “shall 
become effective at such time as the Legislature by proper enactment shall 
                                                                                                     
 303.  WHITTIER, supra note 17, at 29-30.  The statewide District Court was established in 1961, 
replacing numerous county courts and creating a unified system. See P.L. 1961, ch. 386.  The 
Legislature established the present Superior Court system, which had been county-based, in 1930. See 
P.L. 1929, ch. 141. 
 304.  The History of Political Science at UMaine, THE UNIVERSITY OF MAINE, http://umaine.edu/ 
polisci/the-history-of-political-science-at-umaine (last visited September 16, 2015). 
 305.  See generally DOW, supra note 17. 
 306.  Id. at 17.  He recommended that the number of probate judges, courts, and registers be reduced 
statewide and that registers should be appointed by the probate judges.  Id. at 18.  His report included a 
strong critique of the county government structure, which had changed little since the constitutional 
amendment of 1855.  Id. at 6–10. 
  A commission convened by Governor John H. Reed in the early 1960s to review the entire 
Maine Constitution and make recommendations for reform included among its proposal the appointment 
of probate judges.  However, the Maine Legislature rejected this proposal in 1963.  TINKLE, supra note 
20, at 16.  As discussed in this section, the Maine Legislature has consistently rejected proposals to 
reform the probate courts or the position of probate judge. 
 307.  See generally THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE DESIRABILITY OF 
INTEGRATING ACTIVITIES OF THE PROBATE COURTS OF MAINE INTO THE SUPERIOR COURT 1–2 (1969) 
[hereinafter IJA REPORT] (citing S.P. No. 710 (July 8, 1967)); BUREAU OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 
UNIVERSITY OF MAINE, REPORT OF THE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE FEASIBILITY OF A PROBATE 
DISTRICT COURT SYSTEM FOR MAINE 1–3 (citing SP 254) (May 10, 1967) [hereinafter BPA REPORT]. 
 308.  See, e.g., BPA REPORT, supra note 307, at 7–9.  The jurisdiction of probate courts included 
wills, estates, adoptions, changes in legal name, the appointment of guardians; the judges were part-time 
and members of the bar; other than appellate review, there was no oversight of probate judges and little 
central rule-making; and there was little coordination with other courts.  As that report noted: “each of 
the 16 probate courts is, in essence, a court unto itself . . . .” Id. at 8. 
 309.  See Resolves 1967, ch. 77 (amending Me. Const. art. VI, § 6 (repealed 1967)). Approximately 
55% of the voters approved the amendment in the November 7, 1967 vote. 
(http://www.state.me.us/legis/lawlib/const.htm).  The Maine Legislature authorized a study of the 
Probate Court System with the aim of specifically examining the possibility of establishing a “Probate 
District Court System with full-time judges appointed by the Governor.”  IJA REPORT, supra note 307, 
at 1–2.  The Legislative Research Committee retained the Institute of Judicial Administration, based in 
New York, to undertake the study.  Id. at 2.   
94 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
establish a different Probate Court system with full-time judges.”310  The purpose 
of that contingency was, as described later by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, 
“to give the Legislature discretion to study and determine the best system for 
administering and adjudicating matters traditionally within the jurisdiction of the 
probate courts.  The intent was to open the way for change in the system.”311 
The Legislature has never fulfilled the condition of the amendment, although it 
has considered numerous court restructuring proposals in the years since its 
passage.312  The 1969 Report issued by the IJA recommended that the Legislature 
assign jurisdiction of the various matters then heard before the probate courts to the 
Superior Court as part of a simple “three-tier court structure.”313  This approach 
was favored because it reflected the Superior Court’s familiarity with probate court 
matters as it sat as the Supreme Court of Probate.  The IJA also noted that the 
“modern trend” among states was “to make the probate judge a full-time judicial 
officer – free of the administrative work that can be done as well or better by a 
trained and supervised register.” 314  
In 1980, pursuant to a mandate from the Maine Legislature, the Maine Probate 
Law Revision Commission (“MPLRC”) issued a report also recommending that the 
Legislature transfer the entire jurisdiction of the Maine Probate Court to the 
Superior Court.315  The MPLRC based this recommendation on reasoning similar to 
that in the IJA’s 1969 recommendations, as well as several changes that were 
necessary as a result of the adoption of the UPC in Maine.316  The MPLRC noted 
that the probate courts shared jurisdiction with other courts in actions for 
separation, support of wives and children, and protective custody of children.  The 
enactment of the MPC had eliminated the probate court’s jurisdiction over 
separation actions, as noted above.317 
                                                                                                     
 310.  Resolves 1967, ch. 77 (amending ME. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (repealed 1967)). 
 311.  Opinion of the Justices, 412 A.2d 958, 982 (Me. 1980) (emphasis added). 
 312.  For a period of time, it appears that some assumed that such condition could not be fulfilled 
absent a further constitutional amendment permitting the Governor to appoint probate judges. See 
MAINE PROBATE LAW REVISIONS COMMISSION, supra note 116, at 12–13.  However, as the Supreme 
Judicial Court clarified in its 1980 opinion, no further amendment is needed if the Legislature simply 
eliminated the position of “probate judge.”  Opinion of the Justices, 412 A.2d at 981. 
 313.  IJA Report, supra note 307, at 16–18.  
 314.  Id. at 25. 
 315.  MAINE PROBATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE PROBATE CODE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Jan. 
1980).  This proposal would have retained the county-based registers of probate, but would make them a 
part of the state judicial system.  Id. at 17–18. 
 316.  Id. at 1–20.  Those changes would apparently create greater inefficiencies in the probate court 
system (as more of the work could be performed by registers), and the Commission determined that the 
simpler approach was simply to transfer all jurisdiction to the Superior Court.  Among the other reasons 
it recommended transferring all jurisdiction to Superior Court was to eliminate the part-time judges 
(increasing the number of Superior Court Justices by three to accommodate the extra work) because of 
the ethical concerns presented by probate judges who continued to practice law.  
 317.  Id. at 5.  The MPLRC noted that there had been some proposals for a family court system as 
part of probate court reform, but the report was not clear what those proposals were.  The MPLRC 
concluded that combining family and probate matters into one court was not appropriate given the 
“considerable question as to the actual and meaningful relationship between matters of probate law” and 
those that are usually considered to be part of family law, as they “do not involve the same kind of 
judicial discretion.”  Id. at 6–7.  It did note that a family court system could be established as a division 
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The MPLRC was concerned, however, that a further constitutional amendment 
would be necessary to implement all of the recommended changes—it 
recommended that the Legislature submit certain specific questions regarding the 
constitutionality to the Supreme Judicial Court.318  Accordingly, the Senate sought 
an opinion from the Maine Supreme Judicial Court as to the constitutionality of the 
bill, “An Act to Transfer Probate Jurisdiction to the Superior Court,” then pending 
before it.319  The Justices responded that the bill was constitutional and would, 
among other things, “carr[y] out the broad purpose of the operative language of the 
1967 [constitutional] amendment,” by replacing the county-based system with a 
different probate court system.320  Nonetheless, the Legislature never enacted the 
bill. 
Efforts to study and reform the probate courts continued in the 1980s, and the 
focus shifted specifically to their jurisdiction over parental rights matters.  In 1985, 
the “Committee for the Study on Court Structure in Relation to Probate and Family 
Law Matters” issued its Report to the Maine Judicial Council.321  The committee is 
commonly referred to as the “Cotter Committee” after its chair William R. Cotter, 
then President of Colby College.322  The Judicial Council created the Cotter 
Committee to again study the probate court structure and system of part-time 
elected judges, particularly in light of the enactment of the MPC, and to “[e]xamine 
the need for changes in the judicial structure for handling family matters, including 
the possibility of creating a special ‘family court structure.’”323 
The Cotter Committee noted that, as a result of the enactment of the MPC in 
1979, the nature of the work done by Probate Judges had shifted away from the 
administration of estates to the remaining areas of its jurisdiction, particularly 
guardianships and adoptions, with an overall reduction of the judicial workload.324  
Its survey found that probate courts were also taking on an increasing number of 
“family” matters including guardianship, adoption, and name changes, and that the 
promulgation of new rules regarding notice and other aspects of more “formal” 
proceedings have increased that part of the courts’ workload.325  The vast majority 
                                                                                                     
within the Superior Court to “avoid any undesirable further fragmentation in the judicial system.”  Id. at 
7.  At that time, unlike the present, the Superior Court had jurisdiction over divorce and other family law 
matters. 
 318.  Id. at 20–23. 
 319.  Opinion of the Justices, 412 A.2d 958, 982 (1980) (citing 2 Me. Legis. Doc. 3425 (1967) 
(remarks of Senator Lund)). 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY ON COURT STRUCTURE IN RELATION TO PROBATE AND FAMILY 
LAW MATTERS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1985) (“Cotter Report”).  The Legislature created 
the Judicial Council to make a “continuous study of the organization, rules, and methods of procedure 
and practice in the judicial system of the State . . . .” 4 M.R.S.A. § 451 (now repealed). 
 322.  Lauren McArthur, Debate Renewed Over Probate Reform, LEWISTON DAILY SUN 1, 1 (Mar. 5, 
1985), https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=PAAqAAAAIBAJ&sjid=52cFAAAAIBAJ&pg=555 
7%2C554585. 
 323.  Cotter Report, supra note 321, at 1.  This study took place during a time of development of 
“family court” systems across the country.  See H. TED RUBIN & VICTOR EUGENE FLANCO, COURT 
COORDINATION OF FAMILY CASES, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE 
7–9, 51–61 (1992). 
 324.  Cotter Report, supra note 321, at 2. 
 325.  Id.  
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of traditional probate matters, by contrast, were routine and uncontested.  The 
Cotter Committee noted that the allocation of judicial resources across the state for 
family matters between the two courts was the result of “historical development” 
rather than planning, and that it was not a “rational allocation of resources.”326 
The Cotter Committee recommended several potential changes.  One proposal 
was to transfer jurisdiction of estate and trust matters to the Superior Court, as 
other studies had recommended.  Jurisdiction over family matters, however, would 
be transferred to the District Court, which had become “by far Maine’s 
predominant court for the handling of family disputes or other disputes that have a 
significant impact on families.”327  The Committee recommended concurrent 
jurisdiction in the District and Superior Courts over guardianship, conservatorship, 
and other protective proceedings.328  This shift would “help further consolidate 
family matter jurisdictions (adoptions and name changes) within the court where all 
other family matters are primarily handled.”329  The concurrent jurisdiction over 
protective proceedings would recognize the dual nature of these proceedings (part 
“estate law” and part “family law”) and would increase the number of judges 
available to address requests for emergency relief in those cases.330  The probate 
judges would be replaced by appointment of four additional state court judges, 
which would eliminate the ethical concerns from the practice of law by probate 
judges that were discussed extensively in the report.331  
The following year, another report made similar observations regarding the 
probate courts’ jurisdiction over family matters.  In 1986, the Commission to Study 
Family Matters in Court (“CSFMC”) studied the question of the creation of a 
“Family Court System.”332  Among its findings, the CSFMC’s report noted that, at 
that time, “Maine . . . has several family courts” including the District Court, 
Superior Court, and probate courts, each of which exclusively or concurrently 
exercised jurisdiction over particular kinds of family law cases.333  “This scattered 
jurisdiction,” the report continued, “prevents the most efficient use of Maine’s 
judicial resources in serving troubled parents and children.”334  The then-current 
framework resulted in simultaneous and inconsistent proceedings and prevented 
                                                                                                     
 326.  Id. at 5.  It noted in particular that a recent report regarding the child welfare system outlined 
the critical need for more judicial time for child welfare cases in District and Superior Courts.  Id. at 5 
(citing GOVERNOR’S WORKING GROUP ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, supra 
note 100, at 14–20).  The Cotter Committee also noted that there was a lack of uniformity of procedure, 
particularly in the area of adoptions. 
 327.  Id. at 5, 9 (emphasis added). 
 328.  Id. at 7. 
 329.  Id. at 7.  
 330.  Id. 
 331.  There were two alternative proposals to address the part-time practice issue and to provide for 
appointment or creation of a Probate and Family Division within the state court system.  Id. at 7–8. 
 332.  COMMISSION TO STUDY FAMILY MATTERS IN COURT, FINAL REPORT TO THE 112TH 
LEGISLATURE (March 1986). 
 333.  Id. at 3.  Specifically, the District Court handled juvenile matters, divorces and annulments, 
child protection petitions, and parental rights and responsibilities cases. The Superior Court heard 
divorces, annulments, parental rights and responsibilities matters, as well as actions under the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.  The probate courts acted on adoptions as well as parental 
rights and child protective matters.  Id. 
 334.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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consolidation of matters involving the same child or children.335  “Each judge,” the 
CSFMC noted, “has only a few pieces of the family’s puzzle.  No uniform solution 
to the family’s problems can be fashioned by a judge lacking the whole picture.”336  
The delay caused by unavailable courtrooms or “overburdened” judges can cause 
uncertainty, anxiety, and “do greater damage to a troubled family.”337 The CSFMC 
concluded: “Consolidation of jurisdiction over family matters within one Maine 
court can address those problems.”338 “However,” it also noted, “before this 
consolidation can occur, Maine’s current probate court system must be revamped,” 
and specifically that the probate courts must be absorbed into the state judicial 
department,339 as the current structure of the system prevented them from being 
integrated into a “unified approach to family matters in the Maine courts.”340 
Despite the consistent findings and recommendations of these three reports 
issued within a six-year period, and the urging of both the Judicial Council341 and 
the Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, 342 the Maine Legislature 
enacted none of the reports’ recommendations.  As noted earlier, the Maine 
Legislature eventually created the Family Division of the Maine Judicial Branch in 
1997.343 The Maine Judicial Branch describes the scope of the matters 
encompassed within the Division as nearly every kind of matter addressing the 
                                                                                                     
 335.  Id. at 4.  
 336.  Id. 
 337.  Id. at 6.  
 338.  Id. at 9. 
 339.  Id. at 9, 11. Under this recommended reform, the probate courts would retain jurisdiction 
(which would become concurrent with the state courts) over guardianships and adoptions because such 
matters had traditionally been part of the probate courts’ jurisdiction and they were most familiar with 
the “specialized procedures” in such cases, but the CSFMC also noted that consolidation of jurisdiction 
within the state court system “may be appropriate at a later date.” Id. at 12. 
 340.  Id. at 10. 
 341.  In 1987, the Judicial Council submitted a letter to the Joint Committee on the Judiciary noting 
its “‘continuing concern’ for the necessity of probate reform” and the lack of progress in the Legislature 
to adopt recommendations regarding such reform. Legis. Rec. 112 (1987), Letter from the Judicial 
Council to the Judiciary Committee (Jan 29, 1987) (available at http://lldc.mainelegislature.org/ 
Open/LegRec/113/Senate/LegRec_1987-02-02_SP_p0110-0113.pdf).  In the letter, the Council noted 
that the Council and others had studied the probate court system since 1966, with several 
recommendations made for reform and particularly the elimination of part-time elected probate judges.  
The Cotter Committee recommendations had been included in a bill before the Legislature the prior 
year, which was carried over.  Id.  (citing LD 1250 (112th Legis. 1987) (resulting in “Leave to 
Withdraw” status on April 3, 1986)).  The Council also noted the findings and recommendations 
regarding the probate courts in the CSFMC report, which were reflected in a bill that was defeated on 
the floor.  The following session the Legislature considered LD 976 “An Act to Consolidate Family 
Cases in a Family Court within the District Court and to Establish Full-time Appointed Probate Judges,” 
id. at 113 (citing LD 2402 113th Legis. (1987)), which was also ended with “leave to withdraw” status 
on May 26, 1987. 
 342.  Chief Justice Vincent McKusick, State of the Judiciary Address, A Report to the Joint 
Convention of the 112th Legislature 2480 (Feb 6, 1985), http://lldc.mainelegislature.org/ 
Open/Laws/1985/Laws1985v2_p2475-2481_State_of_Judiciary_1985.pdf (“I transmit to you the 
proposal of the Maine Judicial Council that the present 16 county-funded probate courts with part-time 
elected judges be phased out, in the same way as the old part-time municipal courts and trial justices 
were phased out by the Legislature in the early Sixties.”); see also McArthur, supra note 322 (describing 
reaction to the proposed probate court reform). 
 343.   P.L. 1997, ch. 69, § 1 (enacting 4 M.R.S.A. § 183 (Supp. 2014)). 
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lives of children: 
This includes divorce, annulment, judicial separation, parental rights and 
responsibilities, paternity, child support (including cases brought under the 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act), visitation rights of grandparents, 
emancipation, and any post-judgment motions arising from these actions.  Also 
under the umbrella of the Family Division are protective custody proceedings, 
protection from abuse actions and cases brought under the Maine Juvenile 
Code.344 
There is nothing in the legislative record from the enactment of the Family 
Division regarding the family matters that would not fall within its scope: namely, 
those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court. 
The 2014 Report of the Family Division Task Force (“Task Force”) noted 
earlier345 is the latest study to recommend changes to the current alignment of 
jurisdiction over parental rights matters.346  The Task Force undertook an 
“intensive and concentrated review of the current family matters process.”347  Its 
findings about the significant problems caused by the split jurisdiction led to a 
discussion among the Task Force members regarding whether “the best result 
would be to consolidate the county probate courts into the Judicial Branch.”348 
However, “given the mammoth undertaking that would create” (likely in 
recognition of the string of unsuccessful attempts at making such reform), the Task 
Force offered a far more modest recommendation: that the District Court’s 
jurisdiction be expanded to include guardianships and name changes in paternity 
matters to allow consolidation of such proceedings with other family matters in the 
District Court involving the child.349  The Task Force explained that “[c]reating an 
avenue for the parties and/or District Court to request all family matters be 
consolidated before the District Court would, in great part, minimize the confusion 
created by dueling legal forums, decrease intentional delay by one or more of the 
parties, and conserve family financial resources.”350  The Task Force’s 
recommendation included statutory and rule changes to effectuate such 
consolidated proceedings, as well as to encourage cooperation between the District 
and Probate Courts regarding family matters and to require parties in District Court 
matters to disclose any Probate Court matters involving the child.351 
Thus, in light of the consistent findings of more than a half-century of studies 
                                                                                                     
 344.  Maine Judicial Branch, Family Division, http://courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/family/ 
index.shtml (last visited Sep. 29, 2015).  
 345.  FDTF Report, supra note 266; see supra notes 266–267 and accompanying text. 
 346.  In the year between the flurry of reports in the 1980s and the FDTF Report, the only 
recommendation made about the Probate Courts was a brief mention in the 1992 report of the 
Commission to Study Maine’s Courts. Commission to Study the Future of Maine’s Courts, Preliminary 
Recommendations (Sept. 1992) (Revised Following Meeting of September 25, 1992).  That commission 
recommended that the position of Probate Judges be converted to four full-time probate judges, who 
would be appointed and become part of the overall Maine Judicial Branch (which would organize the 
four probate courts using groupings of counties).  Id. at 12. 
 347.  FDTF Report, supra note 266, at iv. 
 348.  Id. at 6 n.7. 
 349.  Id. at 6 n.7. 
 350.  Id. at 7. 
 351.  Id. at 7-8, app. B1–B2, C5.   
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of the probate court system, there can be little question that substantial reform is 
not only needed, but is urgently overdue. In the section that follows, I discuss a 
range of reforms that would address the most acute problems seen today. 
B. Jurisdictional and Structural Reforms 
1. Eliminate the “Scattered Jurisdiction” and Enable the District Court to Serve as 
a Child’s “Home Court”  
In light of all of the difficulties of simultaneous and conflicting orders and 
proceedings involving the same child described earlier, the Maine Legislature 
should end the current system of divided exclusive jurisdiction between district and 
probate courts so that the same court can adjudicate all matters implicating parental 
rights regarding a child.  This would fulfill the mission of the Family Division and 
enable all litigants to benefit from the efficiencies and benefits of a comprehensive 
family justice system. 
Building on the recommendations of the Family Division Task Force, Maine 
law should be amended to provide concurrent jurisdiction in District Court for 
guardianship of a minor, change of a minor’s name, and adoption (including 
paternity determinations and terminations of parental rights in the context of 
adoption petitions).352  A provision should be enacted to require that, if the child is 
already the subject of an interim or final order in effect that resulted from a 
Parental Rights and Responsibilities, Divorce, Grandparents Rights, Child 
Protection, Paternity, Protection from Abuse, or Protection from Harassment 
matter, or if there is a pending proceeding in Maine District Court to seek such 
order, any guardianship, name change, or adoption matter must be both filed in and 
addressed in the District Court (or transferred to that court if the initial filings were 
in the Probate Court), and preferably in the court location where such order, 
judgment, or proceeding occurred.353 
This reform would establish the District Court as a child’s “home court,” 
having exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child, including modification and 
enforcement of all orders regarding that child, if that court has already issued, or is 
presently overseeing litigation seeking, an order concerning parent rights of that 
child.354  A guardianship or adoption petition would essentially be treated as a 
                                                                                                     
 352.  4 M.R.S.A. § 152 (1989 & Supp. 2014) (regarding District Court jurisdiction); 18-A M.R.S.A 
§§ 1-701, 5-102, 5-204, 9-103, 9-201, 9-204 (2012 & Supp. 2014) (regarding Probate Court 
jurisdiction). 
 353.  This model is reflected in LD 890, “An Act to Ensure a Continuing Home Court for Cases 
Involving Children,” which is pending in the Maine Legislature. L.D. 890 (127th Legis. 2015) available 
at http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/display_ps.asp?paper=HP0609&snum=127 (last visited 
Sep. 29, 2015).  The bill has been carried over to the Second Session pursuant to a request from the Joint 
Standing Committee on Judiciary.  
 354.  This proposal is based on the basic objectives and concepts set forth in the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), codified in Maine law at 19-A M.R.S.A.  
§§ 1731–1783 (2012 & Supp. 2014). That Act provides that, if a court in one state has issued a “child 
custody determination,” such court thereafter has “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” over that 
determination (including any modification of such order) unless the parties no longer reside in or have 
significant connections with such state.  19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1746, 1747 (2012).  The law also precludes 
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petition to the court seeking modification (or termination) of an existing order or a 
cross-petition for a different order (in the case of pending proceedings).  Where 
there is a question regarding whether a case must proceed in District Court, the 
statute should require communication between the courts to resolve the dispute, 
and, where appropriate, determine the process for transferring the matter to another 
court.355  To end the current practice of forum-shopping between district and 
probate courts (and then among probate courts of different counties), Maine law 
should require that cases brought in Probate Court initially be transferred to the 
District Court when a case is started there, and it should permit parties to remove 
any other case to the District Court from the Probate Court. 356  This model is 
depicted in Figure 2. 
  
 There are several significant benefits to a system requiring consolidation of all 
proceedings involving a child in one court.  It eliminates the confusion, added 
                                                                                                     
simultaneous child custody proceedings in different states and sets forth procedures and standards for 
determining which state may exercise jurisdiction over the matter. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1750 (2012).      
 355.  The UCCJEA includes provisions requiring or authorizing communications between courts of 
different states to resolve jurisdiction questions.  See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1748(4), 1750(2) (2012).  
In Guardianship of Johnson, which involved simultaneous and conflicting proceedings in the Probate 
and District Courts, the Law Court explained the importance of communication between courts with 
pending proceedings involving the same child. In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶¶ 16–17, 
98 A.3d 1023. 
 356.  The MPC includes a provision regarding removal of matters to Superior Court for jury trials, 
but that does not provide a mechanism for removal of family matters (which cannot be decided by a 
jury) nor does it expand the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear any Probate Court matters.  See 18-
A M.R.S.A. § 1-306 (2012).  A party may wish to remove a case to the District Court because, even 
where there is no risk of conflicting orders or simultaneous proceedings, there is still the question of 
whether a probate court has sufficient staff, court time, and resources to adjudicate contested family law 
matters.  In many instances the “formality” of a District Court proceeding, with its associated 
procedures and standards, would best serve the family involved. 
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costs, re-litigation, and re-education of a new judge or GAL, and the conflicts 
described above.  It enhances the efficient and timely disposition of family matters.  
It provides more flexibility and opportunities for creative solutions to address 
children’s needs while preserving their relationships with parents who still have 
parental rights.  It ensures that the parties and court are aware of what orders are in 
effect and the procedural status of the case.  It ends the practice by some litigants of 
“court-shopping” or otherwise using the present two-court system (and multi-
county system of separate probate courts) to increase delay, cost, or inconvenience 
to another party.  It facilitates the participation of attorneys and GALs in the matter 
and permits global mediation of all issues among all involved family members 
(everyone’s at the table and everyone buys in). 357  All of these results would 
benefit the courts as well as the parties and children involved.358  
This recommendation would not only address the significant problems created 
by concurrent orders and proceedings in the district and probate courts, it would 
also serve the broader policy goal of minimizing the adverse impact of litigation on 
children and families, discussed above.359  Based on research findings, many states 
have established specialized family courts with comprehensive jurisdiction, 
including Unified Family Courts, to ensure that proceedings can be as effective and 
efficient as possible and to minimize the amount of time a family must appear in 
court to resolve a dispute.360  Some scholars have argued that “unit[ing] in one 
                                                                                                     
 357.  See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(1)(A) (2012) (“The Legislature finds and declares as public 
policy that encouraging mediated resolutions of disputes between parents is in the best interest of minor 
children.”). 
 358.  Testimony of Mary Ann Lynch, Maine Judicial Branch, in Support of LD 890, 127th 
Legislature (April 2015), http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=29276. 
The Family Law Advisory Commission (FLAC) concluded its Report to the Judiciary Committee on LD 
890 with the following: 
FLAC is not taking a position either for or against LD 890, but in general supports the 
notion that it is important to have clear, consistent and timely proceedings in family 
matters to minimize or avoid confusion, delay, undue expense and the likelihood of 
inconsistent results.  Certainly, if one were setting out today to design the model system 
from the ground up for adjudicating issues affecting children and families, it is doubtful 
that our current approach would be used.   
MAINE FAMILY LAW ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT TO 127TH MAINE LEGISLATURE JOINT 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY ON LD 890 “AN ACT TO ENSURE A CONTINUING HOME COURT 
FOR CASES INVOLVING CHILDREN” (April 2015), http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/ 
getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=29262. 
 359.  See supra notes 268–270 and accompanying text.  
 360.  Scholars and others working on court reform efforts have documented the problems of 
“fragmentation” in family law jurisdiction and developed the “Unified Family Court” model as a means 
to reduce such problems.  See, e.g., Barbara A. Babb, Unified Family Courts: An Interdisciplinary 
Framework and Problem-Solving Approach in PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVEs 65, 76 (Richard L. Weiner & Eva M. Brank eds., 2013); Developments in the Law 
– Unified Family Courts and the Child Protection Dilemma, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2099, 2106 (2003) 
(noting UFC advocates’ view, consistent with “family systems theory,” that “traditional courts’ 
‘illogical compartmentalization’ of a family's legal problems is more than a breach of best practices: 
fragmented resolutions result in substantive injustice to the family and may even amplify the damage 
that family conflicts cause.”); Catherine Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of Unified 
Family Courts, 32 FAM. L. Q. 3 (1998).  In addition, several state courts adopted aspects of the UFC 
model to provide comprehensive subject matter jurisdiction over family law matters in a single court. 
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court all matters relating to parents and children,” would be “a major step towards 
advancing the interests of all children” as the legal issues in all of these 
proceedings essentially focus on the “best interests of the child.”361  As Professor 
Andrew Schepard has explained, a “unified” family court would address “all 
disputes involving parents and children, regardless of the legal label that their 
dispute receives . . . . [Such labels are] often arbitrary, and the problems that 
families present to the court are interrelated.”362 
The few provisions in Maine law that presently permit consolidation of certain 
kinds of parental rights proceedings reflect these same objectives.  The Child 
Protection Act and Protection from Abuse Act both permit consolidation of other 
parental rights matters pending in District Court.363  The Legislature’s 2011 
amendment to permit District Court judges to oversee the adoption petitions of 
permanency guardians in child protection matters was also a step towards 
simplifying the process by permitting it to approve an adoption in the context of an 
existing case involving the child.364  Ensuring clarity and consistency is a 
significant policy reason behind the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act, adopted by Maine and every other state in the U.S. to eliminate 
multiple proceedings and conflicting orders by precluding more than one state from 
issuing orders concerning custody of a child.365 
The primary argument in opposition to this proposal stems from the probate 
courts’ contention that they are better able to oversee adoptions and guardianship 
matters involving the protection of children than the District Court, and 
specifically, that they can order emergency relief more quickly.366  With respect to 
the latter assertion, they may be referring to their jurisdiction to grant preliminary 
protection orders in child protective proceedings, which, as noted above, is 
concurrent with the District Court.  Some Probate Judges state that they are more 
responsive to the needs of children and families than District Court judges and 
                                                                                                     
Barbara A. Babb, Reevaluating Where We Stand: A Comprehensive Survey of America's Family Justice 
Systems, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 230, 233 (2008).  
 361.  MASON, supra note 24, at 190.  
 362.  ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR 
DIVORCING FAMILIES 178 (2004). 
 363.  See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4031(3) (Supp. 2014) (permitting consolidation of protective custody 
proceedings with another pending proceeding in which child custody is an issue); 19-A M.R.S.A.  
§ 4010(2) (2012).  
 364.  See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4038-E (Supp. 2014).  
 365.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1731 cmt. (2012) (setting out “statement of purposes” of UCCJEA, 
including avoiding “jurisdictional conflict and competition,” discouraging use of multiple states for 
“continuing controversies over child custody,” avoiding re-litigation of issues decided in other courts, 
and facilitating enforcement of existing orders). 
 366.  Letter from Hon. Michael Dubois, President, Me. Probate Judges Assembly, to Joint Comm. on 
Judiciary (April 16, 2015) (“The Probate Courts have served as the best forum for a just, speedy and 
inexpensive resolution for family crises involving the placement and protection of minors.”). The 
Probate Registers Association took a position neither for nor against LD 890.  Ayers, supra note 146. In 
addition, Judge Mazziotti notes that having a single judge and a relatively small caseload enables 
Probate Judges to personally oversee the scheduling of emergency matters and to recommend a specific 
plan for the management of each case.  Mazziotti, supra note 130. 
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schedule matters more quickly than a District Court judges could.367  This is a 
curious assertion, as the District Court, which has full-time judges, regularly acts 
on an emergency basis–-including after hours, in a range of matters.368 Further, 
there has never been a study or analysis of the respective scheduling practices of 
the probate and district courts.369  If there is any deficiency in the responsiveness of 
the District Court, that problem should be addressed specifically rather than 
maintaining an entire dual-court exclusive jurisdiction situation, which causes 
extensive delays in other matters and particularly in adoptions taking place after 
child protection matters.370 
This proposal would not require any change for adoption proceedings where 
the parents have died or provided consent through a private arrangement.  
Similarly, such requirement likely will not have an impact on parent-initiated or 
testamentary guardianships since there would not be any parental rights and 
responsibilities order in effect at the time of petition.  This reform would primarily 
expand the District Court’s adoption jurisdiction to include all those cases 
involving children who were the subject of a child protection or other parental 
rights proceeding in that court (beyond the permanency guardianship context), 
                                                                                                     
 367.  Dubois, supra note 366; Nadeau, supra note 74, at 33 n.29 (“God knows how many times 
during the past six years I have received telephone calls at my home during the late afternoons, 
evenings, and early morning hours from DHS caseworkers requesting an emergency protection order in 
a child protective case because they allegedly could not find one of our local state judges for the same 
purpose.”); Testimony of Probate Judge William Blaisdell IV before Joint Committee on the Judiciary, 
127th Legis. (Feb. 3, 2015).  In other contexts, however, probate judges assert that they lack the 
resources to timely manage cases involving children. See Dennis Hoey, Woman Sues York County 
Probate Judge Over Delay, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.pressherald.com/ 
2015/12/03/woman-sues-judge-nadeau-over-case-delay/ (quoting Probate Judge Nadeau, who was 
subject of civil rights lawsuit for allegedly creating delays in his docket over pay dispute, as saying that 
certain kinds of probate matters “especially guardianship disputes involving parents, have become far 
more complex and time-consuming to preside over,” resulting in scheduling delays). 
 368.  See, e.g., 15 M.R.S.A. § 55 (2003) (search warrants); 15 M.R.S.A. § 706 (2003) (arrest 
warrants); 17 M.R.S.A. § 1021(4) (2006) (ex parte orders to seize abused or neglected animals); 19-A 
M.R.S.A. § 4006(2) (Supp. 2014) (temporary protection from abuse orders); 22 M.R.S.A. § 810 (2004) 
(orders granting DHHS custody of person who is a threat to the public health).  This is not a new 
contention by probate judges. The 1985 Cotter Committee report concluded that availability to take 
emergency action is not unique to probate courts, and that, in fact, District and Superior Courts (which 
have far more judges) have more availability than probate courts to take emergency action. COTTER 
REPORT, supra note 321, at 4. 
 369.  Attorneys consulted in my own informal survey about the relative scheduling delays in these 
courts universally stated that they have observed far more and longer delays in their Probate Court 
matters than in state court matters, and this has been my observation as well. 
 370.  Two attorneys with an adoption-focused practice were the only individuals to testify against LD 
890.  They raised concerns regarding the capability of District Court judges to oversee the complex 
adoption process.  In his written testimony, attorney Christopher Berry wrote: “[A]doptions require 
speedy resolutions due to Federal regulations; which the already burdened District Courts would likely 
not be able to meet.”  An Act to Ensure a Continuing Home Court for Cases Involving Children: 
Hearing on L.D. 890 Before the J. Standing Comm. On Judiciary, 127th Leg. (Me. 2015) (statement of 
Christopher Berry), available at http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/ 
getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=29267.  He also argued that adoptions are a “specialized area of the law” with 
which Probate Courts are already familiar, and that “adoptive parents and children [who] come into the 
Probate Courts understand that this is a fresh start, a new beginning and trust that every procedure has 
been reviewed, checked and heard.”  Id.  Of course, there is no reason why District Court judges could 
not achieve the level of expertise possessed by probate judges in adoption matters. 
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where the familiarity of the judge, DHHS, and GAL would be beneficial to the 
adoption context. 
I should emphasize that I have sketched out here only some very broad ideas 
for addressing the problems described earlier in this Article.  Implementation 
would require revisions to several laws and related rules, as well as a study of the 
costs and impact on both court systems of such change to determine the best 
process for effectuating the reforms.371  For that reason as well, the Legislature 
must develop and implement a plan for reform at the earliest opportunity. 
2. Recording of Proceedings 
As noted earlier, the Probate Courts do not routinely record testimonial or 
other proceedings other than for TPR hearings, and the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court recently amended Maine Rules of Civil Procedure and Probate Procedure to 
make clear that parties are entitled to have any proceeding recorded, on twenty-four 
hours’ notice of such request, and that courts must record certain proceedings as a 
matter of course, where set forth in a rule, statute, or order.372  However, it should 
not be the responsibility of a probate court litigant, most of whom are 
unrepresented, to invoke the right to a recording in advance.  A requirement that 
courts record all proceedings involving parental rights should also be clearly set 
forth in the applicable statutes.  Specifically, the MPC should be amended to 
require that all hearings and other proceedings in guardianship and other parental 
matters are recorded by the Court (whether Probate or District Court), as well as 
other proceedings on request of one or more parties, all at no cost to the parties.373  
3. Law Practice by Probate Court Judges 
Every study of the probate courts, starting with the University of Maine 
                                                                                                     
 371.  One consideration, for example, is the appointment of counsel for indigent litigants where 
required by statute.  In Probate Courts, such appointments are made by individual courts and paid out of 
the court’s budget.  If such appointments were to occur in District Court, it would likely need to be 
through the Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, which oversees appointment of counsel in 
child protection proceedings, as well as in criminal and civil commitment matters.  See 4 M.R.S.A.  
§ 1801 (Pamph. 2014).  
 372.  See supra text accompanying notes 288–290; ME. R. CIV. P. 76H(b)(2)(B); ME. R. PROB. P. 
76H. See also In re Guardianship of McIntosh, 2015 ME 95, ¶¶ 14–15, 120 A.3d 654 (clarifying that 
probate courts must record all adult guardianship proceedings because they implicate fundamental 
liberty interests and because “without an adequate record, including a transcript, the appellate court and 
the parties to the appeal cannot adequately address the trial court’s fact-findings and exercises of its 
discretion.”). 
 373.  For example, the child protection statute specifies that all child protection proceedings must be 
recorded. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4007(1) (Supp. 2014) (requiring recording of all children protection 
proceedings); In re Dylan B., 2001 ME 31, ¶ 3, 766 A.2d 577 (holding that Probate Court TPR must be 
recorded pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4007(1)).  Maine Supreme Judicial Court Administrative Order JB-
12-1 (A. 11-14) includes “Testimonial Proceedings involving the appointment of a Guardian for a 
Minor” among the types of proceedings that must be recorded.  However, some Probate Courts 
apparently consider the order to have no application to proceedings in their court, despite the fact that 
they have near exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.  See In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 
104, ¶ 10 n.6, 98 A.3d 1023 (noting that probate court did not record minor guardianship proceeding or 
permit a party to make its own recording). 
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Bureau of Public Administration (BPA) 1967 study, outlined the many serious 
implications of permitting Probate Judges to practice law part-time due to potential 
for actual conflicts as well as an overall appearance of impropriety it causes.374  On 
the question of converting the probate judge position to full-time, 12 of the 16 
judges interviewed for the BPA study–-which was undertaken when the probate 
courts’ caseloads were considerably lighter than they are today—believed that the 
system would operate more efficiently if they were full-time positions and the 
judges did not need to attend to a law practice at the same time.375  They also felt 
that converting the positions would increase the respect for the position and 
decrease the chances for abuse of judicial discretion.376  Such a system would also 
increase uniformity among the probate courts with respect to procedure.377 
The Cotter Committee was perhaps most blunt in its assessment, issued thirty 
years ago.  It observed that the practice of law by probate judges was a “point of 
serious complaint” and raises “the serious appearance of impropriety.”378  It 
concluded that the practice “should no longer be permitted to continue,” and it 
recommended amending the applicable Code of Judicial Conduct to “prohibit the 
practice of law by all judges, including Probate Judges.”379  No modifications to the 
probate court system or ethical rules have been enacted in response to—or 
consistent with—those recommendations,380 and the same problems documented in 
1985 persist today.  Indeed, it is likely they have worsened as, with the enactment 
of the MPC and expansion of minor guardianship law over the past 35 years, the 
role of Probate Judges today is primarily one of overseeing litigation, while 
registers take care of most of the estate administration responsibilities. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court can amend the applicable provisions of the 
Maine Code of Judicial Conduct381 to, at the very least, impose limitations on the 
practice of law by Probate Judges before other probate courts or other courts in the 
                                                                                                     
 374.  See COTTER REPORT, supra note 321, at 4; MAINE PROBATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, 
supra note 116, at 8–10; COMMISSION TO STUDY FAMILY MATTERS IN COURT, supra note 332, at 11; 
IJA REPORT, supra note 307, at 13; BPA REPORT, supra note 307, at 21–25. 
 375.  BPA REPORT, supra note 307, at 21–22. 
 376.  BPA REPORT, supra note 307, at 21–23.  The BPA noted in its report: “One attorney 
interviewed, expressed dissatisfaction with the existing system because he discovered that the opposing 
attorney in a contested will case was a prominent judge of probate from an adjoining county.”  Id. at 23. 
 377.  Id. at 24. The BPA Report considered and dismissed any potential downsides to prohibiting 
such practice.  Two of the “disadvantages” raised by some probate judges interviewed—less “access to 
judges” and decreased connection with community—were in fact seen by the report authors as 
improvements, since they would minimize the “problem of preserving the confidence of the community 
in the impartiality of the judge.” Id. at 24–25 (internal quotations omitted). 
 378.  COTTER REPORT, supra note 321, at 4. 
 379.  Id. at 4–6. 
 380.  The Maine Probate Judges Assembly adopted a “nonbinding resolution” in the 1990s 
“recommending” that probate judges not appear before other probate judges in contested matters (but 
permitting the judges’ law partners to do so).  MITCHELL & HUNT, supra note 29, § 14.42 at 14-126.  
 381.  See ME. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, INTRODUCTORY NOTE, COVERAGE & EFFECTIVE DATE I(B)(2); 
see also 4 M.R.S.A. § 307 (Pamph. 2014) (governing probate judges’ conflict of interest); 18-A 
M.R.S.A. § 1-303(c) (2012) (authorizing probate courts to transfer a case to another county “in the 
interest of justice”).  This change could be phased in over time to allow Probate Judges to make 
necessary changes to their practices or, if they prefer, to choose not to seek re-election. 
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same county.382  The Court has acknowledged that the practice of law by Probate 
Judges is controversial and unpopular, but it has taken the position that any 
restrictions on the practice of law by Probate Judges must begin with the Maine 
Legislature.383 
4. Comprehensive Reform 
As an alternative to all of the above suggestions, the Maine Legislature could 
finally adopt a “different Probate Court system with full-time judges,” as directed 
by Maine voters nearly 50 years ago, by shifting the probate courts’ jurisdiction to 
the Maine Judicial Branch as has been recommended, proposed, and attempted 
several times since the Maine Constitution was amended.  The probate courts have 
remarkable staying power, most likely because the prospect of undertaking such 
reorganization is seen as “mammoth,”384 expensive, and political, since it may be 
regarded as shifting power from counties to the State.  However, such calculus fails 
to account for the substantial costs of maintaining the status quo, in terms of 
inefficiencies as well as the injuries to children and families from a family justice 
system that falls far short of addressing their needs. 
Each year that passes sharpens the contrast between the two court systems and 
renders the need for comprehensive reform more urgent.  The Maine Legislature 
has now imposed on the probate courts substantial responsibility for adjudicating a 
wide range of matters that implicate not only property but also individuals’ 
constitutional rights, with potentially drastic and permanent impact on the lives of 
children and families.  At the same time, Maine’s Judicial Branch has, as a unitary 
system of courts, taken measures to improve the adjudication of matters under its 
jurisdiction—measures not found in the probate courts.  There is every reason to 
suspect that a reorganization to merge the probate courts into the state Judicial 
Branch will become both more challenging and more urgent as time goes on.  
Maine’s legislators should fulfill the mandate issued to them by Maine’s electorate 
and start the process of bringing the probate courts into our modern court system as 
                                                                                                     
 382.  See also Peter L. Murray, Maine's Overdue Judicial Reforms, 62 ME. L. REV. 631, 640–41 
(2010) (noting potential for “serious scandal” and other problems from current system in which probate 
judges are permitted to practice law). 
 383.  ME. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO 2015 AMEND., 
ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH WEBSITE/RULES (visited Sept. 25, 2015).  The Court stated: 
Issues concerning Probate Court judges’ part-time status, particularly their representation 
of clients in probate court matters, generated substantial negative comments.  That issue, 
however, is a matter that can only be addressed by legislative action.  Id.; In re Estate of 
McCormick, 2001 ME 24, ¶16, 765 A.2d 552 (“The practice of allowing part-time 
probate judges to litigate cases as part-time lawyers has received widespread criticism . . . 
. The Maine Legislature has addressed this issue and has continued to allow probate 
judges to maintain active probate practices.”).  However, the statutory provision cited by 
the Court in McCormick as the source of probate judges’ authority to practice law, 4 
M.R.S.A. § 307, contains only an implicit reference to such authority, rather than actually 
conferring it. 4 M.R.S.A. § 307 (Supp. 2014).  Rather, it is the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
as noted above, which expressly exempts probate judges from the prohibition on practice.  
However, as a practical matter, amending the Code of Judicial Conduct to restrict probate 
judges’ practice of law should occur in the context of broader reform to the probate 
courts’ structure, which only the Legislature can implement. 
 384.  FDTF Report, supra note 266, at 6 n.7. 
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soon as possible. 
For one potential model, Maine could once again look to the courts of 
Massachusetts. The courts of that commonwealth are unified in one court system.  
One “department” of that system is the “Probate and Family Court,” which has 
comprehensive jurisdiction (some of it concurrent with other departments) of 
nearly every kind of case involving children.385  The probate courts were, until the 
enactment of a sweeping court reform measure by the Massachusetts legislature in 
1978, county-based and funded.386  Indeed, there is no shortage of models for such 
reform, as the clear trend among states is to consolidate their courts, including their 
probate courts, into a single court system.387  Maine remains an outlier, with no 
clear benefits to its citizens from maintaining such position. 
C. Reforming the Maine Probate Code – Moving Beyond the Orphan Model 
Addressing the substantial jurisdictional and structural problems associated 
with adjudicating parental rights in probate courts is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
step to reverse the ways Maine law falls short in meeting the needs of the children 
and families involved in these cases.  Any court that hears a guardianship or 
adoption matter must operate within the statutory framework set by the Legislature.  
The current language of the MPC provides little by way of the standards, authority, 
and flexibility that a court needs when attempting to meet the needs of children in 
volatile, complex, and contentious situations.  Although the very same rights are at 
stake in probate court and District Court parental rights proceedings, and the policy 
of family preservation should apply with equal force in all such cases, the MPC 
provides probate courts with few tools to enable the matters to operate effectively 
as forms of private child protection. The enactment in 2011 of a provision 
authorizing probate courts to enter an order for “transitional arrangements for 
minors” as part of a guardianship was an excellent addition to the MPC,388 but it 
does not go far enough.  Substantial changes to the guardianship and adoption 
statutes are needed to address the realities faced by the families involved in these 
complex cases. 
Further, as discussed in Part III.A., the Law Court has, when exercising its 
appellate jurisdiction over MPC matters, noted several ways that the MPC fails to 
                                                                                                     
 385.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, §§ 1-6 (West 2005).  The PFC does not have jurisdiction 
over juvenile matters, but the Juvenile Court department has jurisdiction over many kinds of family law 
matters, and, in any event, matters may be transferred between departments, and courts in one division 
can enter orders in another. Telephone Interview with Linda Medonis, Deputy Court Adm’r for Mass. 
Probate and Family Court (June 4, 2015). 
 386.  1978 Mass. Acts, 647-50, ch. 478, §§ 128-38; Telephone Interview with Paul Burke, Deputy 
Court Adm’r for Mass. Housing Court (June 8, 2015).  These reforms stemmed from a strongly-worded 
study of the Commonwealth’s various courts, including county-based probate courts. The committee, 
chaired by Archibald Cox, noted that “unification” was the “primary standard for modern judicial 
administration,” GOVERNOR’S SELECT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL NEEDS, REPORT ON THE STATE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS COURTS 13–15 (Dec. 1976), and it recommended, among other reforms, absorbing the 
county probate courts into a unified state court system to eliminate the “delay and waste” caused by “the 
extraordinary fragmentation of jurisdiction and responsibility.”  Id. at 3, 7, 10–11, 15.  
 387.  For example, Vermont absorbed their county-based probate courts into the state judiciary in 
2010. 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 185.  See also sources cited supra notes 233–234.  
 388.  P.L. 2011, ch. 43, § 2 (codified as 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-213 (2012)). 
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ensure adequate protections for parents or to be consistent with other aspects of 
Maine parental rights law, and it has effectively re-drafted several key provisions 
of the MPC.  Accordingly, the guardianship and adoption provisions within the 
MPC are in need of substantial revision to reflect the case law developments 
regarding the constitutional rights of parents and to provide coherent and useful 
guidance to courts, attorneys, and litigants.  This section will briefly outline some 
reforms to the MPC itself to make courts better equipped to address these matters 
and to serve the overarching policy goals of Maine’s family laws.389 
1. Minor Guardianships 
The appointment of a guardian for a minor is a substantial event for the child, 
her parents, and the guardian.  Unless the guardianship is limited, a parent’s rights 
are suspended indefinitely, which implicates the parent’s fundamental 
constitutional liberty interest in parenting her child.390  The appointment is also a 
potentially life-changing experience for a child.  It may enable him to find safety 
and stability in a new home, but it may also limit or sever his connection with one 
or both biological parents.  Such appointment also imposes a significant 
responsibility on the guardian: to provide shelter and care for another person’s 
child.  Accordingly, Maine law must provide clear standards to the courts making 
such appointments to ensure that initial appointment of a guardian and the ongoing 
supervision of the guardianship appropriately consider and reflect the rights, 
responsibilities, and interests of all parties. 
Three sources can serve as useful primary models for reforming the 
guardianship statute. First, as noted above, minor guardianships involve aspects of 
both parental rights and child protection matters; accordingly, the Legislature can 
look to, and where appropriate, adopt language similar to provisions in Title 19-A 
(parental rights and responsibilities) and Title 22 (child protection) of the Maine 
Revised Statutes.  Consistency with the approaches taken in these matters is 
particularly important if the Legislature expands the District Court’s jurisdiction so 
that it may adjudicate MPC parental rights matters, as proposed above.  Second, the 
MPC should reflect Maine Supreme Judicial Court case law on guardianship and 
adoption, particularly with respect to the requirements for appointment and 
termination of guardianships. 
A third model for revisions to the MPC is the newly enacted Vermont Act 170, 
                                                                                                     
 389.  The Legislature’s Probate and Trust Law Advisory Commission (PATLAC) recently reviewed 
the MPC in light of revisions to the UPC and issued a comprehensive report and recommendations to 
amend the MPC (except for the adoption provisions, which are not included in the UPC).  PROBATE AND 
TRUST LAW ADVISORY COMMISSION, PATLAC RECOMMENDATIONS: UNIFORM PROBATE CODE WITH 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMENTS (attachment to REPORT TO MAINE LEGISLATURE JOINT 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY RE:  RESOLVE 2013, CH. 5) (“PATLAC Report”) (Dec. 6, 2014).  
The Report and Recommendations were incorporated by reference in L.D. 1322 (127th Legis. 2015), 
which was carried over to the next session of the Legislature.  PATLAC made several recommended 
revisions to the minor guardianship provisions of the UPC, most of which do not represent substantive 
changes.  However, in a follow-up report issued in November 2015, PATLAC modified its earlier 
proposal to include two revisions to ensure that the MPC is consistent with case law with respect to the 
burdens of proof in minor guardianships issued over the objections of parents and contested terminations 
of guardianships.  It is expected that these revisions will be reflected in amendments to LD 1322.   
 390.  In re Guardianship of Jeremiah T., 2009 ME 74, ¶ 22, 976 A.2d 955. 
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“An Act Relating to the Guardianship of Minors,” which became effective on 
September 1, 2014.391  This law, which overhauled Vermont’s minor guardianship 
statute, was enacted in response to a 2012 Report to the Vermont Legislature, 
“Minor Guardianship Proceedings in Vermont,”392 issued by a committee 
established by statute.  That report raised many concerns about minor guardianship 
identical to those noted in this Article.  The Vermont Legislature also enacted a 
jurisdictional requirement similar to the “home court” jurisdiction proposal 
above.393  Accordingly, this new law serves as an ideal model for statutory 
language aimed at addressing those concerns. 
Revisions to the MPC’s guardianship provisions should address several 
objectives.  One is to encourage family members to reach agreements about the 
care of children, whether through a guardianship or other arrangements.  By 
eliminating the all-or-nothing approach to guardianship orders in terms of both 
their scope and length suggested by the current statute, and by granting parties the 
ability to reach an agreement for a guardianship order that will specifically address 
the parents’ current situation and the child’s needs, there will be more 
guardianships by consent and fewer protracted, contested matters.  For example, I 
suspect that many parties would be willing to agree to the entry of an interim order, 
which would address a child’s immediate needs while preserving the parties’ 
positions in the litigation.  These temporary arrangements can operate as trial 
periods, with the opportunity for extending or modifying the orders so that the 
parties—or, if necessary, the court—can find a plan that will work for all. 
At the same time, the statute should ensure that there is a supervisory role for 
the court in the establishment of all guardianships, even those by consent or 
nomination by a parent, as well as the ongoing monitoring of the guardianship.  
The allocation of parental rights to non-parents is a matter that implicates both a 
child’s well-being and a parent’s fundamental constitutional rights.  Accordingly, 
while families should be encouraged to reach agreements that will work best for 
them, the court should ensure that all litigants’ rights are protected and a child’s 
best interests are served throughout the course of the guardianship. 
a.  Appointment of a Guardian of a Minor.  
Standard for Appointment.  The Maine Legislature’s multiple amendments to 
the standard for appointment under section 5-204 has left the provision long and 
unwieldy, particularly with respect to appointment of guardians over the objections 
of parents.  Therefore, such language should be both simplified and clarified for 
use in the non-testamentary context. 
The language regarding when a parent’s consent is not required is outdated and 
ambiguous.394  The phrase “parental rights of custody” is unclear and inconsistent 
with other current provisions of Maine family law.  For example, the Title 19-A 
                                                                                                     
 391.  2014 Vt. Act 170 (codified as VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2621-2634 (Supp. 2014)).   
 392.  ACT 56 MINOR GUARDIANSHIP COMMITTEE, MINOR GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS IN 
VERMONT 2012: REPORT TO THE VERMONT LEGISLATURE (Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.leg.state.vt.us/ 
reports/2012ExternalReports/284664.pdf. 
 393.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2624 (Supp. 2014). 
 394.  See 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(a) (2012). 
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provisions regarding parental rights and responsibilities specifically eliminated the 
word “custody,” which is often the source of confusion.395  Accordingly, the first 
condition for appointment could simply read: “There are no living parents with 
parental rights and responsibilities.” 
Appointment by consent should remain an alternative condition for 
appointment, and the language presently in section 5-204(b) appears to provide 
sufficient clarity.  However, I recommend additional requirements for consented-to 
guardianships to ensure that such consent is voluntary and based on a complete 
understanding of the implications.  The new Vermont law provides a good model 
for such language, and the Vermont Judiciary—of which their county-based 
probate courts are a division—has created a new form for providing such 
consent.396 
For appointment of guardians over the objection of a parent, it is critical that 
the statute reflect the constitutional principles set forth in cases such as Jeremiah 
T.397 and Jewell II398 by setting a high standard.  Prior to the adoption of the 
language in section 5-504(c) the standard for appointment of a guardian was 
essentially the same as that for termination of parental rights in a child protection 
action.399  However, given that appointment of a guardian is not a permanent 
removal of parental rights and as long as other statutory language is in place to 
enable the parent to realistically seek modification and termination of the 
guardianship, as described below, the standard for such appointment need not be 
the same as a termination of parental rights.  However, it must nonetheless require 
findings of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.400 
The specific standard for “unfitness” should be clearer than either the 
awkwardly phrased “at least temporarily intolerable living situation” language of 
section 5-204(c), or the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s explanation of that 
language.401  For example, the Legislature could adopt some of the language from 
the definition of “jeopardy” in the child protection context.402  In many respects, the 
                                                                                                     
 395.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653 (2012); see also JON D. LEVY, MAINE FAMILY LAW 6-3 (2014). 
 396.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2626 (Supp. 2014).  The form is available at 
https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/eforms/PMG70p.pdf.  
 397.  In re Guardianship of Jeremiah T., 2009 ME 74, ¶ 27, 976 A.2d 955. 
 398.  Jewell II, 2010 ME 80, ¶12, 2 A.3d 726. 
 399.  See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 400.  In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 33, 118 A.3d 229. 
 401.  Jewel I, 2010 ME 17, ¶ 13, 989 A.2d 726 (holding that an unfit parent is one who is “currently 
unable to meet the child’s needs and that inability will have an effect on the child’s well-being that may 
be dramatic, and even traumatic, if the child lives with the parent”). 
 402.  See 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4002(6), 4035(2) (Supp. 2014).  “Jeopardy” is defined as: [S]erious abuse 
or neglect, as evidenced by: 
A. Serious harm or threat of serious harm; 
B. Deprivation of adequate food, clothing, shelter, supervision or care or education when 
the child is at least 7 years of age and has not completed grade 6; 
B-1. Deprivation of necessary health care when the deprivation places the child in danger 
of serious harm; 
C. Abandonment of the child or absence of any person responsible for the child, which 
creates a threat of serious harm; or 
D. The end of voluntary placement, when the imminent return of the child to his 
custodian causes a threat of serious harm. 
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functional difference from the perspective of the parent and child is insignificant in 
a public versus private child protection action.  The child is, in most cases, 
removed from the home403 and placed into the custody of a non-parent over the 
objection of a parent.  The Vermont guardianship statute takes a somewhat 
different approach to the appointment standard, by framing the standard in terms of 
the needs of the child rather than the unfitness of a parent.  In order to appoint a 
guardian, regardless of whether a parent objects,404 the court must find that the 
child meets the definition of “a child in need of guardianship,” and the statute 
defines that term to encompass a wide range of situations in which a parent is 
unable to provide adequate care.405 The Maine Legislature could adopt some 
aspects of this approach in the MPC as well. 
Because a guardianship determination also results in the acquisition of parental 
rights by a non-parent, including those of physical residence, a court must make a 
specific finding, in addition to parental unfitness, that appointment of the petitioner 
as guardian would be in a child’s best interest.406  The Legislature should amend 
the statute to clarify this best interest standard and to incorporate by reference the 
definition of “best interest” found in Title 19-A.407  The “best interest” 
determination is particularly important when a court is faced with competing 
petitions for guardianship of the same child. 
Finally, the Legislature should amend the MPC to require courts appointing 
guardians over the objections of one or both parents to include in its order detailed 
                                                                                                     
Id. § 4002(6).  The statute also sets forth specific definitions for “abuse or neglect” and “abandonment” 
at sections 4002(1) and (1-A), respectively. 
 403.  In some instances, DHHS will file a so-called “straight” child protection petition, without an 
accompanying preliminary protection order, and seek supervision of the child and family while he or she 
remains in the home of one or both parents.  Id. §§ 4032, 4033, 4036(1)(B) (2004 & Supp. 2014). 
 404.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2626, 2627 (Supp. 2014). 
 405.  Id. § 2622(2):(2) “Child in need of guardianship” means: 
(A) A child who the parties consent is in need of adult care because of any one of the 
following: 
 (i) The child's custodial parent has a serious or terminal illness. 
(ii) A custodial parent's physical or mental health prevents the parent from providing 
proper care and supervision for the child. 
 (iii) The child's home is no longer habitable as the result of a natural disaster. 
 (iv) A custodial parent of the child is incarcerated. 
 (v) A custodial parent of the child is on active military duty. 
 (vi) The parties have articulated and agreed to another reason that guardianship is in 
the best interests of the child. 
(B) A child who is: 
 (i) abandoned or abused by the child's parent; 
(ii) without proper parental care, subsistence, education, medical, or other care 
necessary for the child's well-being; or 
 (iii) without or beyond the control of the child's parent. 
 406.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(c) (2012) (“[T]he proposed guardian would provide a living situation 
that is in the best interest of the child.”); id. § 5-207(b) (“[T]he welfare and best interests of the minor 
will be served by the requested appointment.”). 
 407.  19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3) (2012).  Presently, the MPC has its own definition of “best interest of 
the child” at 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-101(1-A) (2012), which, at one time, aligned with that used in other 
parental rights matters under Maine law, but has not been amended to reflect changes to section 1653(3) 
in title 18-A.  See PATLAC Report, supra note 389, at 543 (proposing to define “best interest of minor” 
in minor guardianship statute to incorporate the 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3) definition).  
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findings setting forth the basis for such appointments, as is required in jeopardy 
determinations.408  The Law Court has encouraged probate courts to issue specific 
findings in orders in contested guardianship matters.409  However, not all probate 
courts follow this practice, which can present difficulty both on appeal and in 
subsequent proceedings to modify or terminate guardianship orders. 
Temporary Guardianships.  The MPC sets a fixed limit for temporary 
guardianships at six months.410 In some instances, the family would be better 
served by a longer temporary guardianship (such as to implement a transition plan 
under section 5-213 or some other progressive arrangement).  However, the 
language of the MPC does not grant clear authority to courts to extend temporary 
guardianships or to order successive appointments.411  In the recent opinion in In re 
Guardianship of Johnson, the Law Court noted the restricted authority granted to 
probate courts under the MPC with respect to temporary guardianships.412  The 
Law Court interpreted the present statute to preclude a court from using “serial 
temporary guardianships as stop-gap measures while the petition for permanent 
guardianship is proceeding.”413  However, some probate courts interpret the 
provision to provide courts flexibility to make successive appointments of 
temporary guardians, on agreement of the parties, where the parents object to the 
entry of a permanent guardianship yet the parties agree that the child and parents 
are not yet ready for reunification.414 
To eliminate uncertainty and inconsistency, the MPC should be amended to 
eliminate the confusing and counterproductive temporary-versus-permanent 
guardianship distinction.  Instead, the statute should permit a court to set a specific 
term for a guardianship—which may be short or long—and to extend such term as 
needed, with the goal of addressing the specific circumstances presented including 
the implementation of transitional arrangements under section 5-213.  A court 
should also have authority to enter an interim order if needed to address a child’s 
immediate needs, much like the orders that District Court judges may enter in the 
                                                                                                     
 408.  22 M.R.S.A. § 4035(2)(B) (Supp. 2014) (“The court shall make findings of fact on the record 
upon which the jeopardy determination is made.”). 
 409.  See In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 21, 98 A.3d 1023 (noting that probate 
court’s findings explained the basis of its findings under the statutory requirements); Jewel I, 2010 ME 
17, ¶¶ 12-13, 989 A.2d 726 (indicating the required findings by probate court for entry of guardianship 
over parent’s objection). 
 410.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-207(c) (2012). 
 411.  A probate court has authority to extend a temporary guardianship where one of the parents of 
the minor is “a member of the National Guard or the Reserves of the United States Armed Forces under 
an order to active duty for a period of more than 30 days.” 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-207(c-1) (2012). Under 
certain circumstances, as described in the statute, the temporary guardianship may be extended until 30 
days after the parent is no longer under active duty orders. Id. 
 412.  2014 ME 104, ¶ 17 n.6, 98 A.3d 1023. 
 413.  Id. 
 414.  Mazziotti, supra note 130.  For example, in the Johnson case the Probate Court entered a 
Limited Guardianship Order to implement a transitional arrangement under section 5-213 pursuant to 
the parties’ agreement.  Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 6, 98 A.3d 1023.  The Law Court nonetheless 
interpreted such order as another “temporary guardianship” entered after the expiration of the original 
temporary guardianship order.  Courts and litigants attempting to fashion such orders would greatly 
benefit from more clarity and flexibility with respect to both temporary guardianships and transitional 
arrangements. 
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full range of parental rights proceedings.415 
Additionally, the present language in the MPC does not provide a sufficiently 
stringent notice requirement for temporary guardianships.  The current law not only 
shortens the notice requirement in the UPC to only five days prior to the hearing, 
and does not require notice to anyone whose address or whereabouts are unknown, 
but also allows the court to waive notice on any person—other than the minor child 
if at least fourteen years of age—entirely for “good cause.”416  Given the 
substantial rights at stake in these cases and importance of providing notice to a 
parent before their rights are suspended, the MPC should at least follow the 
language in the UPC417 regarding notice and dispense with granting the court such 
broad discretion. 
b. Scope of Guardianship Order and Process for Review and Modification.   
The MPC sets forth few provisions regarding the scope and effect of 
guardianship orders, and the existing language could be far clearer.  In one 
provision, which applies to guardianships for both minors and adults, “[a] judge 
may appoint a limited guardian with fewer than all of the legal powers and duties 
of a guardian.”418  Another provision applicable only to minor guardianships states: 
“If the court appoints a limited guardian, the court shall specify the duties and 
powers of the guardian . . . and the parental rights and responsibilities retained by 
the parent of the minor.”419  Thus, the MPC is drafted in such a way that a 
guardianship that reserves no rights for the parents is the default, rather than the 
exception.  This approach runs counter to policy objectives of family preservation 
and the engagement—to the maximum extent possible and appropriate—of both 
parents in a child’s life.420  As the Law Court has noted, a guardianship order that 
does not expressly reserve rights in the biological parents “effectively strip[s] the 
parents of their parental rights.”421 
The MPC should provide courts with both clear authority and flexibility to 
                                                                                                     
 415.  See ME. R. CIV. P. 107(a)(1) (allowing courts to enter orders regarding parental rights and 
responsibilities prior to the entry of a final judgment). 
 416.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-207(c).  PATLAC’s 2014 report explained the rationale for departing from 
the UPC’s language on the procedure for temporary guardianships is that the MPC’s approach 
“accommodates prompt disposition and appropriate protections for participants in the context of 
Maine’s part-time Probate Courts.”  PATLAC Report, supra note 389, at 584.  The limitations of the 
present court structure should not drive the policy decisions regarding the due process requirements for 
these important matters.  Indeed, the “service and notice” provisions for the initiation of a preliminary 
protection order in a child protection proceeding are far more stringent than those for temporary 
guardianships.  22 M.R.S.A. § 4033(2) (Supp. 2014) (requiring notice to parents “by any reasonable 
means” unless there is a finding that “[t]he child would suffer serious harm during the time needed to 
notify the parents” or such prior notice would place the child at risk of serious harm). 
 417.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-204(d) (amended 2010). 
 418.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-105 (2012). 
 419.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-204(d) (2012). 
 420.  Cf. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(2)(D)(4) (Supp. 2014) (requiring all parental rights and 
responsibilities orders to include language granting both parents access to records and information 
regarding the minor child unless the court specifically finds that such access in not in the child’s best 
interests or would cause detriment to the other parent and states the reasons for such finding in the 
order). 
 421.  In re Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 15, 98 A.3d 1023. 
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craft guardianship orders that best serve a child’s needs and interests in a particular 
situation by setting forth what specific rights are retained by parents whose rights 
are intact at the time of the guardian’s appointment, including rights of contact, 
involvement in decision-making, and access to records and information about the 
child.422  Courts issuing guardianship orders must also have clear statutory 
authority to set forth specific terms regarding the circumstances of parent-child 
contact, parental education, participation of the child and one or more of the parties 
in counseling (together or separately), as well as other measures designed to 
preserve, support, and enhance the parent-child relationship, to ensure the safety 
and well-being of the children during the pendency of the guardianship, and to 
enable the family to move towards reunification.423  The statute should require 
guardianship orders to spell out a guardian’s powers—and the parents’ 
corresponding retained rights—and reverse the “default” to require courts to make 
specific findings if it does not retain parental rights for a parent, and it should also 
be required to explicitly address the impact of such order on any current rights of 
contact.424  Guardianship orders that include these terms would provide far more 
clarity to the parties regarding their respective rights and responsibilities and would 
provide a foundation for continued parental engagement and potential 
reunification.425 
I would also propose adding a requirement for the guardian to provide regular 
reports regarding the child to the court and the child’s parents—the Vermont statute 
has such provisions—426which would keep the court and parents reasonably 
informed and allow early identification of any problems that may require further 
action of the court.427  This would ensure that a guardian is fulfilling all of her 
                                                                                                     
 422.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2628(b) (Supp. 2014): A guardianship order issued under this 
section shall include provisions addressing the following matters: 
(1) the powers and duties of the guardian consistent with section 2629 of this title; 
(2) the expected duration of the guardianship, if known; 
(3) a family plan on a form approved by the Court Administrator that: 
 (A) in a consensual case is consistent with the parties' agreement; or 
 (B) in a nonconsensual case includes, at a minimum, provisions that address parent-
child contact consistent with section 2630 of this title[.] 
The “family plan” form is available at https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/eforms/PMG61.pdf. 
 423.  Compare 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653 (Supp. 2014) with 22 M.R.S.A. § 4041(1-A) (Supp. 2014). 
With the establishment of “permanency guardians” and a specific provision permitting adoption by the 
same, title 22 now has particularly useful guidance for provisions about parent-child contact.  22 
M.R.S.A. § 4038-C (Supp. 2014). 
 424.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2630(a) (Supp. 2014) (“The Court shall order parent-child contact 
unless it finds that denial of parent-child contact is necessary to protect the physical safety or emotional 
well-being of the child.  Except for good cause shown, the order shall be consistent with any existing 
parent-child contact order.  The order should permit the child to have contact of reasonable duration and 
frequency with the child's siblings, if appropriate.”). 
 425.  Judge Mazziotti notes that his practice is to encourage parties to reach agreement on 
guardianship orders—particularly temporary orders—that preserve some rights for the parent (such as 
contact and access to information) so that the parents have incentives “to turn things around” and the 
guardians understand that they will need to demonstrate an ability to comply with an order for him to 
consider appointing them as permanent guardians.  Mazziotti, supra note 130.  
 426.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2631 (Supp. 2014).  
 427.  The MPC requires conservators to file certain reports and an annual accounting with the court, 
18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 5-418, 5-419 (2012), but has no corresponding requirement for guardians. 
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obligations to the child and that the parents have been able to exercise their rights 
and to be informed of their children’s welfare, and it would enable the court to 
make adjustments to the order as necessary.  The MPC should include clear 
language permitting courts to modify guardianship orders to reflect any changed 
circumstances that arise while the order is in effect, much like parental rights 
orders.428  And, as is the case in District Court parental rights matters, the MPC 
should authorize the court to order the parties to mediate in good faith before 
holding a hearing.429 
The November 2010 Report issued by the Maine Legislature’s Task Force on 
Kinship Families includes similar recommendations for amendments to the MPC’s 
guardianship provisions and to the procedures for such appointments.430  The 2011 
amendment to grant probate courts the authority to order transitional arrangements 
for minors was one of the recommendations, and the only one adopted by the 
Legislature.431  The Task Force also concluded that kinship families would be 
“well-served” by: “guardianship orders that include terms of visitation . . . with the 
child’s parents or other persons[;] . . . guardianship orders that include findings or 
reasons for granting or modifying the guardianship[; and]. . . the increased use of 
mediation prior to contested guardianship hearings.”432 
The minor guardianship law should allow for continued engagement, as 
appropriate, of the child’s parents to preserve the family relationship and to allow 
the guardianship to serve as a foundation for reunification where appropriate.  
Guardianship orders should reflect these policy goals by not only spelling out the 
parties’ rights and responsibilities—thereby ensuring that the rights granted under 
the order can be enforced if necessary—but also by providing guidance for the 
court in any post-appointment proceedings including modification and termination 
of the order.  Maine’s existing family law and child protection laws, which include 
preservation of parent-child relationships among their goals, can provide 
substantial guidance for these revisions. 
As a final note, the Legislature should amend the MPC to reflect the role of 
DHHS in guardianships.  As discussed earlier, while many guardianship petitions 
are filed at the behest of DHHS as part of a “safety plan” to avoid removal of the 
child pursuant to a child protection petition,433 DHHS has no formal role or 
                                                                                                     
 428.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(10) Supp. 2014); 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1657 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
14, § 2630(c) (Supp. 2014).  Such a change was also recommended by Assistant Attorney General 
Janice Stuver in her comments to the Task Force on Kinship Families.  See TASK FORCE ON KINSHIP 
FAMILIES: INTEGRATED ANSWERS TO INFORMATION REQUESTS, at 4 (2010), http://www.maine.gov/ 
legis/opla/kinshipfamResponsesToInfoReq.pdf. In the Clinic’s experience with these matters, we have 
noted that some probate courts in Maine simply do not recognize a “motion to modify” process for a 
guardianship order.  
 429.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 251 (2012) (family matters); 19-A M.R.S.A. § 851(4) (2012) (judicial 
separation); 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(11) (Supp. 2014) (parental rights and responsibilities matters); 19-A 
M.R.S.A. § 1804 (2012) (grandparents visitation matters). 
 430.  124TH MAINE LEGISLATURE, FINAL REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON KINSHIP FAMILIES 7-10 
(November 2010), http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/kinshiprpt.pdf (hereinafter “TASK FORCE ON 
KINSHIP FAMILIES”).  
 431.  18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-213 (2012).  
 432.  TASK FORCE ON KINSHIP FAMILIES, supra note 430, at iii. 
 433.  See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
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responsibilities in the proceeding itself.  While these “private child protection” 
matters can minimize the State’s involvement with a family, it also cuts off 
potential routes to services and support that may be essential for family 
reunification, particularly where poverty limits a parent’s access to treatment, 
transportation, visitation supervisors, and other resources. 
The Vermont guardianship task force noted a similar dynamic in that state,434 
and the new guardianship law requires the state’s Department for Children and 
Families to adopt a specific policy limiting use of guardianships as a resolution for 
investigations of child abuse or neglect.435  Rather, the child welfare caseworker 
may refer a family member to a resource for more information about seeking a 
guardianship, and, where a guardianship has been entered, the caseworker must 
“inform the guardian and the parents about services and supports available to them 
in the community and shall close the case within a reasonable time unless a specific 
safety risk is identified.”436  The Maine Legislature should consider adopting 
similar or other language clarifying the appropriate role of DHHS in guardianship 
matters. 
c. Termination of Guardianships.   
The current MPC could be far clearer regarding termination of guardianships.  
Section 5-210 is titled “Termination of appointment of guardian; general” but 
refers only to automatic terminations or resignations of the guardian, whereas 
section 5-212 is titled “Resignation or removal proceedings” and refers to petitions 
to terminate the guardianship.437  Interestingly, the MPC makes no reference to a 
minor ward’s parents in the guardianship termination provisions, which suggests 
that this provision as well is based on a testamentary appointment (i.e. “orphan”) 
model where the parents have no role in the proceedings after appointment.438 
The simplest approach for reform would be to consolidate these two provisions 
and make further amendments to expressly address the rights of petitioning parents 
who are seeking to recover their rights.  In addition, the statute should reflect the 
requirements and clarifications set forth in Maine Law Court case law requiring 
parents’ petitions to terminate, such as the presumption of parental fitness,439 and 
the requirement in certain circumstances of transitional arrangements.440  The 
Vermont guardianship law provides a detailed description of the procedure and 
analysis for termination cases, which would be consistent with Maine’s current 
approach and provide far better guidance to courts and litigants than the current 
                                                                                                     
 434.  ACT 56 MINOR GUARDIANSHIP COMMITTEE, supra note 392, at 7–8, 14. 
 435.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2634 (Supp. 2014). 
 436.  Id. § 2634(4). 
 437.  18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 5-210, 5-212 (2012). 
 438.  PATLAC has recommended that MPC consolidate all termination provisions in one section.  
PATLAC Report, supra note 389, at 561-64.  However, it has proposed to move the termination 
provision outside of the minor guardianship law entirely to the “General Provision” that applies to all 
guardianships.  This would cause confusion because certain language that is applicable only to minor 
guardianships.  
 439.  In re Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶ 7, 10 A.3d 684. 
 440.  In re Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶¶ 16–20, 86 A.3d 1197. 
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statute.441 
2. Adoptions, Paternity, and Termination of Parental Rights 
The language of Article IX of the MPC, particularly with respect to 
terminations of parental rights and determinations of paternity, is in need of 
substantial revision.  Foremost, the Legislature must bring the statutory language in 
line with the case law and ensure that it reflects the significant implications for the 
families involved with these cases.  In In re Tobias D., the Law Court noted that 
the paternity aspects of adoption law are quite outdated, such as its lack of 
provision for paternity testing.  The Law Court suggested the probate courts use 
provisions in Title 19-A as helpful guidelines.442  The adoption statute must also 
reflect the development of the jurisprudence of parental rights generally.  As the 
Law Court noted in that opinion: “Through many years of interpretation, we have 
concluded that the procedures, burdens, and standards set out in [Title 22] section 
4055 constitute the means by which the fundamental constitutional right to parent 
is safeguarded.”443 
The MPC should include specific language requiring reunification efforts (or 
waiver of the same) as a prerequisite for a TPR hearing, as is the case in child 
protection cases under Title 22, as well as additional provisions incorporating other 
aspects of Maine’s child protection law. This language would impose an 
affirmative duty on courts overseeing such TPR proceedings to ensure that they 
provide parents a fair opportunity to address their fitness and relationship with their 
children before a court may permanently dissolve those legal bonds.444  Such 
provision would reverse the holding in In re Adoption of L.E., which was based on 
a reading of the current language in the MPC.445 The Law Court noted: “[T]he 
Adoption Act does not incorporate [the Title 22] termination [of parental rights] 
subchapter’s purpose, which is to ‘[a]llow for the termination of parental rights at 
the earliest possible time after rehabilitation and reunification efforts have been 
discontinued and termination is in the best interest of the child.’”446 
As an additional note, now that the Maine Legislature has adopted the Maine 
Parentage Act,447 there may be several provisions in the MPC that it would need to 
amend, including those pertaining to the establishment of paternity.448  In addition, 
the MPA’s clarification of when a court can find a person to be a child’s de facto 
                                                                                                     
 441.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2632 (Supp. 2014). 
 442.  In re Adoption of Tobias D., 2012 ME 45, ¶ 11 nn.7-8, 40 A.3d 990. 
 443.  Id. ¶ 17. 
 444.  See, e.g., 22 M.R.S.A. § 4041 (2004 & Supp. 2014) (setting forth DHHS’s obligations to 
attempt family reunification through as a specific “rehabilitation and reunification plan” and to receive 
court permission to cease such reunification efforts as a prerequisite to petitioning to terminate a 
parent’s rights). 
 445.  In re Adoption of L.E., 2012 ME 127, ¶ 13, 56 A.3d 1234. 
 446.  Id.  In that case, neither parent specifically sought reunification efforts, so the holding of the 
case addresses only the court and petitioners’ lack of an affirmative duty, not a parent’s potential 
entitlement to such efforts if requested. 
 447.  Maine Parentage Act, P.L. 2015, ch. 296 (codified as 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1831–1936 and 
miscellaneous other amendments). 
 448.  See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1861 (2012) (regarding voluntary acknowledgment of paternity). 
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parent449 may decrease the need for many adoptions, such as by step-parents, so 
that there are fewer adoption/TPR cases outside of the child protection context. 
3. Change of Name 
The language of Maine’s name change statute has not changed significantly 
since it was enacted in the 19th century.  As noted above, it employs language 
regarding a parent’s authority to change a minor’s name that does not reflect the 
laws that set such authority—specifically section 1653 in Title 19-A.450  The 
language should be revised to reflect the current notions of “parental rights and 
responsibilities,” and it should also authorize a court to make a name change as part 
of an existing parental rights proceeding, rather than requiring two separate 
proceedings in every case. 
4. Appointment of GALs  
GALs can play an essential role in the parental rights cases discussed in this 
Article.  The MPC also contains a statute regarding GALs but, like the best interest 
of the child language, other provisions in Maine law have developed since its 
enactment so that the MPC’s approach is quite different from that set out in other 
family law statutes.451  Because GALs in cases involving minors—as opposed to 
adult guardianships—perform a similar function and analyze similar, if not 
identical, questions as those appointed in Title 19-A or Title 22 parental rights 
matters, the Legislature should amend the MPC to ensure that the standards and 
requirements for all GALs are consistent.  This will also make it easier to appoint a 
single GAL across multiple proceedings involving the same child. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is an urgent need for reforms to our current system of adjudicating 
parental rights matters in Maine’s probate courts, for the benefit of Maine children 
and families, as well as for the proper administration of justice in Maine.  We must 
acknowledge that these courts are taking an increasingly important role in 
addressing the most acute needs and challenges of families in crisis; this sharply 
differs from their traditional role of ensuring long-term stability for orphans and 
their property, strains their limited resources, and is ultimately unworkable due to 
their adherence to outdated models of court administration.  Maine is falling far 
short of having an effective family justice system and, as a result, it is failing 
Maine families.  The Maine Legislature cannot continue to sit this one out.  It must 
set in motion a plan to overhaul the current court structure and substantive law to 
fulfill its obligation to those families. Although the reforms are already long 
overdue, there is no time to lose. 
                                                                                                     
 449.  Id. 
 450.  See supra notes 204–208 and accompanying text.  19-A M.R.S.A. §§1501(a), 1653 (2012). 
 451.  Compare 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-112 (2012) with 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1507 (2012). 
